Use the link to find out

HOW DEFEAT WAS SNATCHED FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY 25 YEARS AGO
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page13.html

The Egyptian Halls CPO Review Report

1st DECEMBER 2025

How can there be a 2nd CPO without clarifying why the 1996 1st CPO failed?

"You will see from the letter that Mr Souter is concerned at the Council's handling of the transfer of ownership of the remainder of the building to his company. He feels that the Council's actions may be putting the project to repair and restore the building in jeopardy.

"I would be grateful if you could reply direct to Mr Souter outlining the Council's position. Can you also let me have a copy of the response for our records".

First Minster McConnell's Private Secretary 1st May 2004 to GCC's Lord Provost

1) **Was the First Minister told the truth? Unequivocally NO!**
2) **Given GCC failed to disclose a then known contract breach**
3) **That was only disclosed by massive error by GCC 14 years later!**
4) **Surely the Scottish Government is interested some 22 years later?**
5) **Given it's potentially to be asked to approve a 2nd CPO?**
6) **Or will this be a case of GCC- Scot Govt marking each other's homework?**

This Grade A "architectural masterpiece" is under threat. Unless transparency, honesty and accountability are factored in; nearly 30 years since the 1996 1st CPO.

Log to the independent view of Greek Thomsons's Greatest Champion for clarity!
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/The-EgyptianHalls-HeritageLobbying.pdf

Post GCC 5th Feb CPO Review approval; fundamental GCC Knowledge Gaps emerge

Facts Change Opinions – But Opinions Can't Change Facts

- GCC Ignores fundamentally perplexing decisions B@R Register Sept 2000 (25 yrs ago):***"S.Enterprise has withdrawn its grant, Hist Scotland has reduced its; the project is unlikely to proceed."*** **FACT**
- GCC has ignored its own record, **Feb 2002** detailed structural assessment, which reinforced the requirement for the full LBRN to be discharged to reconcile identified public safety issues. **FACT**
- Yet 23 years later, in March 2025, GCC concocts a rationale for a partial Defective Notice, which does not reference that GCC has known for 23 years that public safety issues exist. **FACT**
- GCC openly states it will rescind its own 2008 Conservation Burden due to the specified architect failing to change causal structural and public safety recommendations. **FACT**
- The Conservation Burden is still legally binding and will be founded upon going forward despite GCC seeking to ignore its very existence and its causal legal obligations. **FACT**
- From 1998 to 2025 LBRN costs have increased **X EIGHT** due to accelerating deterioration, with GCC ignoring or discounting detailed, expert Structural Reports 2018/2019/2021 and 2024. **FACT**
- The District Valuer Reports GCC is founding upon for 2019, 2024 and 2025 are materially flawed. Due to misformed briefings or due to the DV inexplicably not implementing RICS Standard Practice. **FACT**
- The DV by not accessing the current, applicable Title Deeds renders all Valuation Commentary, all Repairs Apportionment and the DV's stated negotiation scenarios all materially flawed. **FACT**
- Any back-to-back buyer would have to guarantee funding significant upper-floor valuation. **FACT**
- Any back-to-back buyer would have to guarantee funding Ground Floor Compensation. **FACT**
- Further, it's surmised 99.99% that the "independent valuation" GCC states an offer in excess of that was not progressed is another materially flawed statement. **FACT**
- GCC's contention that USP/USI refused to engage with Ediston is 100% inaccurate given it was Ediston that resiled from an agreed feasibility study in April 2023 without meeting USP/USI. **FACT**
- Scotland's FM intervened directly In May 2004, GCC was asked to explain if its amended CPO approach was causing a title delay. And if so, what was the cause? **FACT**
- Unequivocal on-record proof GCC did not disclose the truth, misrepresented the actual situation and briefed known falsehoods. Let's not overlook Scotland's then First Minister. **FACT**
- If GCC had disclosed the true position from mid-2002 onwards, the Egyptian Halls would have been preserved and returned to commercial sustainability 20+ years ago. **FACT**
- One does wonder if the Egyptian Halls can actually survive what is a 27-year disastrous farrago given the aforementioned and that GCC is unaware of its own public safety advice. **FACT**
- Will GCC and the Scot Govt still be marking each other's homework? **HIGHLY PROBABLE**

USP and USI still remain committed to ensure that every opportunity to ensure the Egyptian Halls are preserved and returned to long-term commercial sustainability is mutually agreed with GCC/Scot Govt

Derek J Souter
For and on behalf of USP Ltd, USI Ltd, and the Standard Security holders

THE EGYPTIAN HALLS CPO REVIEW RESPONSE UPDATED – 01/12/2025

A CONSIDERED RESPONSE: PRE-APPEAL PROCESSES BEING ACTIONED

How GCC "Partners" in 1999 became "Outcasts" in 2025

CONTENTS

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Fundamental Clarification

No one at GCC or HES or any Scot Govt entity is directly to blame for the situation that now has to be reconciled. **Over the past 27 years, USP and USI have liaised with over 100+ DRS/NRS, Building Control Land/Environmental/Legal Officers, HS/HES Officers, Culture, Regeneration, Finance Ministers and Departments and the raft of Heritage bodies**. This response seeks to set out as true a position that can be based on the complex Design, Engineering, Funding issues identified way back as far as 1991, but 34 years on are now working through half-truths, untruths, forgotten facts and studies, errors, mistakes and overlooked factors coming to the fore along with long, strong, sometimes febrile opinions. However, USP, USI and the core investors have to defend their track record, significant investment and professional reputations. Hence, this report has been researched and produced. And to quote a current GCC Officer, that's why ***"we are where we are"!***

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This response to the GCC CPO report, which for significant sections is understandably inaccurate, having been mainly written by Officers who have neither the knowledge nor access to the required reports/studies/correspondence due to significant institutional churn since 1998. All can be proven by the correspondence on file; 95%+ based on GCC-HES-Scot Govt-produced responses, independent studies, reports, appraisals covering structural, architectural, costing, and valuations as per GCC 2010. The CPO Review report was written with scarce reference to the on-record facts. A germane indication of the conflicted, challenging position the Egyptian Halls finds itself in when its future could and should have been secured 25 years ago. Given Scotland's then First Minister took a direct interest and was not informed accurately of why the scheme was being delayed and the true position was withheld.

Neither GCC or HES/GDA should be held solely accountable for the combined public sector errors on record since 1998 and were submerged instead of being reconciled USP and USI do again reinforce here their own willingness to explore reconciliation options now: mediation and arbitration (advisory or binding) as opposed to all parties enduring another five years or more of legal and political impasse. To achieve this, we must first recognize the report does not approach reaching the benchmark defined in the House of Lords ruling: ***https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/50.html***. This gives rise to the two questions at the very heart of this appeal.

- ***Whether the terms on which GCC propose to make the assembled site available to the developer are within the scope of that power?***

- ***Whether GCC took all relevant considerations into account when it decided to exercise the power in this way***

It's a cliché indeed that often the cover-up is worse than the (sic) crime. This in 2000-2004 was, as GCC Legal described it, a "weak on error contract breach". However, this was not disclosed until July 2018. But here's what the cover-up has metamorphosed to become. And somehow GCC believe it's the fault of USP and also now USI it's akin to being fitted up for a crime one did not commit Given this breach was not disclosed until July 2018. Despite USP calling for a CPO Review since 2002, that lobbied FM who was not briefed accurately by GCC, which has caused a now 21-year delay. And then asked for CPO Reviews constantly-consistently has been informed by GCC it's to assess whether another CPO can be promoted. This is despite GCC directly causing the 1996 CPO to fail due to a unilaterally imposed CPO Amendment predicted to cause a few months delay and founded upon materially flawed structural advice, which was then proven to be fundamentally inaccurate!

But the die had been cast oh so wrong. The CPO Amendment was legally irreversible, and it also meant GCC lost Direct control over the conveyance of the Upper Floors titles. And this caused a 12 year delay, which was eventually reconciled by USP as GCC could not. The consequences of this delay in 2004 were £4M, in 2012 £10M, in 2025 £25M+. And somehow GCC believes this was the fault of USP and USI.

A perplexing and obtuse attempt to shift blame caused by local government/ Scot Govt dysfunctionality onto private sector SME's that remarkably GCC is on record praising etc. also FM request and factor in no fewer than four approved Planning Applications have failed, with the Upper Floors lying vacant for 45-plus years, leading to severe structural deterioration. Funding rescindments and ownership complexities have exacerbated the issue. In 1997, £1.335M was allocated for restoration; today, costs exceed £25M. As this document will show, GCC's approach favours adversarial negotiation over collaboration, despite the owners USP and USI's willingness to mediate. Fundamentally why will GCC not engage in mediation when this could reduce costs and delays? Is it because they'll lose out quantum-wise?

CPO Review General and Relevant Points To Consider:

Jan 2025-Feb 2025; GCC; unethical overreach and attempted destabilisation

GCC Officers (DRS/Building Control prior to the 30th of Jan Econ Dev Committee meeting and without any notice to USP) took it upon themselves to enter the Union Street Ground Floor units (No. 84, 88, 96 and 100), asking for details of each tenant's lease, including Rent paid/Repairs obligations as well as spreading rumours and innuendo about a future CPO. Why was this actioned? Who actioned it? And for what express purpose? Appears to be yet another attempt at destabilisation, bullying and harassment par excellence – it's apparently the GCC way but is it the SNP way? Is it the Labour way? Or is this another instance of GCC Councillors being unaware of what's being practised and implemented by GCC staff?

CPO Review Report: General points to consider

Failure to disclose the independent valuation report was both funded and facilitated by GCC based upon earlier GCC-commissioned reports 2016 and 2019 which contained material, unchecked inaccuracies

CPO Review Report Key Omissions to consider:

- Failure to disclose HES advice "*There are some complex issues around Egyptian Halls. Solving those issues will need some creative solutions It needs creative approaches to design and engineering, but also creative approaches to funding. It needs a commitment from all involved to continue to discuss and test a wide range of options"* Feb 2020 "Greek" Thomson Symposium

- Failure to disclose USP offered to re-profile it is acknowledged by GCC "very significant expenditure" so as to reduce significantly the Ground Floor deficit in return for a long-term lease/JV option.

- Failure to disclose USI offered 2010-2014 to loan it's significant valuation and development potential (£3M+) to reduce the Ground Floor deficit in return for a long-term lease/JV option.

- Failure to disclose these USP and USI offers were with the approval of the Standard Security holders, and there were then no obstacles to serious negotiations/mediation to reconcile this.

- Failure to admit/disclose that GCC has not got on record anything like the information held by USP and USI. And if it did, then this CPO Review would not have been needed.

- Failure to disclose GCC-commissioned District Valuers Reports 2016, 2019 and 2024, which would have allowed fundamental inaccuracies to be reconciled. And therefore improving the probability of some certain assumptions, therefore making them more meaningful, and also in parallel ruling out any assumptions that were not founded upon reference to and use of the relevant Deed of Conditions.

- Failed to disclose the single letter from April 2014 from GCC's then Legal Director it believes still reconciles all outstanding issues fails materially to do so. Given it ignores signed statements to the contrary from USP's legal advisors 2015, 2016 and 2017.

- Failed to disclose GCC had refused to assess the proven new issues of materiality it requested were needed to re-assess the failed 1st 1996 CPO. That were disclosed July 2018 when GCC inadvertently communicated it had not disclosed a known contract breach dating back to Dec 1999 to a) Councillors 2002 b) First Minister 2004 d) USP and its lawyers 1999-2018.

- Failed to disclose GCC and USP have legal obligations to adhere to the 2008 Conservation Burden. It's only USP that can rescind this given it's applicable to USP and not the relevant title deeds.

The "alleged" Offer by "the interested party"

- The alleged offer did not meet the requested separate ownership offer criteria. Therefore, it did not meet the required contractual threshold to become an indicative/outline/informal offer.
- Failure to disclose it's not an independent valuation, as it was part funded and facilitated by GCC and based on materially flawed and inaccurate GCC-briefed DV 2016 and 2019 Valuation Reports. Again, further evidence the CPO Review is founded upon untenable information.
- Failure to disclose the (sic) independent valuation does not value the envisaged end use of separate Ground Floor Retail and separate Upper Floors hotel use
- The interested party failed to disclose there was never an offer to purchase the co-owned building
- Failure to disclose the "approach" from an interested party was an offer of potential future payment, non-guaranteed.
- Failure to disclose an offer to pay by some unspecified date out of non-specified and non-guaranteed profits from a venture yet to be funded or delivered with no timescale.
- Failure to disclose the potential "approach" from the interested party was not followed up on four occasions. Instead, it was reported it was the owner who had not actioned this
- Failure to disclose the informal offer was from a non-specified entity and did not also specify what property it was enquiring about
- Failure to disclose the independent valuation was never used as a negotiation tool by The List
- Failure to disclose the alleged offer could then not be in excess of this independent valuation
- Failure to disclose GCC had not carried out the required due diligence of this non-offer
- Failure to clarify The List did not therefore table a competent " commercial offer"
- Failure to clarify if The List was able to disclose this information, given The List had given an undertaking to keep all "conversations confidential"
- Failure to clarify if this commercially sensitive information can be used by a non-authorised parties

Currently Topical Management Theory applied to the Egyptian Halls

https://psychology-spot.com/the-dead-horse-theory/

The *"Dead Horse Theory"* is a satirical metaphor that illustrates how some individuals, institutions, or nations handle obvious, unsolvable problems. Instead of accepting reality, they cling to justifying their actions. The core idea is simple: if you realise you're riding a dead horse, the most sensible thing to do is dismount and move on. However, in practice, the opposite often happens, i.e., take actions such as:

- *Creating committees or task forces to analyse the dead horse problem from every angle. These groups work for months, compile reports, and ultimately conclude the obvious: the horse is dead.*
- *Justifying efforts by comparing the horse to other dead horses, concluding the issue is a lack of training.*
- *Proposing training programmes for the horse, which means increasing the budget.*
- *Redefining the concept of "dead" to convince themselves that the horse still has potential.*
- *Firing the horse's stable hand and hiring someone new, hoping for a different outcome.*
- *Holding meetings to discuss ways to increase the dead horse's speed.*
- *Buying a new saddle for the horse.*
- *Improving the horse's diet, despite it being dead.*
- *Changing the rider instead of addressing the real problem.*

This highlights how people and organisations can look to deny reality, wasting time, resources, and effort on ineffective solutions instead of acknowledging the problem from the start (the 1998 CPO Amendment – contract breach prime example) and making smarter, more effective decisions. Yet GCC/HES/Heritage stakeholders still insist on the (nigh) impossible?

Now let's factor in what we know regarding the Egyptian Halls: since 2000, very difficult choices have been sidelined (**structural, funding, regenerational),** significant opportunities missed, failures to deliver joined-up government and inadvertent misrepresentation. And in addition to the praised significant capital investment made. There is also the significant income earned from Ground Floor shops and intermittent hoarding advertising, which has all been invested on trying to maintain the building, which GCC just wishes to ignore as if admitted there's no CPO Review (all on record). There are seriously challenging decisions to be made if the Egyptian Halls are to be saved, against the backdrop of no interest from private sector investors and developers due to known and proven non-viability.

This project had approved grant funding in **1997** of **£1.5M**. What public sector interventions it needs now would have been quantified by now if the submitted Feasibility Study Sept 2024, which GCC promised a response to within a week but has still to respond formally.

Mysterious Marketing based on District Valuers Reports 2016, 2019, 2024 and 2025 iterations.

We now have GCC's marketing of the Egyptian Halls akin to a single title when GCC knows it's separately owned and valued with separate Repair obligations, and we find out somehow the District Valuer is using an out-of-date Deed of Conditions instead of the current version. Error or deliberate? If it's the former, then fundamental assumptions made by the District Valuer or briefed by GCC have to be reassessed. As this throws into considerable (to say the least) doubt the DV's Valuation scenarios as well as those for negotiations to purchase the separate Ground Floor properties and Upper Floors.

From GCC's Partners Dec 1999 to (sic) Outcasts Jan 2025; the inexorable decline caused by GCC

- Failure to disclose in CPO Report GCC and USP/USD were "partners" as per Dec 1999 CPO Agreement and "*clearing the way* ***for the repair of the building to proceed***."
- Failure to disclose Buildings at Risk Register in Sept 2000: it states, ***"Scottish Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of a grant, and Historic Scotland has reduced its; the project is unlikely to proceed."***
- Failure to disclose, April 2003, GCC stated, ***"The CPO process adopted by the Council in this case involves compensation being determined before the Council can gain a satisfactory title for onward disposal. There is potential for a significant delay in being available for Union Street. I can understand the frustration expressed by Mr Souter. The resolution is not straightforward."***
- Failure to disclose in June 2004 GCC Econ Dev Report that ***"USD re-secured the grant funding from Historic Scotland, which had reduced the offer of grant for the scheme from £990,000 to £250,000. Union Street Properties negotiated the grant offered back up to £930,000 for the revised scheme."***
- Failure to disclose in June 2004 GCC Econ Dev Report – ***"USD also brought about the withdrawal of the objection to the promulgation of the CPO by the upper-floor proprietor of the building."***
- Failure to disclose in July 2010 to the Scot Govt that "*the Council* ***has been working with USP Properties, the owners of the magnificent grade A listed Egyptian Halls building in Union Street, Glasgow, for many years in order to help them bring the building into a single ownership.***
- Failure to disclose between Dec 1999 and July 2010: ***"A considerable amount of correspondence and many meetings, over a prolonged period of time, have already taken place between the developer and his agents, the City Council and Historic Scotland."***
- Failure to disclose in *July 2010* – ***the developer has committed very significant expenditure on bringing the building into a single ownership, on preparing a range of technical and conservation studies, and in completing both option and development appraisals for a variety of potential end uses***.
- Failure to disclose that the Aug 2023 "blight on Union Street" was not created by USP/USI but by GDA/HS/GCC-Scot Govt. And instead blamed erroneously USP and USI via "*Mr Souter"*

CPO Review Report: General points to consider:

- Non-disclosure of highly relevant facts meant Councillors were not briefed effectively, e.g., potential significant Contingent Liabilities circa **£25M** if GCC decided to step in and carry out Urgent Repairs
- Failure to disclose GCC used the binding Deed of Conditions when apportioning LBRN costs for the 1996 CPO and also at the 2006 Lands Tribunal hearing
- Failure to disclose GCC are well aware that when LBRN costs are apportioned, the Ground Floor has a massive deficit and the Upper Floors a decent surplus
- Failure to disclose any back-to-back buyer of either the GF or UF will have to compensate, as per separate compensation claims
- Failure to disclose GCC does the legal case to CPO a property that has no Repairs/LBRN Liability
- Failure to disclose: "*The building is now in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable, which has primarily been caused by the deterioration of the roof and upper floors from continued water ingress over a prolonged period and the fundamental lack of robustness in the structure."*

- Failure to disclose there is *"the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure which could have serious consequences, with the risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings"*.

- Failure to disclose the "early planning" review ignores the dire structural condition as provided since 2009 and recently WRD 1, 2 and 1 & 2 combined from 2019 to 2024

- Failure to disclose it banned USP from contacting GCC after USP revealed GCC had been "economical with the truth" to the "nth degree"

- Failure to clarify GCC and the Scottish Government have defined this as a commercial project but then deny the commercial solution: new Build in 2010 and 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019.

- Failure to disclose strenuous and sincere attempts to engage since 1998, all on record (via **5000**+ emails and **100s** of letters to GCC, Councillors, MSPs, MPs and Scottish Government Ministers)

- Failure to disclose massive attempts by USP to engage re the City Avenues Project since 2017

- Failure to disclose if GCC step in and fund **£1M** or **£5M,** or **£25M** of repairs, it would recharge USP and take a secondary security over the Ground Floor properties but would rank behind the current primary standard security holder

- Failure to disclose determined attempts by USP and USI to engage re Golden Z and how Mackintosh-Thomson Mews could enhance this, if all collaborate as per HES advice

- Failure to confirm USP has spent circa **£700k-£800k** protecting Public Safety since 2008 via the scaffolding, which was upgraded in Dec 2019 by the design/installation of protective platform

- Failure to confirm 75+ parapet feature stones were removed temporarily to protect public safety.

- Failure to disclose there has been a canon of studies, reports, valuations, development appraisals and initiatives which GCC has praised USP for and on record, as well as TMP/Addison Conservation)

- Failure to disclose GCC specified legally TMP as scheme architects to discharge the LBRN via the 2008 Conservation Bond.

- Failure to disclose GCC now wish to ignore expert advice from TMP due to GCC being unwilling/unable to accept this.

- Failure to disclose GCC cannot summarily rescind the 2008 Conservation Bond without justification

- Failure to confirm that, if the scaffolding cannot continue to be funded, it will be removed, and the Egyptian Halls will likely immediately become a Dangerous Building

- Failure to confirm expert conservation accredited structural studies (2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 and 2024) state the Scaffolding cannot be removed until the 1991 LBRN is discharged

- Failure to clarify Nobody from USP or USI has ever met anyone from Ediston to discuss the Egyptian Halls; in fact, an Ediston via Shepherd Surveyors was approached mid-2019 via email but declined.

- Failure to confirm advice since Dec 2019: the structure is prone to progressive collapse.

- Failure to disclose that the scaffolding requires to be upgraded to allow access and potential repairs. This would have been funded from the now rescinded Ad Hoarding income

- Failure to confirm all Ad Hoarding income has been spent on scheme costs. And no dividends have ever been paid to the investors 1998-2024

- Failure to assess on file Development Appraisals from 2008-2019 (2012 example is very prescient) showing then significant and always increasing Ground Floors deficits

- Failure to assess on file Development Appraisals from 2008-2019 (the 2012 example is very prescient) showing positive Upper Floors surpluses.

- Failure to disclose the independent valuation report was "facilitated" by GCC based upon earlier GCC-commissioned reports 2016 and 2019 which contained material, unchecked inaccuracies

- Failure to use/reference applicable Rateable Values as defined by GCC NDR/Scottish Assessors.

GCC and Public Sector Non-Disclosed Facts circa Dec 1999-2007

- Failure to disclose 1996 CPO was of the Upper Floors in collaboration with the Ground Floor consortium founded upon Repairs Apportionment based on Deed of Conditions

- No acknowledgement of Non-Viability stretching back to 1997 when a £1.335M grant was awarded

- Failure to reference the fact four approved schemes had failed due to public sector errors and mistakes

- No reference to the fact GCC's CPO Amendment caused a 12-year delay when it was predicted to delay the 1997 scheme by a "few months"

- No reference to the CPO Amendment then meant GCC lost direct control of the CPO process

- No reference to the fact the CPO Amendment was actioned based on an inaccurate structural assessment and therefore was never needed.

- No reference to GCC left behind a massive Repairs negative legacy 2010 that it noted way back in 2002 required to be undertaken immediately.

- No reference to GCC being liable for all Repairs 1996-2010 under the CPO T&C's.

- No reference to GCC admitting that it was liable for all repairs/maintenance in their Jan 2003 Eco Dev Report. Yet claimed in 2019 it's exempt from these due to never taking title to the Upper Floors.

- No reference to the 1991 Listed Building Repairs Notice, which is legally non-variable

- No reference to the unilaterally imposed Jan 1998 CPO Amendment, which was predicted to delay the then scheme by only a few months (now 27 years)

- No reference to the CPO Appeal by the former owners in 1997 that stalled the scheme

- No reference to the Dec 1999 CPO Agreement where USD (USP) became GCC's CPO "partners" and set a 30-month timescale to start/complete the brilliant 100% Conservation scheme.

- No reference to GDA and HS grant rescindments Dec 2000: ***"scheme will very likely not progress"***, as per Buildings at Risk Register

- No reference to the fact that GCC DRS/Legal knew it had breached the Dec 1999 Agreement between the parties and June 2002 but decided not to disclose.

- No reference to GCC's CPO Amendment, causing GCC to lose direct control of the 1996 CPO conveyance after USP securing the dropping of the CPO Appeal

- No reference to the fact GCC knew June 2002 the approved Year 2000 scheme could not progress as GCC could not convey the Upper Floors as its CPO Amendment now prevented this

- No reference to the fact this was not disclosed in 2002 to GCC Councillors by DRS/Legal nor any analysis provided to assess the options. given the predicted few-month delay was now 10 times that

- No reference to the fact this committee was not advised of potential financial consequences, if this known contract breach was disclosed to USP

- No reference to the fact that non-disclosure to Councillors and USP was an egregious ethical breach, and that in July 2018 GCC conceded USP did have a point regarding this contract breach

- No reference to GCC admitting April 2003 its CPO Amendment would delay any scheme and there was no timescale for resolution and GCC agreed this was "very frustrating" for USP

- No reference to GCC's DRS's non-disclosure in April 2004 to its then Lord Provost of the reasons for scheme delays when asked by the then First Minister McConnell

- No reference to USP/Derek Souter GCC Econ Dev Report June 2004 "driving force" behind the CPO Appeal, HS grant rescindment being overturned, the dropping of the 1997 CPO Appeal, etc.

- No reference to GCC's CPO Amendment causing GCC to lose direct control of the 1996 CPO conveyance post USP securing the dropping of the CPO Appeal

- No reference to the fact all proposed CPO Amendments have now to be agreed with the Scottish Government

- No reference to the fact a £10k Compensation claim became £2M as direct consequence of GCC's CPO Amendment

- No reference to in 2005 USP negotiating and funding payment to purchase 50% of the seven separate Upper Floors properties

GCC and Public Sector Non-Disclosed Facts, circa Dec 2008-2016

- Failure to disclose GCC have been aware since 2008 that the Upper Floors have a significant development surplus. Any new CPO will require legally to respect this

- Failure to disclose GCC have been aware since 2008 that the Upper Floors has been prevented from developing its commercial assets due to a Ground Floor LBRN discharge deficit

- No reference to USP in 2008, after the Lands Tribunal decision, reconciling and funding the payment to see the 50% balance of the Upper Floors title transferred to it

- No reference to the existence of the 2008 legally binding Conservation Burden, which specifies TMP as scheme architect and commits to the discharge of the LBRN

- No reference to GCC's Jan 2010 on record acknowledgment that USP had reconciled the title conveyance/availability impasse that predicted to cause a few months' delay Jan 1998 (12 years)

- Failure to confirm USP and USI asked GCC and the Scottish Government to consider the potential for TIF finance 2010 in an attempt to bridge the Ground Floor deficit

- No reference to GCC's July 2010 praise of USP for considerable investment on scheme activities, site acquisition, studies, reports, and CPO compensation in correspondence to the Scottish Government

- No reference to June 2010 GCC Econ Dev Report, which states, "There *is therefore no prospect of the project proceeding without external funding support.*"

- Failure to reference GCC also stated: "*We have now reached a very critical stage in these discussions whereby there is a clear, but very time-limited, opportunity to secure the development. The challenges to do so remain formidable.*"

- Failure to explain why 15 years later all these ***formidable challenges*** are the responsibility of USP

- Failure to reference that the Scot Government refused the *"extraordinary funding"* request in 2010

- Failure to reference four Culture Ministers have refused site tours. One went to Abbotsford House in mid 2010, which got **£8.5M** for a massively inferior heritage/conservation/regeneration/job creation scheme, and stated Abbotsford House was decidedly different; hence, it deserved this funding

- No reference to Aug 2010 HS Head of Grants Martin Fairley stating, *"However, I have made my position clear: the project as it stands is non-viable."*

- No reference to GCC firstly supporting strongly in 2014 a £5M HLF application and then with HES torpedoing this mid-2015, achieved when both met the HLF separately without informing USP

- No reference to the fact Feb 2016, GCC (and HES) were submitted a New Build option founded upon non-viability, accelerating deterioration, zero grant funding; Zero Engagement by GCC (and HES)

- No reference to the fact USI Upper Floor owners were to combine to fund the Ground Floor deficit (circa £3M) with BPRA funding and an HES grant to see the approved 2013 scheme be implemented

- No reference to the fact GCC then failed to part-fund their agreed gap funding contribution Feb 2013 when they had to (this was "agreed" pre-application mid-2011)

- Failure to disclose a four-storey extension would have reconciled the deficit in 2013 when only two storeys were approved because four storeys affected the Lighthouse viewing tower

- Failure to disclose two storeys were approved despite GCC knowing this increased the gap funding GCC had committed to and would also hold up Union Street's then long-delayed regeneration

GCC and Public Sector Non-Disclosed Facts, Dec 2017-2024

- No use of the actual title deeds for the constituent GF properties No 84, 88, 96, 100 and No. 92-U.Floors has been made by the DV. Is that their error, or did GCC fail to brief this accurately?

- Therefore no reference to the change in 2018 – the Upper Floors Rateable Values Jan to zero means the GF properties are due 100% of LBRN Repairs, yet 2019, 2024 and 2025 reports don't factor this in.

- No reference to the fact this was caused by GCC asking for the LBRN repairs apportionment formula using fixed rateable %. It should be amended to allow for current Rateable %.

- No reference to the fact this was communicated by legal letter to GCC Nov 2019

- No reference to GCC's failure to disclose a Dec 1999 CPO contract breach from then until July 2018

- No reference to GCC conceding July 2018. USP ***did have a point*** relating this inadvertently disclosed (weak on error) Contract breach. And it was weak back in Dec 1999 but then accelerated furiously.

- No reference to GCC, then threatening to sue USP for disclosing publicly the now admitted fact GCC had known of a contract breach but had not disclosed this to a host of connected stakeholders
- No reference to GCC failing to discharge a duty of accountability regarding its catalogue of errors, mistakes and misrepresentations.
- Failure to disclose The Scottish Government has been recommending Business Plans 2017-2025, not another CPO!
- Failure to disclose Scot Government has insisted the legacy issues would be counterproductive to revisit/review 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 (all on record).
- Failure to disclose, despite expert advice since 2015 from GCC's Conservation Bond architect, that Repairing the Façade in isolation will not see scaffolding removed due public safety risk
- No reference to Feb 2016 and April 2019. GCC (and HES) were submitted New Build options citing non-viability, accelerating deterioration, zero grant funding; Zero Engagement from GCC (and HES)
- No reference to the fact USP and USI has been offering GCC and HES private and confidential, without liability discussions to deliver a mutually agreed solution
- No reference to the fact GCC and Ediston were to work with USP and USI early 2023 on feasibility study for Mackintosh-Thomson Mews then resiled from this

Yet more Prima Facie Non Engagement by GCC Jan 2025-October 2025

As this response to GCC's unilateral decision to seek a 2nd CPO is based upon ignoring how it and causal Scottish Govt agencies combined to derail the 1996 CPO, causing its failure. More inconsistencies, misrepresentations and non-collaborations have been uncovered. And an incredibly pertinent example is the non-provision of GCC DV Valuation Reports 2016-2024 to USP/USI. Whilst in parallel USP/USI were providing GCC with (praised) Development Appraisals (1999 onwards) and specifically 2008, 2009, 2010, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and the draft version of 2024.

Remarkably, this only came to the fore July 2025 when GCC provided the 2025 report. Which referenced the existence of the previous reports. As one has come to expect, these reports are updates, and therefore these have more than a few errors, some massively germane, which lead to assumptions, which are then rendered at best challenging at worst untenable, e.g., **a)** using obsolete Deed of Conditions; **b)** separate ownership is not applied; **c)** out-of-date Rateable Values are used; **d)** Repairs Apportionment is 100% inaccurate; **e)** actual estimated Ground Floor deficit is underrated; **f)** actual Upper Floors surplus is ignored; and **g)** legally binding Conservation Burden is not referenced.

How can USP engage effectively when GCC has not been engaging but has been with like-minded heritage bodies who've minimal knowledge and ZERO investment? And if the 2019 GCC-DV Report had been provided, the aforementioned issue would have been raised and assessed, and the aforementioned either accepted or not? GCC for the record, is required to overturn the 2017 Deed of Conditions by scoping and winning a Court of Session case that would rewrite commercial property case law. GCC has no locus over how the co-owners regulate and apportion various obligations that arise. And the DV is on record stating to be using the "historic deed of Conditions". The fact they're using the wrong version one would surmise, be the foundation of a stateable case to rewrite commercial property law

There have been any instances of people seeking to challenge a registered deed of conditions or other deed imposing title conditions, or to have its terms varied by the Lands Tribunal – invariably a challenge would be by an existing or new owner of part of the larger entity that is affected by the deed of conditions. Given the only parties burdened by the two deeds in question in your case are USP & USI it is difficult to see any problem on this front… **Ken Gerber Anderson Strathern May 2021**
GCC can only apportion costs/repair Notices to the overall building. Currently USP and USI are not instructed to vary this from the core investors of both companies. And given this GCC, via their CPO Review can't deliver a watertight back to back buyer, so it won't progress to Scottish Govt submission as seamlessly as was believed! Hence GCC's evolving position and the potential 2nd CPO Review becoming, as Councillor Kelly commented, mired in legally separate USP and USI/GCC-Scot Govt issues.

- ***"CPOs can be lengthy and complex legal processes but this would be the first major step towards the repair and reuse of this beautiful building, bringing part of Glasgow's heritage back into city life, with so many positive impacts for our city centre."***

- ***Expect the council to use a Compulsory Purchase Order should a "credible" proposal come in and then "transfer it to that organisation" along with £150,000, according to reports. He added that the council's priority is "positive movement" for the Egyptian Halls.***

- ***It's a complex process, and there's no timeline for when it might be concluded.*** Ongoing revision once cognisance is being taken of four failed planning approvals and what caused them

Combined Public Sector Track Record Of Failure

- Caused the 1996 CPO to fail due to a unilaterally imposed CPO Amendment
- Caused the Upper Floors "few months" title transfer delay 1998 to take 12 years to 2010
- Caused the 100% Conservation Year 2000 scheme to fail
- Failed (on record) to disclose known contract breach to Councillors
- Failed to alert (on record) Councillors of potential legal liabilities caused by breach
- Caused the re-approved in 2005 100% Conservation Year 2000 scheme to fail
- Caused massively non-viability to occur due to Upper Floors title non-availability
- Caused unchecked and accelerating deterioration to occur due to title unavailability
- Failed to initiate and develop a planned maintenance programme 1996-2010
- Conspired (GCC/HES) to derail potential £5M HLF grant funding
- Created the environment that could see it defined as a dangerous building
- Created the environment that means scaffolding has be in place to protect public safety
- Created the potential for demolition if scaffolding is removed before LBRN discharge
- Continue to ignore expert advice/studies from USP's architects/structural engineers
- Continue to ignore expert advice/studies from GCC-specified architects
- Continue to attempt to ignore legally binding Commercial Property Law

GCC's propaganda machine goes into overdrive

Now one of the central tenets of propaganda is to blame others for what you caused yourself; GCC expertise in this comes to the fore

And for the record, here are cast-iron-proven non-strategic and significantly contributory actions by GCC, then GDA/Historic Scotland, then GCC that caused this entirely and are all on record but just ignored?

1. 1997 GCC – inaccurate structural assessment led to Feb 1998 CPO Amendment; non-reversible and disastrous, as a predicted few months' delay caused a 12-year delay, now approaching 28 years

2. 1998 GDA grant rescindment, as GDA could not carry approved grant over (perplexing and disastrous) year to year; the essence of a bureaucratic decision-making process

3. 2000 HS – Head of Grants states Union Street Office Rents should be same as St Vincent Street (bizarre, perplexing and disastrous)

4. 2004 First Minister-was vvv interested but GCC does not tell the truth and/or disclose a known contract breach

5. 2008 Scot Govt onwards; not interested as per correspondence to Fabiana, Rusell, Hyslop by all stakeholders; GCC, MSP's, USP-USI

- **Aug 2023** *the dilapidated building is a barrier to the regeneration of Union Street. "The Egyptian Halls has been the biggest barrier for us being able to do anything with Union Street."* ***It's a blight on the street, and it has been allowed to get into that condition***.
  *"We would be willing to have further discussions with Mr Souter and his Planning agent in Savills****, but we would note that we are very keen as a city to progress with plans for this important building which are feasible and have a realistic chance of being delivered*** *but so far discussions with Mr Souter have not produced this."*

- Obviously written without knowledge of the known condition since 1991 and GCC's Feb 2002 structural appraisal Over to GCC to clarify if this is an error or premeditated?

- **So, we would welcome GCC's tenable explanation of how USP and latterly USI contributed in any way to the creation of the aforementioned.** And which has led to none of the approved schemes progressing to delivery; any of them would have seen the scaffolding removed 25 years ago and certainly 15 years ago.

- And the acknowledged Benefits that would have been delivered; Job Creation, Regeneration. And of course, we also have on file GCC's unstinting praise of USP Dec 1999 to April 2014.

  And here's the independent, expert opinion from Greek Thomson's greatest champion. **So let's ask GCC Officers and Councillors and maybe even the Scottish Govt to read what is a passionate but erudite assessment of their combined, catalogue of chronological failures titled *A National Scandal in Slow Motion: 45 Years and Counting!***

  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/The-EgyptianHalls-HeritageLobbying.pdf

- Given the GCC approach from 2015 onwards, it's very apparent some, many at GCC, do believe this is all USP and USI's fault. Despite the existence and reinforcement of the actual evidence, the then key Officers who've failed to disclose the true position from 2002 onwards have left behind a massively pernicious, toxic cultural and financial legacy**.** Further reinforcement of Councillor Kelly ***it's a complex process and there's no timeline for when it might be concluded***

- For sure nobody would believe (once they've actually reviewed the evidence and not just what GCC states it to be) that USP/USI – the investors – have allowed this Grade A architectural masterpiece to fall into disrepair!!!

- And the now uncovered Feb 2002 letter is prima facie proof GCC also believed then the deterioration was serious indeed nearly 24 years ago and that the LBRN had to be discharged imminently (24 years ago!!!). So again, how can USP and now also USI be blamed? Has GCC been proven to be negligent by not taking the action it recommends, given it controlled the 1996 CPO?

Given the aforementioned, any claims regarding negligent owners do not hold up to detailed scrutiny.
TO SUMMARISE:

- **USP and USI will raise separate complaints via GCC's review/oversight processes**
- **USP and USI will raise separate complaints with the SPSPO**
- **USP and USI will raise complaints with all relevant MSPs and the Scottish Government**
- **Legal action will be explored, with full cognisance of *https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/50.html***

2. DETAILED EXAMINATION OF REPORT

This response forms the basis for legal challenge due to errors, misrepresentations and omissions. USP/USI remain committed to preserving this architectural masterpiece, which should have driven Union Street's regeneration in 2000 or 2012-2013. They seek to work with GCC and potential developers to resolve commercial viability issues, as previous funding was withdrawn at the last minute twice.

The CPO Feasibility Report is flawed and misrepresents years of public sector failures, attempting to shift blame onto USP and also USI (which has no Repairs Liability). It appears GCC and their new partners aim to seize the building at a low cost despite previously recognising USP's major financial contributions.

One could surmise GCC and their new "partners" are attempting to engage in a process of clandestine appropriation to somehow squirrel away the building from investors at a price that does not reflect the true scale and scope and timescale involved, despite GCC being on record praising USP's "very significant expenditure" and scheme development activities from 1998 to 2025.

Additional Context and Background 1998-2025

The following sets out the key parameters stakeholders require to be cognisant of to assess these effectively and at last begin to develop what would be the FIFTH planning Application. And which have been singularly ignored by GCC, as GCC could not write this report if this had been taken account of. And e.g. here's perhaps the leading contender for the most dysfunctional decision *a)* **refusing Demolition despite non viability being proven and then agreed by both GCC and HS mid 2010. Then both GCC and HS promoted the potential to scope an application that would be funded and then when 100% Conservation based 2012-2013 application was approved GCC failed to part fund it's agreed share**

Union Street should have been regenerated 15-25 years ago. And now in 2024-2025, the Scot Govt keeps asking for a Business Plan to be created. GCC called for this in the media in Aug 2023; it is both perplexing in the extreme and also on record stating schemes are non-viable. And today GCC are wholly confrontational and unwilling/unable to accept there are consequences accruing from historic failures.

The Egyptian Halls FOUR approved but failed Planning Applications – Can there be a FIFTH?

There is unequivocal proof the scheme has been delayed since Year 2000 due to causal legal, grant funding and non-viability issues, which combined to prevent any scheme being delivered

- 1997 - approved (without expert conservation structural advice) and would remove cast iron frame, causing collapse. A CPO Appeal was then made, prompting a CPO Amendment.

- 2000 - brilliant 100% Conservation scheme, CPO appeal reconciled. What could go wrong? GDA/HS rescinded grants, derailing the scheme and payoff for former owners.

- 2005 – Reapproval of Year 2000 scheme, held up before and for next 7 years by CPO Amendment's non-predicted consequences

- 2013 - CPO Title issues reconciled by USP, 100% Conservation scheme approved, which was agreed to be funded pre-application. GCC/HES then failed to fund (on record)

Ownership/Investment

- Ground Floors are owned by USP Ltd but controlled by the Standard Security holders
- Upper Floors are owned by USI Ltd but controlled by the Standard Security holders
- Note USI has no legal obligation to cross-subsidise USP!
- Note GCC is on record stating USP has committed a ***very significant expenditure***

Development Appraisals Deficit Reduction Factors

- Since 1997 Grant funding has been a pivotal component due to proven non-viability.
- Last Dev Apps (2019) – Massive Ground Floor deficit and decent Upper Floor surplus
- Fundamentals that would change are a) more storeys Upper Floors, b) increased costs
- Any Upper Floors valuation uplift is attributed solely to the USI, as it owns the Upper Floors.
- The oft-requested merged title was offered 2010-2015 but was rejected by GCC and HES
- Remarkably in 2015 GCC and HES met the HLF and briefed no grant funding was on offer when a **£5M** grant was being applied for. Note: GCC-HES did not discuss this with USP-USI
- Note GCC 9th July 2024 reinforced this was a Commercial Project being developed by commercial companies, e.g., a 14-15 storeys NEW BUILD for PBSA (Student Accom).

A New CPO; Contentious, Controversial and Would Trigger a Review of Why the 1996 CPO Failed.

- What would GCC's rationale for this be? What would actually be CPO'd?
- USI – Upper Floors have no LBRN liability, so they should not be part of any potential CPO
- USI – offered a **£3M** subsidy 2012-2013, but GCC failed to provide its promised **£3M** gap funding
- USP has a 100% LBRN Liability. GCC would require a back buyer for Ground Floor deficit.
- This would also require for Scot Govt to review why the 1996 CPO failed.
- A reversal of its current position, which ask for business plans for the Feasibility Study proposed.
- **Plus USP has been calling for a CPO Review since 2002 – all on record!!!**

Conservation Burden

- GCC created the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden, which both GCC and USP signed
- GCC can't amend the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden; it has no locus to do this
- USP can amend the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden by application to the Lands Tribunal
- Deed of Conservation Burden specifies TMP as the architect to discharge the 1991 LBRN
- GCC wishes to ignore the Burden as the TMP/WRD provided expert advice, GCC refuses to accept.
- Conjecture: GCC is ignoring what was designed to preserve a Grade A architectural masterpiece because GCC cannot accept conservation structural/architectural advice from it specified experts.

Statutory Notice Primacy/Deed of Conditions

- LBRN served on building 1991; circa 10 ownership interests
- Now reduced to single ownership then co-ownership co-ordinated by common investors
- Neither USP nor GCC can't vary the legally non-variable 1991 LBRN (on record from GCC)
- USP is 100% liable when Deed of Conditions is applied for Statutory Repairs
- USI has Zero liability when Deed of Conditions is applied for Statutory Repairs

1996 CPO Failure

- Failed when GDA and H. Scot derailed the brilliant Year 2000 100% Conservation scheme
- Failed again due to a GCC unilaterally imposed believed to be vvv minor CPO Amendment Feb 1998 predicted to cause a ***"few months delay"***
- USP reconciled what then became a **12-year legal impasse**; GCC failed to disclose why this was!
- GCC on record praising USP for this and its causal development activities/investment

Defective Notice Option

- Would it conflict with the incumbent, legally non-variable 1991 LBRN
- Was discussed in detail 2016 and 2019 (on file) and not progressed
- If GCC served a Defective Notice, USP would appeal, citing GCC's role in causing deterioration.
- GCC could step in and remedy what it believes needs to be done and be liable for this.
- Any then GCC expenditure claims would rank behind the SS holders for payment

Historic Maintenance

- GCC did not carry out any programme of Maintenance 1996-2010 as per its legally binding 1996 CPO obligations. So from 1980-2010 (30 years), very limited Repairs/Maintenance
- GCC in 2019 via an FOI request denied it had any obligations due to never owning the Upper Floors, a claim that is untenable when assessed against the 1996 CPO T&Cs.
- Since 2010 USP has carried out limited Maintenance since July 2023, Budget been cut massively
- GCC rescinded the Ad Hoarding income based on internal opinion whilst ignoring the advice of its own specified architect **FACT!**
- Scaffolding is protecting public safety and costs £50k p.a.
- Temp Works at the request of Building Control were scoped/cost and presented Sept 2022; no response or requests for clarification were made by GCC

Scaffolding Removal without discharging 1991 LBRN

- Deed of Con Architect-TMP on record many times stating Scaffolding cannot be removed
- Skim from 2016 ***https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/news/14285327.warning-over-calls-for-egyptian-halls-facade-to-come down/***
- March 2016 Kidstons letter details what action USP would take if GCC actioned this
- USI would have also then taken separate legal action to protect its property.
- WRD state similar that the Scaffolding cannot be removed 2019-2024 WRD 1, 2 and 3
- Both cite It's protecting Public safety and is ***"approved building/construction works"***
- Feb 2016 GCC states: ***'the Council acknowledges that George Morrison and John Addison have considerable experience, expertise and knowledge of this building.'***
- All on record and available for GCC to assess

Proven Non-Viability

Sept 2000: Buildings at Risk Register states Scottish Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of grant aid and Historic Scotland has reduced its; the project is unlikely to proceed So what part did USP have in creating this? Note GCC on record praising USP for getting the HS grant restored. GCC despite its scale, contacts, heft, did not achieve same for GDA grant. And has never ever taken GDA and HS to task to explain why they derailed this massively important Conservation/Regeneration project from 1996 onwards (yep, there was also a first CPO which GCC appears to believe can be).

April 2003: E.Times article briefed by GCC DRS: "The CPO process adopted by the Council in this case involves compensation being determined before the Council can gain a satisfactory title for onwards disposal. There is potential for significant delay in being available for Union Street. I can understand the frustration expressed by Mr Souter The resolution is not straightforward. Jings unerringly accurate took from 1998-2010 and GCC failed of course and it was USP who reconciled this; again, on record.

Jun 2010: The GCC Econ Dev Report states, "There is therefore no prospect of the project proceeding without external funding support." Again, proof on file that GCC and also HES never engaged on any serious discussions centring on deficit reduction. Just the usual narrative of blaming the private sector owners. My personal opinion is GCC dislikes private sector investors who don't toe the GCC line.

Aug 2010: HS Head of Grants Martin Fairley - "However, I have made my position clear: the project as it stands is not viable." Again, proof on file that GCC and also HES never engaged on any serious discussions centring on deficit reduction. Just the usual narrative of blaming the private sector owners. My personal opinion is that the GCC dislikes private sector investors who don't toe the GCC line.

In May 2015, Bailie Cameron in a letter to Shadow Culture Minister Baker *"As the property recession took hold the project became unviable."* So GCC is highlighting this impact and is NOT blaming the Egyptian Halls owners. Unlike now, a decade later, it's now alleging, based on discounting all evidence it's been provided, that it apparently does not the depth of files USP has to hand.

March 2018 GCC Scot on Sunday: "And *it may be better – rather than returning to issues from the late 1990s – that the building owners join with us in a co-operative manner to ensure the preservation and regeneration of this historic building*. Seven years+ later USP and USI are still waiting for GCC.

Aug 2020 legal opinion: USP has received a 2nd CPO attempt. *GCC could, of course, seek to promote a new CPO, and in such a CPO GCC might seek to include a direction for minimum compensation (for this **GCC has to be satisfied that listed building deliberately been allowed to fall into disrepair for the purposes of justifying demolition and development or redevelopment of the site or any adjoining site** – see S45 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) (Scotland) Act 1997). GCC before embarking on consideration of a proposed CPO would, presumably, look at its exposure including compensation – I suspect GCC could not even afford the value of minimum compensation, never mind (market value) compensation – and usually would not embark upon promoting this CPO unless it had a "back-to-back" agreement with a prospective developer*.

Surely GCC can't seriously believe it can in an open court blame USP and latterly USI for the aforementioned local Govt/Scottish Government

Onerous Financial Costs of Protecting Public Safety for 17 years

- USP's asset value declined from circa **£3M** to negative- **£15M** due to public sector incompetence
- Scaffolding is protecting public safety and costs **£50k** p.a.
- **£700k** has been spent on Scaffolding/Electricity since 2008 an
- USP has lost circa **£1.6M** in Rental income due to the presence of the Scaffolding.
- Over the period **£1.5M** of Ad Hoarding income came in, so overall down **£800k!**
- GCC has cut the USP/USI working capital budget by **£250k** since Aug 2023 and currently remains to be convinced that the budget should be restored.
- The Scaffolding costs cannot be maintained indefinitely by a commercial company, which in 27 years has not had 1 penny of grant support.

AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE THE USE OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE POWERS (CPO) AND TO SEEK A DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR EGYPTIAN HALLS

Purpose of the report: To seek committee authority to investigate the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls), including approval to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property and devise an appropriate bid process, including selection and evaluation criteria, to assess proposals.

It should be noted that GCC have approved four previous applications, and they, along with public sector partners, managed to derail all four – quite an embarrassing track record of failure by any stretch of the imagination. The Egyptian Halls, designed by Alexander 'Greek' Thomson in 1873, have suffered 45 years of neglect. The Upper Floors have been vacant since 1980. GCC and ground-floor tenants initiated a 1996 CPO due to ownership disputes. USP joined the consortium in 1999, but unresolved issues led to a legally irreversible CPO Amendment, delaying title transfer for 12 years. GCC projected only a few months' delay in 1998 but failed to disclose this key information to USP until 2014. A 2002 GCC report revealed plans to break their partnership with USD while hiding contract breaches that could have led to damages. The Year 2000 plan could have saved the Halls for **£4.5M-£5M**, preventing further decline and ensuring Union Street's regeneration. Instead, GCC's mismanagement caused delays, with vital repairs neglected despite their CPO obligations.

From 1996-2010, GCC admitted on record inaction was inevitable due to title uncertainties. And GCC is now somehow attempting to shift blame onto USP for 45 years of neglect, 30 of which predate USP's involvement. GCC has also cut USP's income by 80% over the past 18 months while failing to offer grant funding. Repairs remain subject to GCC Conservation Architect approval. In July 2024, GCC NRS confirm there is no grant funding available, and in their opinion, the Egyptian Halls Development Project is a private one, being undertaken by private companies. Therefore, the co-owners logically are entitled to a commensurate commercial return. Further, the fact that both grant rescindments and title transfer delays created this non-fundable non-viability as long ago as 2008 – this non-viability will shortly be re-confirmed for assessment/analysis.

It is recommended that Members: *Consider the contents of the report.*

They must also realise that, as it stands, the owners have the right to challenge the report contents as per these amendments and causal support documents, while the actual claimed offer breaches the embryonic working arrangement between The List and USP and USI.

Approve the investigation of the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls), including approval to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse
They must also realise that, as it stands, the owners have the right to appeal this decision.

i *Authorises the Executive Director of Neighbourhoods, Regeneration and Sustainability, in consultation with the Director of Legal and Administration, to approve a development brief and selection and evaluation criteria for the development proposals, including departures from the relevant CPO Framework where necessary or expedient, with the recommended proposal being reported to a further committee for approval.*

They must also realise that, as it stands, the owners have the right to ensure GCC follows established Commercial Property Law, that the 1991 LBRN is non-variable and that GCC put in place a Conservation Burden in 2008 that binds both GCC and USP to discharge this fully – however, USP has the sole right to seek a rescindment, should this be required.

ii *Authorise officers to appoint agents to act on the Council's behalf, if required.*

iii GCC must also openly and honestly assess the role and contribution of themselves across all aspects and also that of other public sector bodies – HS/HES, GDA – in creating the situation now faced.

Important Project Development/Implementation Considerations:

No commercial entity can discharge the 1991 LBRN due to the Fact proven non-viability proven by the fact that four schemes since 1996 have failed. So what caused them to fail? (**Note the now disclosed DV Reports 2016, 2019, 2024 and now 2025 all agree this is unequivocally factual.)**

1) The 1997 scheme was approved based on an inaccurate structural assessment by GCC and HS.

2) The Year 2000 100% Conservation Scheme was derailed by the first GDA and HS on record, then held up for 12 years due to GCC's CPO Amendment. Both GCC and HES are on record stating non-viability in mid-2010. So how can it be viable 15 years later?

3) The envisaged scheme by GCC's "New Partners" is a carbon copy of the approved 2013 scheme: a 150-room Hotel: Upper Floors and Bars and Restaurants and a Food Court- Ground Floors. If that did not happen due to GCC failing to honour their pre-application funding promises as part of a combination of grant and funding sources.

4) How can it be viable today and also structurally achievable given the parlous structural state? Moreover, expert advice based on 27 years of studies and report states it is not possible to remove the scaffolding until discharge of the 1991 LBRN/2008 Conservation Burden.

This means the City Plan/Avenues Project/Golden Z Initiative are held up, and all schemes have been for 25 years. None of this is the fault of USP or USI. It is still believed there is no single guilty party, despite some deliberate proven efforts to mislead, which have been brushed under the carpet. This independent quote personifies the situation: "***Since Year 2000 difficult choices sidelined, missed opportunities, failures to deliver joined-up government, and inadvertent misrepresentation (all on file). And in addition to the capital investment acknowledged by GCC, the significant income earned from ground floor rents and intermittent Hoarding advertising has also been spent on trying to maintain the building.***"

GCC cannot admit that all Conservation Schemes are non-viable since 1997, and GCC has no budget to fund scheme costs, which increase by **£1.5M** per annum. Meanwhile, GCC engages in performative theatre with a non-proven interested party who won't fund the current **£25M+** needed for their proposal, which ticks all the heritage boxes but is now structurally undeliverable. GCC then seeks to throw the investors and owners below the proverbial bus after praising them for making a "very significant expenditure on three failed applications". In light of the Scot Govts and then GCC's errors, mistakes, misrepresentations and failures to act ethically and in good faith (all on record) but ignored to date, one surmises strongly the writer(s) of this report have not been briefed fully on the complexities and consequences of how such a massive non-viability chasm has been created; that has been known about for 20+ years; the most recent non-collaborative action was by GCC to rescind the Hoarding income – if not, then the Feasibility Study or *"Creative Business Plan"* called for by GCC would be funded already.

It is on file that GCC in instances "***did not disclose the truth"*** (Aug 2023 Herald and Times); GCC statement (out of the blue) reinforces why lobbying has to be repeated and reinforced: *"the dilapidated building is a barrier to the regeneration of Union Street"; "The Egyptian Halls has been the biggest barrier for us being able to do anything with Union Street"; "it's a blight on the street and it has been allowed to get into that condition"; "We would be willing to have further discussions with Mr Souter and his Planning agent in Savills, but we would note that we are very keen as a city to progress with plans for this important building which are feasible and have a realistic chance of being delivered but So far discussions with Mr Souter have not produced this"; "anyone with a creative business plan should get in touch"*.

Contrast the above with the following from March 2018, which is the essence of misleading the public, Councillors and MSPs: "*it may be better – rather than returning to issues from the late 1990s – that the building owners join with us in a co-operative manner to ensure the preservation and regeneration of this historic building"* (GCC March 2018); ***Facts Change Opinions, But Opinions Can't Change Facts***

25 years of Structural Studies, Planning Applications, Development Schemes, Correspondence:

- **JAN 2024:** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/ProductiveProblematicNowHopefullyProductiveDiscussions.pdf***
- **JAN 2024:** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/EgyptianHallsSpineTimelineofCorrespondence.pdf***
- **JAN 2024:** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2019-2023.pdf***
- **Conservation Bond specified architect's expert advice, which was ignored by GCC** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Approved Building and Building Work 1998-2019.pdf***

These timelines illustrate the need for clarity, as they ignore 26 years of activity, proven deterioration and causal non-viability. There will be a massive Heritage/Cultural/Conservation/Glasgow backlash if it's decided to demolish without assessing all options. There is unequivocal evidence that highlights public sector errors and systemic dysfunctionality. This legacy, created by GDA-HS-GCC 1997-2000, has been reinforced to current officers and Councillors of the legacy GDA-HS-GCC created from 1997-1998 onwards – an absolute must given the prevalent inadvertent and/or deliberate amnesia. Furthermore, it should be clarified whether, after any CPO review, an absence of joined-up government was found to be a critical factor.

To underline: GCC are on record praising USP's *"significant expenditure",* while HES state, *"There are some complex issues around Egyptian Halls. Solving those issues will need some creative solutions It needs creative approaches to design and engineering, but also creative approaches to funding. It also needs a commitment from all involved to continue to discuss and test a wide range of options."*

This report seeks committee authority to investigate the requirement for the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls), to include the development of an open, fair and transparent process.

This report is certainly not an example of this, given its massive inaccuracy and bias, given it fails to record GCC's and HS/HES's and the Scot Govt's disastrous track record from 1997 to the current date. Moreover, the alleged offer of **£2M** now and **£2M** over 5 years or 10 years is not the same value unless interest is factored in e.g,6% per year cumulative. Meanwhile, the alleged non-offer made by the "interested party" could be defined as a form of Hire Purchase – with HP the ownership of the goods and services, and in this instance the property would rest with the owners. So both the Ground and Upper Floors with separate title deeds could not be used as collateral, as they have not as yet been purchased and paid for.

This renders even more untenable, if that is possible, the claim at *5.3 that "an informal offer to purchase the building was made by an interested party in excess of an independent valuation but this was not progressed by the owners."*

To reiterate, separate offers for Ground Floor properties and Upper Floors was asked for and again not provided. So even the approach asked for was not adhered to. In fact, there was never an offer. Moreover, there is incontrovertible proof it was the interested party that failed to progress matters and, it appears, also breached the agreed commercial confidentiality they stated would be followed.

Assessed objectively, the foundation, accuracy and provenance of the claims made to justify this process being developed and approved are not competent and do not meet the aforementioned benchmark GCC have set, aligned with statutory tests, with which to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property.

aligned with statutory tests, with which to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property. To repeat and for the record, the building is co-owned and separately valued and with very different end uses once developed. Related and relevant activities are regulated by the registered , legally binding Deed of Conditions. GCC did use this document when apportioning LBRN costs for the 1996 CPO and at the 2006 Lands Tribunal hearing.

GCC have used in 2016, then RVs were used, and obsolete RVs in 2019, 2024 and 2025; again, all four DV Reports ignore the legally binding Conservation Burden. Limited internal checks for changes from report to report?

2008 Conservation Bond; Crucial Points Of Relevance to repeat GCC fail to take cognisance of:

- **GCC created the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden, which both GCC and USP signed, the objective being to deliver and discharge the 1991 LBRN or equivalent scheme**
- **Deed of Conservation Burden specifies TMP as the architect to discharge the 1991 LBRN**
- **GCC cannot amend the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden**
- **USP can, however, amend or rescind the 2008 Deed of Conservation Burden**
- **GCC cannot just summarily rescind, discount, ignore its legal obligations without good reason.**

Primacy of the Deed of Conditions and Values: Ground and Upper Floors:

Both USP and USI are confident their respective, legally separate commercial properties will be developed and valued using this registered and legally binding document in order to deliver on the significant investment GCC is on record praising. Why would a commercial project not look to achieve this? Why would commercial companies not seek to achieve this? GCC-Scot Govt cannot have it both ways? It's either a Heritage project that needs grant funding or a for-profit private sector project.

Since 2010 separate valuations have always been calculated due to the hotel option being marketed via a single Upper Floors title. This improves its marketability – ask any professional Chartered Surveyor, not some "person" providing an informal but, of course, independent valuation that USI was unaware of until Tuesday 28th January. However, USI did agree to loan to USP its development value to combine with BPRA funding, HES grant and "promised" GCC funding; GCC then failed to deliver. And has always been mindful of the potential to merge titles subject to grant funding reassurances, which, being frank, have been absent since circa 2004.

As of July-Sept 2025, it has been confirmed that for the GCC – District Valuer July 2025 Valuation Report, the 2017 Deed of Conditions was not used despite it being online appended to the various title deeds. As it transpires, it appears the 2008 Deed of Conditions had been used for the 2016 GCC-DV Report correctly (apart from the major error of excluding the GCC-imposed 2008 Conservation Burden). The subsequent GCC 2019 DV Report and the GCBPT. GCC, by proof of referencing the Deed of Conditions in each of these reports, reinforces its earlier use of the Deed of Conditions since 1996 all the way up to July 2025. It's just that the 2019, 2024 and 2025 Reports are not using the up-to-date Deed of Conditions. The GCC 2024 DV Report appears to have just cut and pasted the relevant paragraph from the 2016 Report. Therefore, for the 2019–2024 and now 2025 Report GCC has predicated a strategy underpinned by several interconnected assumptions that are subject to review given they're not using the incumbent Deed of Conditions.

1.2 The Council has a Framework for the Use of Compulsory Purchase Powers under the Town and Country Planning (S) Act (CPO Framework), which sets out the process for making CPOs and entering into back-to-back agreements with developers.

This we believe would be based on, for example, the Dev Apps commissioned since 2008, which GCC is on record praising USP for both funding and producing – GCC and HS/HES have had Dev Apps 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 from Chesterton, Driver Jonas Knight Frank, and Shepherds which underpin this (all correspondence is on file).

Back-to-back agreements regulate the transfer of the acquired land to the developer. This process is typically triggered by an approach from a developer.

So now we know there was never an offer, informal, indicative outline or by any definition to purchase, but there was a flawed, misformed enquiry of a very vague future profit share, which did not match the asked-for offer conditions by the willing sellers of the separately owned Ground Floors and Upper Floors (see 5.3), or another view is an (sic) offer to acquire on Hire Purchase.

The failure to progress was by the interested party, who also breached confidentiality by disclosing commercially sensitive information. This means, from the outset, the process is materially flawed. Either the alleged developer or GCC or both are being economical with the truth, and the alleged developer and GCC choose with premeditation to ignore the separate ownerships/valuations/LBRN obligations, or GCC has encouraged this approach without due diligence (or GCC knows it was in effect an HP offer).

Is it because GCC are unwilling to accept expert reports – structural, design, and valuations – that they now look to leverage out USP and USI based on inaccurate, misinformed assessments and opinionated doubts, while providing alternatives, and somehow hope to rehabilitate its challenging project track record?

The report sets out the Council's intended response and the changes to the process set out in the CPO Framework proposed to be adopted on this occasion to reflect the differences in the current circumstances from those envisaged in the CPO Framework.

As long as Commercial Property Law is followed, and property ownership is respected, then GCC can present this to the co-owners who, as GCC has stated, ***"committed a very significant expenditure"***.

When, after a near 27-year involvement, USP and its investors read the aforementioned, they cannot fathom why GCC are now trying to build the case for a new CPO, given they caused the 1996 CPO to malfunction massively, aided and abetted by core Public Sector bodies GDA and Historic Scotland. USP and USI also look forward to GCC accounting for their role in the project delays since the year 2000, as well as the Scottish Government and HS/HES, given all of this is on file, yet to date any independent assessment has been refused by GCC, HES and various Culture Ministers.

Furthermore, nearly five years ago the potential fact that the Egyptian Halls was a dangerous building and would very likely be one if the scaffolding was removed without the 1991 LBRN being discharged to the satisfaction of the Director of Planning was raised. GCC refused to discuss this, but now, five years on, they are acknowledging there is a significant issue but attempt to limit this to façade repair, which is again materially flawed – and also somehow this is now all the fault of USP. Further, USI was denied the approved Upper Floors hotel 2013 due to Ground Floor deficit, which was caused by GDA, HS and GCC.

Additional information As Record Of Proof:

- **Aug 2023, Egyptian Halls Slicing the Gordian Knot**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/SlicingTheGordianKnot.pdf

- **Feb 2024, GCC's inadvertent misrepresentation to Provost, Scotland's FM, USP, key stakeholders 1999-2024** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/CPO Title Transfer Delay-Inadvertent Misrepresentation Document.pdf***

1.3 This report does not seek authority to promote a CPO at the current time.
It would likely fail for a variety of core challenges and, if it succeeded, would be appealed immediately; GCC should be in no doubt.

2.0 Background

2.1 Egyptian Halls is a category A-listed building located at a key arrival gateway to the city centre from Central Station on Union Street, within Glasgow Central Conservation Area. The building is in private ownership. The building has been vacant and derelict (at upper floors) for over 30 years (**45 years**) *and has featured on the national Buildings at Risk Register since its inception in 1990* (vacant for 10 years). Scaffolding has been in place for 15 years but is not being used to facilitate repairs, conversion or maintenance

- **Conservation Bond specified architect's expert advice – ignored by GCC**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Approved Building and Building Work 1998-2019.pdf

Completely disingenuous and dangerously misinformed, and it ignores detailed Public Safety issues detailed to GCC numerous times since 2009 after the Scaffolding had been installed to carry out a major structural survey; such was the noted deterioration that it has been needed to protect public safety (again, see link above), partly due to identified works not being carried out by GCC as per their legal obligations under the 1996 CPO. GCC has attempted to claim (on record) they had no Repairs Obligations as they never took title to the Upper Floors. GCC had this liability and never discharged it.

Hence why the retention of the Scaffold has been recommended by TMP/Addison Cons and now TMP/WRD all on record. Including a Protective top deck on the Scaffold as the parapet is not tied to the building. And cannot be, as the roof, floors and rear wall all need replaced.

Surely GCC would fund the consequences of their CPO errors and mistakes, and a scheme would be implemented and funded. And because it never was, the scaffolding has been principally protecting public safety to the current date. And affording access for the raft of surveys as well as façade maintenance, which GCC has been briefed on over the period but in 2025 appears wholly unaware of.

Onerous, non-acknowledged by GCC Financial Costs of Protecting Public Safety for 17 years

- Scaffolding is protecting public safety and costs £50k p.a.
- **£700k** has been spent on Scaffolding/Electricity since 2008.
- USP has lost circa **£1.6M** in Rental income due to the presence of the Scaffolding.
- Over the period £**1.5M** of Ad Hoarding income came in, so overall down **£800k!**
- GCC has cut the USP/USI working capital budget by **£250k** since Aug 2023 and currently remains to be convinced that the budget should be restored.
- The Scaffolding costs cannot be maintained indefinitely by a commercial company, which in 27 years has not had 1 penny of grant support.
- A budget proposal will shortly be submitted which included a Core Maintenance component
- And somehow, based on FLAWED OPINION, GCC believes it's USP's fault! Perplexing indeed!!!

Yet GCC rescinded the income stream that, funded general maintenance, all studies, all reports, scaffolding hire and electricity for the scaffolding (again, we refer to on-record correspondence from TMP/Add Cons and now WRD as well as MSP Paul Sweeney and Heritage-centric journalist Mark Smith).

There has been widespread concern from neighbouring proprietors, heritage bodies and the wider public regarding the deterioration of the building over many years

This is recorded on the Buildings at Risk Register since 1980. USP did not get ownership of the Upper Floors until 2010, so there were 30 years of unchecked deterioration despite GCC's CPO obligations.

Important Dates To Consider:

December 1990: External inspection reveals the building to be in poor condition, with the upper floors vacant for over 10 years since 1980. (Buildings at Risk Register).

January 1991: LBRN is served. Glasgow City Council considers compulsory purchase.

September 1995: Local planners report that the condition is deteriorating with extensive stone repairs required. Repairs are subsequently undertaken via Urgent Works Notice.

August 1995: The Scotsman newspaper reports that consent has been granted for restoration. The building currently suffers from weakened concrete floors and rotten windows, and the external walls require stabilisation. Proposed works include stone cleaning, re-roofing and rot eradication. For the record none of this was done, hence why 30 years later the building's very future is massively uncertain.

Feb 2002 : GCC DRS requests/demands the 1991 LBRN is implemented citing accelerating deterioration and causal public safety issues but does not know GCC DRS/Legal cannot transfer the Upper Floors title

July 2010: Bailie Cameron to Minister Hyslop: "*GCC is now extremely concerned that this development may not proceed for a number of reasons: the building is one of Glasgow's most important grade A listed buildings and is of real international significance. There is no doubt that it is a masterpieceof Victorian design and construction – unfortunately now showing clear signs of accelerating deterioration.*"

Given these Repairs were never actioned by GCC prior to this, and by the time USP got title to the Upper Floors, all schemes to discharge the 1991 LBRN needed additional grant funding, which was refused. So how can the blame be attributed some 15 years later to USP and USI? Both will be lobbying assiduously so their good name is untarnished as a result of this activity, which does not even attempt to reference GCC's role in this farrago. USI, which, as GCC knows, has no repairs or LBRN liability as per the Deed of Conditions apportionment, should not be included in any Assessment. Again, an automatic appeal regarding this by USI is a given.

The presence of the scaffolding and the consequent adverse impact on the environment of Union Street.

We agree 100%, and this has cost USP circa **£1.6M** in lost rental income, and, to repeat, the Scaffolding is in place to protect public safety, costing **£700-£800k**, which is the decision of the GCC-specified scheme architect. Of significant interest is the fact that the 2008-2009 structural review revealed massively increased deterioration, a direct consequence of title availability delay caused by the non-predicted incredibly elongated timescale from a few months to 12 years, due to GCC error, weakening significantly control over the title. This form of CPO Amendment is now no longer allowed without Scottish Govt approval. USP has to take expert advice from TMP/Addison and, since Dec 2019, from WRD. If this advice was ignored then USP would be breaching its known Fiduciary Duty and would see Directors potentially taken to Court. Further Demolition/New Build was refused 15 years ago. But was raised again Feb 2016, April 2016 and Dec 2019 Zero engagement from GCC whom one has to assume are unaware of all of this.

Steps are being considered separately to facilitate the removal of the scaffolding – S3.4.4 and 3.5 below.

This has been much debated since 2014, all on record, and again TMP and now WRD do not recommend at all the removal of the Scaffolding until the full LBRN is discharged. GCC have also been put on notice as far back as March 2016 what the implications would be if they stepped in and somehow removed the scaffolding and ignored the recommendation of its own specified architect/structural engineers.

2.2 The condition of the property has deteriorated in recent years (this is disingenuous, as it has been in dire state for **over 45 years** according to the Buildings at Risk Register)

and there does not appear to be a viable scheme (**this, too, is wholly disingenuous: there never was a viable scheme**) It needed **£1.5M** Grant funding in 1997 and **£9M** in 2010, with both GCC and HES pronouncing all schemes were non-viable, and in 2025, circa **£25M+** due primarily to the combined errors and dysfunctionality of GDA, HS and GCC, all on record) *being developed or proposed by the current owners* (GCC, in early 2023, was presented the Mackintosh-Thomson Mews proposal but appears to have ignored it. And a proposal for a Feasibility Study Sept 2024 has not yet been responded to, *and without intervention, there is an increased risk of significant failure in the fabric of the building.*

USP warned of this Feb 2020 Potential Building Collapse that there was via the highly unlikely Potential Progressive Collapse Scenario (WRD 1 Dec 2019), which raised the potential the building could collapse due to a number of "*trigger events",* including the failure of floors slabs, columns and beams. ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html*** This was presented online and to GCC/HES Feb 2020 However GCC stated via the Herald and Times a survey, carried out by the authority around 18 months ago, found "*no danger of imminent collapse*". GCC also stated at same time, "*the building structure is the responsibility of the owners."*

Again, this links to the question: is it now a Dangerous Building, given GCC Building Control are now similarly minded, given it stated recently to USP's tenants something akin to ***"we don't want a large building falling to the ground and injuring people and potentially worse"?*** Yes: five years later than it should have been.

Again, GCC somehow believe, based on apparently ignoring expert structural evidence, that carrying out a raft of unrelated Urgent Repairs via a Defective Notice will somehow reconcile this and also see the scaffolding removed. This cannot happen easily and safely as was presented in considerable detail in 2014, 2015, March/April 2016, April 2019 and Dec 2019. Underpinned and reinforced by the advice of GCC's specified Conservation Bond architect TMP, based on numerous expert reports justifying the recommended approach – such as that façade repair in isolation won't see the scaffolding removed.

The stated reasons are on record, which both GCC and HES have had submitted; however, GCC point blank refuse to accept expert advice despite the robust conclusions that the scaffold removal is not possible based upon Public Safety, Construction, Conservation and Financial Grounds.

Also in 2022 an exercise to assess Temporary Works stated that despite these works being carried out, the scaffolding could not be removed due to still very challenging public safety issues that would not be reconciled (all on record).

2.3 It is important to take steps to secure the future of this A-listed building, as it is widely regarded as the masterpiece of Alexander Thomson's architectural legacy within the city. Thomson was an extremely important and influential architect whose pioneering approach to design and structural innovation has been praised and celebrated internationally since he began designing buildings in the mid-19th century.

GCC (and Scot Govt) have had **45 years** to act, but what have they and HS/HES achieved, apart from approving the 1997 Planning Application, which if implemented would have seen the Egyptian Halls collapse (TMP on record)? In contrast, consider this endorsement of the superior scheme by Greek Thomson's greatest champion:

"The Council did the right thing and started compulsory purchase proceedings against the delinquent owners of the upper floors. Now after legal wrangles, majority ownership has been acquired by Dundee developer Derek Souter, ***who has commissioned an admirable conservation report from good architects and structural engineers. The resulting proposals for a conservative restoration of the whole structure, including the remarkable iron-framed interior, have won backing from Historic Scotland."*** (Private Eye, Piloti (Professor Gavin Stamp), Jan 2000)

Despite this, between them, GDA and Historic Scotland derailed this scheme. The building's at Risk Register Sep 2000 states: *"Scottish Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of grant aid, and Historic Scotland has reduced its grant; the project is unlikely to proceed."* Then we have more delays caused by GCC, not USP, as outlined in the April 2003 Evening Times article briefed by GCC DRS: *"The CPO process adopted by the Council in this case involves compensation being determined before the Council can gain a satisfactory title for onward disposal.* ***There is potential for significant delay in a being available for Union Steet.*** *"I can understand the frustration expressed by Mr Souter.* ***The resolution is not straightforward."*** A contender for the understatement of the last 25 years.

So on what basis can the accusation be levelled that USP has held up the implementation of approved building/construction works or approved scheme planning permissions? This is especially pertinent when considering GCC praises USP as follows in the GCC Econ Dev Report of June 2004: *"Derek Souter has been the driving force behind the second consortium, which comprised Union Street Properties, Birthdays and Superdrug (as tenants of numbers 88 and 96) and Co-operative Insurance as proprietors of number 100. Union Street Properties on behalf of the Consortium re-secured the grant funding from Historic Scotland, which had reduced the offer of grant for the scheme from £990,000 to £250,000. Union Street Properties negotiated the grant offered back up to £930,000 for the revised scheme. Union Street Developments also renegotiated and entered into "Agency" missives with the Council to allow the CPO of the upper floors to proceed. Union Street Developments also brought about the withdrawal of the objection to the promulgation of the CPO by the upper-floor proprietor of the building.* The above is yet another on-record endorsement from GCC. Yet somehow in this report GCC can't find the room to acknowledge this. Again, this will be submitted as evidence, if required.

Lands Tribunal 2002-2008 moves from £10k Compensation to a £2M Claim!!!! Perplexing indeed!!!

This elongated, very expensive and time-consuming process would never have been needed if GCC had not unilaterally implemented a CPO Amendment founded upon a **wholly inaccurate structural assessment by non-Conservation-accredited Structural Engineers** (see TMP's Inconvenient Truths Dec 2024). GCC, for the record, used the Deed of Conditions extensively during the 1996 CPO process right up to the Lands Tribunal as it sought to increase the Upper Floors LBRN apportionment due to applying appealed Rateable Values achieved for Ground Floor units against the older non-appealed separate Upper Floor Rateable Values. GCC ignored USP's pre-Lands Tribunal advice to allow the Upper Floors to use the appealed Rateable Values. Note the Land Tribunal approved this.

This disaster caused by the CPO Amendment was predicted by GCC to cause a few months delay Jan/Feb 1998 and to be done and dusted for April/May 1998), precipitating a nominal compensation claim predicted to be £10k to become a £2M compensation claim from the now massively disaffected former owners who'd agreed a deal to exit for a six figure sum.

This was to be funded out of the lease surrender payments that two FRI tenants had agreed to pay as soon as the scheme was to start. GDA and HS grant rescindments made this fail. The two 50% pro-indiviso owners set out to hold up all schemes for as long as they could.

How did this happen? Before the CPO Amendment title was taken by General Vesting Declaration (GVD) and then compensation was paid. However the unilaterally imposed Jan 1998 CPO Amendment (which was legally irreversible) used a Notarial Instrument (NI) and before the title could be conveyed onward the current owners had to be compensated. So GCC threw away direct control of the CPO process.

It is an undeniable fact that GCC hid, submerged and failed to disclose from Dec 1999 to April 2014. Of course, this saw GCC breach the Dec 1999 CPO contract with USP – again this known contract breach was never disclosed out with GCC DRS/Legal we are led to believe until July 2018 when it was inadvertently disclosed to USP's Derek Souter.

As ever, it gets more perplexing as we believe GCC DRS did not realise between Dec 1999 and June 2022 that the Upper Floors title could not be transferred, ***e.g FOI March 2019***. *Can I now request perhaps two or three at most earlier reports that relate to:*

1. Recommendation of approval for Dec 1999 GCC-USD CPO Agreement

2. Explanation of why the Dec 1999 GCC-USD CPO Agreement requires amendment

3. Recommendation for approval for the amended June 2002 GCC-USD CPO Agreement

And points 2 and 3 are maybe within the same report?

FOI March 2020 "*The other report(s) or reports I'd wish to have a copy of relate to the requirement to amend the aforementioned missives, which would have been discussed and agreed between 26th July 2002 (see attached letter from GCC Legal to Kidstons, which states the Upper Floors title was ready to be transferred) and Dec 2002 when the amended missives were signed*.

And the real kicker here is if HS had not reduced the **£1M** grant to **£250k** instead of increasing it to circa **£1.25M**, the then very real weak-on-error contract breach would have been reconciled. The Dec 1999 contract allowed for the title to be transferred to USD. And the approved scheme had to be delivered within 30 months. So whilst the lobbying to get the HS grant reviewed and increased, the title transfer was on hold. Hence why June 2022 it was ready to be transferred and by Dec 2022 an amended CPO had to be signed due to the effect of change in title conveyance from a General Vesting Declaration (GVD) to a Notarial Instrument (NI) Proof no one really knew of the contract breach, out with a very few at GCC and of course the 1st Consortium and their lawyers, who also did a number on USP, and by the time we realised fully there had been a contract breach and the options to raise actions of Prescription against all parties – Portfolio Holdings, Birthdays, Superdrug, Bird Semple/DLA, Shepherd Wedderburn, Kidstons and GCC – had expired

How Defeat was snatched from the Jaws of Victory - STV 2001
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page13.html

JUNE 2023 What caused the Year 2000 Scheme to Founder?
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/What Caused The Brilliant Feasible Year 2000 Scheme To Founder.pdf

MARCH 2023 How a barrier to regeneration was created inadvertently
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/How A Barrier Was Created Inadvertently.pdf

AUG 2022 HES Request for Accountability
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/HES-Accountability-Appendices.pdf

Sept 2000: The Buildings at Risk Register states ***Scottish Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of grant aid and Historic Scotland has reduced its' the project is unlikely to proceed***.

So, how can the predicted consequences from nearly 25 years ago be ignored? Given also the availability of the Upper Floors titles legally agreed to be conveyed to USD in Dec 1999 was never possible due to the never-disclosed CPO Amendment, which delayed this for a decade.

And it was USP who reconciled the title availability impasse, which GCC acknowledged as such in Jan 2010 that USP "***had completed title by voluntary acquisition"***. So in what commercial world are the consequences of this delay somehow the fault of USP? Where then is the critical assessment of GDA, HS, GCC? Where was the joined-up government, where was the strategic direction? Instead we currently have GCC attempting blatant clandestine appropriation whilst attempting to airbrush away 27 years of local govt/public sector errors. A prime example of people giving out the homework are marking it also.

Evidence of a lack of Joined-up Government between GCC and HES/Scottish Government – will it lead to the Demolition of this Grade A "architectural masterpiece"

The other — unspeakable — option also looks like a dark shadow: demolition. As we've seen with Africa House, demolishing a listed building is possible if the owner can demonstrate that it's not financially viable, no longer of significance, incapable of repair, or that demolition would benefit the public. It seems unlikely that the Met Tower would meet much of this criteria yet—it's in a prime location and was only built 60 years ago. What if a new development is proposed that the council considers to be of greater public benefit… it's all to play for. The Bell May 9th, 2025

The Egyptian Halls is facing the same quandary

***it's not financially viable,* Grant Funding Issues – highlighted 25 years ago!**

- Sept 2000: The Buildings at Risk Register states ***Scottish Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of grant aid and Historic Scotland has reduced its; the project is unlikely to proceed.***

Title Availability Delays caused by GCC's non-disclosed CPO Amendment

- April 2003: E.Times GCC DRS **"***The CPO process adopted by the Council in this case involves compensation being determined before the Council can gain a satisfactory title for onwards disposal.* ***There is potential for significant delay in being available for Union Street. I can understand the frustration expressed by Mr Souter. The resolution is not straightforward.***

Has created Proven Non-viability

- Jun 2010: GCC Econ Dev Report states ***There is therefore no prospect of the project proceeding without external funding support***
- Aug 2010: HS Head of Grants **"*****However, I have made my position clear: the project as it stands is not viable."***
- 1999-2019 **On record are chronological Development Appraisals by leading Chartered Surveyors; each version records increasing non-viability. 2025 version under development**

External Economic Factors

- **May 2015, Bailie Cameron, in a letter to Shadow Culture Minister Baker, said, "*As the property recession took hold the project became unviable.*" So GCC is highlighting this impact and is NOT blaming the Egyptian Halls owners, unlike now, a decade later, based on discounting all evidence that's been provided, given it apparently does not the depth of files USP has to hand**

One of GCC's many calls for Collaboration

- **March 2018 GCC Scot on Sunday: "And *it may be better – rather than returning to issues from the late 1990s – that the building owners join with us in a co-operative manner to ensure the preservation and regeneration of this historic building* seven years+ later, USP and USI are still waiting for GCC to collaborate effectively. Then again, GCC believed it had no need to!**

Massively controversial Discussion Points

- ***no longer of significance* – a Worldwide renowned, architectural masterpiece shamefully mistreated by public sector (HS-GDA-Scot Govt), and then GCC was left carrying the baby.**
- ***incapable of repair, does that now only mean façade retention?***
- ***or that demolition would benefit the public* GCC cannot fully implement its City Centre plans/Golden Z initiative until it reconciles this, so unless it's made viable, then the decision ducked 15 years ago has to be made.**

And in 2025, GCC are still attempting to evade (assisted by the Scottish Govt) the now-known consequences of what everyone would agree was a weak-on-error, easily reconcilable contract breach 2000-2002. Time to release the FOI files!!!! The lauded 100% Year 2000 Conservation scheme could not get the Upper Floors title; costs are accelerating, and grant funding has been reduced from £1.335M to £350k, ergo, non-viable 23 years ago. How could GCC reconcile the move from a **£10k** compensation to **£2M** potential claim? It spent years doing very little, as it had rings run around it by Paratus (403) Ltd, who also claimed to have POA over the other 50% pro indiviso title. USP decided, based on the now massively elongated timescales and cost increases, that GCC could not sort this, and instead USP developed and implemented the decisive action that reconciled this for still circa **£200k**.

How? Through a 50/50 pro indiviso title owned by Man Lung Fung (MLF), now Hong Kong-based, and Paratus (403) Ltd. Over the period 2004-2005, MLF, via his brother (UK-based), was in contact with Derek Souter, and discussions started slowly about how much MLF's 50% could be sold for. They wanted £250k, which was impossible to fund, as Paratus (403) Ltd still wanted £2M. Tiger Lung Fung (TLF) stated they needed £100k as soon as possible and would settle for this. He also provided an updated POA, which gave him control over the 50% pro indiviso title. Remarkably, we managed to get this down to £25k.

This was done; USP had 50% of the Upper Floors. This threw Paratus into a tailspin, as this price would be a market price for their 50%. However, Paratus held out all the way to the Lands Tribunal in mid-2008 before being awarded £25k. Paratus then raised another C-of-S action, which GCC then began obfuscating over again – their Officers had no experience of this, despite it being self-created by GCC in late 1997 and early 1998. USP investors became involved directly again and funded a further £150k payment to Paratus.

So the original **£10k** GVD title transfer cost **circa £200k** (massively less than **£2M**, mind you) meant lost time on the project amounting to **circa 12 years,** during which deterioration had accelerated, and costs, likewise, coalesced to deliver massive non-viability. The GCC appear to have overlooked these measurable consequences of their misformed CPO Amendment.

None of this is referenced – if it was, this report could not be written, given its central premise is to look to blame USP and USI, while absolving GCC and the Scottish Government of chronological errors, mistakes and misrepresentation by GCC DRS/Legal. Again, this will be founded upon if required. If USP has to go back to the Lands Tribunal, how can anyone seriously blame USP (and now also USI) for the collective failure of GDA/Scot Govt/HES and GCC to achieve effective joined-up Government? Even now in 2025, GCC still cannot accept expert structural advice from Conservation-accredited Structural Engineers and its own specified Conservation Bond architect, as GCC does not like what it's being told**. Opinions** should never supplant **FACTS, but** it seems to be the GCC modus operandi, very redolent of Trumpian/DOGE tactics.

Scottish Government Long-Term Failures/Causal Disinterest

There are on record numerous attempts, letters, emails and lobbying to Scottish Govt Ministers by GCC, MPs, MSPs and Heritage stakeholders. All of these prove fundamental and deep-seated non-interest. A special mention of Culture Minister Hyslop and her department for consistently defining this as a commercial project from 2010 onwards, despite grant funding of £1.35M being awarded in 1997.

- **AUG 2022 HES Request for Accountability**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/HES-Accountability-Appendices.pdf

- **JUNE 2023 What caused the Brilliant and Feasible Year 2000 Scheme to Founder?** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/What Caused The Brilliant Feasible Year 2000 Scheme To Founder.pdf***

- **MARCH 2023 How a Barrier to Regeneration was created inadvertently** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/How A Barrier Was Created Inadvertently.pdf***

Independent Commentary

"The neglect of iconic buildings such as the Egyptian Halls highlights broader issues: economic stagnation, fragmented urban planning and insufficient investment in cultural assets. Glasgow's Victorian-era structures are not just relics of the past but vital symbols of its heritage and potential drivers of tourism and civic pride. The decline of the city centre also underscores significant socioeconomic disparities. In many other European cities, wealthier suburbs contribute little to their upkeep, and the city's cultural and economic vibrancy suffers as a result. Stalled redevelopment projects further highlight the pressing need for collaboration between public and private sectors to repurpose unused spaces for contemporary needs, such as affordable social housing and creative industries." Sarah O'Donnell, Jan 2025.

"If the Egyptian Halls were in Edinburgh, would they be in this condition? Specific buildings, this being one of them, should be better protected by the Scot Govt, and the responsibility should not just be at the feet of Glasgow City Council. Look at the Scottish Government's approach to the burnt-out Glasgow School of Art Mackintosh Building. They rejected their own committee report that recommended a public inquiry into the fires. Probably because at the root of most built heritage drama is government ineptitude. What would they do if Edinburgh Castle burnt down, I wonder? Or would the Mack be back in business if it was in the capital?" **Marissa MacWhirter, Jan 2025**

- **Piloti Files written by late Thomson champion Professor Gavin Stamp** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/The Piloti Files 2000-2019.pdf***

- **How Defeat Was Snatched From The Jaws of Victory, STV 2001** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page13.html***

Another missed Opportunity due to a lack of collaboration or GCC owning up to its errors

GCC also stated to the Culture Minister in July 2010: *"The Council is now extremely concerned that this development may not proceed for a number of reasons, including:*

a. *The likelihood that the failure to fill the current funding gap will almost certainly mean the prospect of securing the development in the foreseeable future would be lost.*

b. *The building is one of Glasgow's most important Grade A listed buildings and is of real international significance. There is no doubt that it is a masterpiece of Victorian design and construction – unfortunately, now showing clear signs of accelerating deterioration;*

c. *The proposed development is clearly in line with national economic and tourism strategy and, in addition to providing accommodation towards the acknowledged hotel bed space shortage in the City, will contribute employment (160 jobs) and additional non-domestic rates (approximately £350,000 per annum); and*

d. *The development is a critical part of our developing strategy for the refurbishment/upgrading of Union Street*

I am writing to request that the Government take account of all of the above and agree, either through itself, or the appropriate Government-funded agencies (i.e., Historic Scotland, Scottish Enterprise), to provide the ***additional £1.35 million*** *needed to allow this vitally important project to proceed."*

Duty of Care Failure

So, it was not funded, and the approved scheme for 2012-2013 was not delivered. Also, GCC admit *"clear signs of accelerating deterioration"*, which dovetails with the postings on the Buildings at Risk Register to similar effect. Again, this was just after GCC had been legally responsible for Repairs and Maintenance as per the 1996 CPO. However, GCC cannot confirm what Repair and Maintenance Works were carried out, stating via an FOI request that this would be too costly to do. One informal, non-professional opinion suggests GCC did not discharge effectively its legal obligations as per the 1996 CPO it promoted. If so, and the evidence appears to be unequivocal, that's a significant Duty of Care failure.

In terms of valuation criteria, the registered and legally binding Deed of Conditions, as calculated by Hardies/valued Shepherds for a scheme scoped by GCC's specified architect, all based upon the Deed of Conditions, sets out how statutory Repairs are apportioned. By the time USP reconciles the CPO by "voluntary acquisition", the project is impossible to deliver without significantly increased grant funding.

- **June 2010 GCC Econ Dev Report states, "There** *is therefore no prospect of the project proceeding without external funding support."*
- **Aug 2010 HS Head of Grants Martin Fairley states, "However,** *I have made my position clear; the project as it stands is non-viable."*

Opportunities that were allowed to atrophy, founded upon inadvertent misrepresentation, created an ironclad, fundamentally flawed institutional belief within GCC, HES, GDA and the Scottish Government, as evidenced here:.

- **NOV 2018 History of Non-Viability Development**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0811-2018 The Egyptian Halls Non Viability Confirmation 1996-2018.pdf
- **NOV 2018 Missed Opportunities**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0511-2018 Historic Marketing and Missed Opportunities Summary 1996-2018.pdf

2.3 Thomson's designs were largely confined to Glasgow, and many of those properties have now been demolished, damaged or lost to bombing in the Second World War. Egyptian Halls is one of the very few large-scale, commercial buildings that he designed which survives. It is a unique architectural and historic asset within Glasgow, and repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the building is a priority for the Council.

GCC has had 45 years, and now it is a priority that is close to being untenable. One would not have surmised this was a priority given the approach GCC and its public sector partners have handed down since 2000, yet GCC's approach is one of being afforded to mark their own homework, which they then present as being objective, transparent and wholly accurate. Again, don't rely on USP's opinion, as it's defined as being subjective. It is certainly worth repeating this:

Endorsement of the superior scheme by Greek Thomson's greatest champion:

"The Council did the right thing and started compulsory purchase proceedings against the delinquent owners of the upper floors. Now after legal wrangles, majority ownership has been acquired by Dundee developer Derek Souter, who has commissioned an admirable conservation report from good architects and structural engineers.

The resulting proposals for a conservative restoration of the whole structure, including the remarkable iron-framed interior, have won backing from Historic Scotland." Private Eye, Piloti (Professor Gavin Stamp – Greek Thomson's unrivalled expert), Jan 2000.

GDA and HS's grant rescindment/reductions combined with GCC's CPO errors, mistakes and contract breach caused a 12-year delay, making all schemes non-viable. GCC then failed to contribute towards the 2012 approved scheme despite promising to do so prior to Planning being applied for (on record from a well-respected Heritage Planning Consultant.

> *1.4 The City Development Plan and the City Centre Strategic Development Framework both prioritise and encourage retention of historic assets. The Central District Regeneration Framework and its Action Plan identify the Egyptian Halls as a "high profile, architecturally significant Building at Risk that must be prioritised to find a sustainable long-term use that respects (these) important buildings".* (Again, this ignores **45 years** of failure by the public sector.) *The Action Plan supports early focus on the Egyptian Halls as a building at risk as an "Immediate Action".*

USP and USI have been lobbying for this, investing for this and delivering their side of the bargain but have been let down numerous times by GDA, HS/HES/GCC, as evidenced in earlier report downloads:

- **Nov 2018, History of Non-Viability Development**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0811-2018 The Egyptian Halls Non Viability Confirmation 1996-2018.pdf

- **Nov 2018, Missed Opportunities**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0511-2018 Historic Marketing and Missed Opportunities Summary 1996-2018.pdf

Proposed action identified within the Action Plan includes approaching owners to evaluate potential to support and advise. As discussed below at 3.3 prolonged engagement by officers with the current owners in line with the Action Plan, why it has not resolved the issues or brought about meaningful progress.

USP and USI do not recognise any prolonged positive engagement with GCC DRS from Dec 2000. From 2013 onwards we've experienced akin to 95% attrition from GCC. In 2014 GCC focussed almost entirely on getting the scaffolding removed because GCC had been offered £750k Streetscape funding from ScotRail for the immediate area out with its Union Street side entrance at Central Station.
This could not be actioned due to the presence of the scaffolding, which needed to be reinforced by the reports and studies related to public safety from GCC's specified architect due to the very fragile state of the façade and parapet (this had been noted as far back as 1995 on the Buildings at Risk Register).

We also had the Pandemic, circa 3 years of massive disruption, but no leeway afforded to USP. Note GCC had also banned USP's Derek Souter for being too persistent and the tone of correspondence for alleging non-disclosure to GCC's then Lord Provost, Scotland's then First Minister and its own Economic Dev Committee Councillors, all of which is 100% accurate and factual. And in terms of non-engagement, nobody from GCC DRS ever got in touch directly with USP between Dec 2019 and April 2023, when USP's Derek Souter had a brief meeting with a GCC Senior Officer out with the GCC Offices.

One also cannot comprehend how GCC and their *"new partners"* expect to bridge the LBRN deficit, which has to be discharged due to it being legally non-variable. The CPO report does not reference any of this. GCC must be asked why and must explain this. To repeat, GCC banned USP and USI in April 2019 for continuing to ask GCC to account for why it took 12 years for the Upper Floors title to be conveyed (Jan 2010) when it was originally agreed legally to be Dec 1999 and how it could be expected to find a commercial funding solution to a now massively non-viable building. **Again, redolent of the Trumpian tactics both SNP, Labour, Greens are so condemnatory of, apart from when it's of their doing**

On the question of *"not resolved the issues or brought about meaningful progress",* to repeat HES, Scottish Government and GCC have a significant case to answer here, given they derailed the Year 2000 scheme and caused massive non-viability. And then GCC, after promising to part-fund a known grant commitment, did not and derailed the approved 2012-2013 scheme. Further, this would have been resolved 20+ years ago if only GCC had disclosed the actual true position after the direct intervention of Scotland's then First Minister, who asked what was causing scheme delays.

The FM's Office unequivocally did not disclose the reasons for the scheme delays but was given a confected account. Also GCC's own Councillors were kept in the dark and told a false story as to why there was a delay. So GCC needs to look at its own pivotal contribution and not blame USP or USI.

3.0 Current situation – 3.1 Ownership: **Ownership/Investment Clarification:**

- **Ground Floors are owned by USP Ltd but controlled by the Standard Security holders**
- **Upper Floors are owned by USI Ltd but controlled by the Standard Security holders**
- **USP's Ground Floors have a massive deficit, but would not if this was New Build**
- **USI has a significant surplus whether the building is preserved, or it is New Build**
- **Then WRD1 - Dec 2019, WRD2 - Sept 2021 and WRD 1 & 2 combined - July 2024**
- **The Upper Floors have a single title and legally separate repair obligations and valuation**
- **USI has no legal obligation to cross-subsidise USP, and GCC is on record stating USP has committed a "*very significant expenditure (available on a P&C basis)*".**

3.1.1 The property address is 84–100 Union Street.

3.12 The ground and basement floors, known as 84, 88, 96 and 100 Union Street, are owned by UNION STREET PROPERTIES LIMITED (SC186601), Registered Office Whitehall House, 33 Yeaman Shore, Dundee, They are also separately valued with a significant deficit as per Dev Apps 1999, 2000, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019 and 2025 based upon the legally registered Deed of Conditions.

3.13 The upper floors are entered from the close numbered 92 Union Street and are owned by UNION STREET INVESTMENTS LTD (SC353348). They are also separately valued with a significant value as per Dev Apps 1999, 2000, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019 and 2025 based upon the legally registered Deed of Conditions.

- **Ground Floor Deficit estimated NEGATIVE £25M+**
- **Upper Floors Surplus estimated PLUS £6M-£8M+**

How a back-to-back buyer reconciles this is a source of significant conjecture, given the statutory non-viable obligation to discharge the 1991 LBRN, further reinforced by the legally binding obligations to discharge the 2008 Conservation Burden as defined by the specified architect. And separate ownership!

Long-term Proven Lack Of Engagement From GCC and HES

Finding a back-to-back buyer for the separately owned properties will be an almost insurmountable challenge. However, USP and USI believe this deficit can be reconciled if a 20-25 year timescale is factored in, despite GCC having not yet engaged fully since resiling from the MT Mews Feasibility Study. Perhaps they will when the now favoured back-to-back buyer cannot secure the funding quantified and/or USP and USI have secured an independent project review sought since 2002. Please note:

- **FEB 2024: GCC's inadvertent misrepresentation to Provost, Scotland's FM, USP, key stakeholders 1999-2024**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/CPO Title Transfer Delay-Inadvertent Misrepresentation Document.pdf

Attempted Engagement With GCC (HES) by USP and USI, 2000-2015 and 2016 onwards

GCC has on record significant studies/reports/scheme options after its failure to provide gap funding Year 2000-2005 and 2010-2015. On record are Approved Schemes 2000, 2005 and 2103 and Scheme Options 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, then WR1-Dec 2019, WRD2-Sept 2021 and WRD3-July 2024.

Also, from April 2019 (via the Shepherds Valuation Report) onwards, GCC was offered discussions centred on the £10M site assembly/acquisition costs (which GCC had acknowledged USP had made via "committing a very significant expenditure"), which would have seen this significant sum reprofiled given USP believed this would be recouped long term given their unstinting belief in the project.

And that a regenerated Union Street Rental currently valued at £12-£15 could return to the heyday of £70+ as per 1992 Rental values. Mackintosh-Thomson Mews could, of course, springboard this valuation uplift. And we now know in 2025 two units in Buchanan Street were sold for £13.5M. And of course the Egyptian Halls is on Union Street, but it does have FOUR units and a critical location well capable of driving valuation growth and uplift. Again, it would appear the CPO Report authors are also unaware of this also. Systemic issues are undoubtedly present in relation to retention of and access to core correspondence and documentation.

Also tabled for discussion was the merged title option that would see the now significant Upper Floors surplus added to reduce the Ground Floor deficit. The idea being to agree with the Standard Security holders on a long-term lease/part or whole purchase by an SPV? Again, zero response back from GCC. For the record, there follows below a broad indicative of attempted engagement, which on reflection is 98% one way from USP to GCC, Councillors, MSPs, the Scottish Government and Heritage stakeholders.

Emails/Letter To	2007-2020	2020-2025	TOTAL
GCC	**2025**	**684**	**1679**
Councillors & MSPs	**690**	**212**	**912**
HES/Scottish Government	**480**	**79**	**579**
HES/Grants-HLF-SPRUCE	**406**	**N/A**	**406**
Heritage Stakeholders	**405**	**113**	**518**
TOTAL	**4006**	**1088**	**5094**

In addition to above, there are also on file (as hard copy) 1000+ letters, reports and documents to GCC, HS/HES and the Scottish Government from 2000 to 2025. And don't forget GCC banned Derek Souter USP/USI from contacting Officers/Councillors 2019 and has to this day not rescinded this formally. GCC was therefore favoured, we are led to believe, for contact to be principally between Savills/WRD/TMP, in what USP believed to be attempts to scope and fund a FIFTH Planning Application. However after GCC announced their core city centre car ban policy, which would also see the old NCP Mitchell Street Car Park become redundant, we approached the owners to look to develop that site and create Mackintosh-Thomson Mews **+ Golden Z + Avenues + Frasers:** (a plan dating back to April 2000). That led to the development of the concept, which was presented to a Senior GCC Officer, and a Feasibility Study was also agreed to be developed in spring 2023. **http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/opportunity.html**

However, to repeat, post-mid 2023 and Ediston resiling from a joint feasibility study option, GCC had another Senior Officer and a year to facilitate a meeting to look to discuss (non-viable) scheme options. GCC cancelled that due to taking court action, then that person left, and it took until April 2024 to schedule the next meeting; although Derek Souter did attend as an observer a meeting Nov 2023 between GCC and Primevest (owners of the NCP Mitchell Street Car Park), and post that meeting, USP and USI again pushed the potential for Mackintosh-Thomson Mews.

And in parallel to this, and to repeat, Ediston were not interested in the Egyptian Halls circa mid-2019 due to known issues but did state the NCP site redeveloped as New Build was of interest in the passing, then the MT Mews concept was to be assessed by Ediston. Next, this approach was rescinded from, citing systemic non-viability. In September 2024 the property standard security holders approved the concept to develop a Feasibility Study via Savills, which would include structural details, costings, development options and a full valuation commentary. The report also makes no reference to the pandemic and the subsequent issues experienced by all, which should be factored in, but lo and behold, it has not been.

3.14 Both companies are owned by the same parties.

Again, for clarity, they are legally separate property titles, with separate obligations and valuations. Ideally, this should have been a distinct advantage and was the agreed approach from Dec 1999 onwards, given it was reduced down from 10 ownership interests.

GCC now has an issue with the co-ownership despite it praising this approach from Dec 1999 to 2010. And today expect a combined valuation or a single title, despite being unable to be trusted as proven time after time.

GCC has to accept the legally Registered Title Deeds and causal Deed of Conditions, which regulates all relevant commercial property matters, including apportionment of repairs, in this case by Rateable Value – not just when it suits. In fact, when they undertook the 1996 CPO with the Ground Floor consortium, Nos 88 and 96 were both owned by Scottish Metropolitan, and their respective repair obligations were separately calculated using each unit's Rateable Values. GCC also used the Deed of Conditions in relation to the Lands Tribunal process 2002-2008, all on record.

3.15 The ground floor shops are partly occupied by tenants, which include a phone shop, a motorbike shop and a vape shop.

3.16 The upper floors are not occupied. The Council will investigate ways to support the relocation of the current tenants if the use of compulsory purchase powers is authorised in due course.

Previous CPO – 3.21 The property has been the subject of a previous back-to-back CPO. The City of Glasgow District Council made a CPO in March 1996 at the request of a consortium of owners in the building. The CPO was confirmed by the Secretary of State for Scotland on 23rd May 1996.

The paucity and sparseness of this paragraph is the essence of being economical with the actualité. USP would have won the 2010 CPO refusal appeal due to GCC valuing the building as a single title and ignoring the legally binding Deed of Conditions. And being cognisant of this, GCC encouraged the 2013 application. When GCC failed to provide its promised share of the known deficit, the approved Upper-Floors hotel and clutch of Ground-Floor Restaurants could not be developed. Then the EHBPT was incorporated to allow an HLF **£5M** grant application that GCC originally endorsed in 2014. Before torpedoing the application process a year later by confirming along with HES there would be no grant funding support to bridge the known deficit, which, for the record, both GCC and HES had stated was commercially non-fundable mid-2010. In 2016, given the only option was New Build, a detailed **292-page** dossier was submitted to GCC and HES to look to agree to this or secure the funding for a conservation-centric scheme; zero engagement from both GCC and HES. Similar non-engagement occurred April 2019 (all on file) Please skim the following; it has everything GCC does not want to have to come to terms with.

3.22 Notice of Confirmation and then Notices to Treat and Notices of Entry were served in January 1998 at the request of the consortium. However, the title was not taken at that time.

This para however breaches the disclosure/accountability threshold for commercial transactions. Does Local Govt have different and varying standards for disclosure of germane facts? This refers obliquely, to say the least, to the unilaterally imposed CPO Amendment by GCC, founded upon a massively flawed structural assessment. GCC then took entry as it believed the building was to collapse. Lo and behold, GCC were wrong again. However, the poison pill (well, overdose) was the predicted "*few months scheme delay*" due to the CPO Amendment became 12 years and now 27 years. And not a reference or a mention in this report. Note GCC did not disclose this to USP until April 2014 – yes, 16 years later

- **Sep 2019 - Why did the 1996 Egyptian Halls CPO fail? Briefing to SPICE, the Scottish Parliament:** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/1609-2019 UPDATED Egyptian Halls CPO Briefing Note.pdf***

- **Sept 2019 - Why has GCC's CPO Amendment Claim that "*it will only delay your scheme by a few months*" become 312+ months and many times the original £3M cost?** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/2409-2019-GCC's Feb 1998 CPO Amendment will cause a 300+ month delay – WHY!.pdf***

Due to the 12-year delay caused by GCC's (still non-disclosed) CPO Amendment, all projects had become non-viable as per Development Appraisals provided. Both GCC and HES are on record on this. On May 1, 2004, the then First Minister McConnell's PS wrote to GCC's Lord Provost: *"You will see from the letter that Mr Souter* ***is concerned at the Council's handling of the transfer of ownership of the remainder of the building to his company. He feels that the Council's actions may be putting the project to repair and restore the building in jeopardy****. I would be grateful if you could reply direct to Mr Souter, outlining the Council's position. Can you also let me have a copy of the response for our records?*

GCC's response requires to be cross-referenced with proven non-disclosure of a known contract breach Dec 1999 onwards, which was "weak on error" if it had been reconciled 25 years ago. How can GCC look to divert blame and liability onto USP and USI for what is maladministration even potential malfeasance?

Prima facie proof of GCC'S unstinting, non-facilitated praise of USP

June 2004 GCC Econ Dev Report

- *USD re-secured the grant funding from Historic Scotland, which had reduced the offer of grant for the scheme from* ***£990,000 to £250,000****.*
- *Union Street Properties negotiated the grant offered* ***back up to £930,000*** *for the scheme.*
- *USD also brought about the withdrawal of the objection to the promulgation of the CPO by the upper-floor proprietor of the building."*

July 2010 GCC wrote to Culture Minister Hyslop as follows: "***As you may know, the Council has been working with USP Properties, the owners of the magnificent grade A listed Egyptian Halls building in Union Street, Glasgow, for many years*** *in order to help them bring the building into a single ownership and, having achieved this, to bring forward suitable proposals for the refurbishment of the building for an appropriate productive use. A considerable amount of correspondence and many meetings, over a prolonged period of time, have already taken place between the developer and his agents, the City Council, and Historic Scotland,* ***and the developer has committed very significant expenditure on bringing the building into a single ownership, on preparing a range of technical and conservation studies, and on completing both option and development appraisals for a variety of potential end uses.*** *We have now reached a very critical stage in these discussions whereby there is a clear, but very time-limited, opportunity to secure the development.* ***The challenges to do so remain formidable****. The Council is now extremely concerned that this development may not proceed for a number of reasons, including* ***the likelihood that the failure to fill the current funding gap will almost certainly mean the prospect of securing the development in the foreseeable future would be lost****."* **And whose fault was that? In chronological order, it is a) GDA, Historic Scotland and GCC** ***(see Page 22)***

May 2013 Another very positive GCC compliment, this time from then GCC Leader Matheson; wonder how many more to uncover? Certainly adds to the story of commitment and investment by the core investors. *Dear Mr Souter, Thank you for your kind invitation to visit the Egyptian Halls.* ***I have been kept fully informed of your progress so far and I am delighted that your team has now secured Planning Permission and Listed Building Consent as the next milestone in your plans to redevelop the building. Officers from the Council have visited this building on many occasions, as have those from Historic Scotland, and I have been briefed by them on the work you have done.*** *Unfortunately, I'm unable to attend a tour at this point but I look forward to your team bringing the building back into a viable new use, which I'm sure, will complement Union Street and the surrounding area. Councillor Gordon Matheson Leader of the Council,* 22/05/2013

Q? How in 2025 can a 45-year delay be blamed on USP and USI? GCC surely requires to explain why?

GCC Ethical, Contractual Contradictions or Knowledge Gaps: 1996 CPO Admitted Failure by GCC

- **Dec 1999, DRS Prop Sub-Committee stated,** *"Union Street Developments Ltd (USD) had now purchased the interests of Portfolio Holdings in the building and wished to enter into an agreement with the Council, thus becoming the Council's new partner; and completion of the CPO and transfer of the property to USD would result in a single ownership being achieved for the ground and upper floors of the building, which would allow the objection to the CPO to be dropped, clearing the way for the repair of the building to proceed."*
  After consideration, the sub-committee authorised the Director of Protective Services to enter into an agency agreement with USD, **almost delivering the 100% Year 2000 Conservation scheme; however, GCC was let down badly by GDA and Historic Scotland (all on record).**

- **April 2003**: GCC DRS *"The CPO process adopted by the Council in this case involves compensation being determined before the Council can gain a satisfactory title for onwards disposal.* ***There is potential for significant delay in being available for Union Street. I can understand the frustration expressed by Mr Souter. The resolution is not straightforward."***

- **1st May 2004**: **FM McConnell to GCC -** *You will see from the letter that Mr Souter is concerned at the Council's handling of the transfer of ownership of the remainder of the building to his company.* ***He feels that the Council's actions may be putting the project to repair and restore the building in jeopardy. I would be grateful if you could reply direct to Mr Souter outlining the Council's position.*** *Let me have a copy of the response for our records.”*

- **May 2004**: **GCC DRS Exec Director stated to the Lord Provost/First Minister, Councillors, Owners:** *“The circumstances surrounding the CPO process have now been explained to Union Street, and a follow-up meeting will be held with them, their solicitor, and the council’s solicitor to provisionally agree the way forward.”* **Note that there is no disclosure of a contract breach, then known by some for 5 years.**

- **Aug 2004**: GCC Econ Dev Report *Based on legal advice it has been determined that to complete the compulsory purchase process the Council will either have to agree compensation with the two parties possessing ownership interests or, if required, to include them in a reference to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland.* ***The position has been explained to USD, who appreciate a number of months will elapse before the Council will be able to complete the compulsory acquisition*** *and in turn be able to pass legal Title to them.* **Not even remotely accurate and it took another near 6 years to reconcile**. Why were the GCC Councillors not briefed on the actual FACTS, e.g., a few months' title transfer delay was by now 78 months! And no end in sight for another near 6 years. Oh and GCC had breached the Dec 1999 CPO Agreement, but this has not been disclosed to USD or USP

- **April 2014**: **GCC Director of Legal Services states,** *“Given this comprehensive response, which has taken up a considerable resource, I do not consider that there is any merit in continuing this dialogue unless any new matters of materiality emerge.* Note there is no disclosure of a contract breach known now by some for **15 years**.

- **March 2018**: **GCC in Scotland On Sunday:** *“These allegations in respect of misrepresentation and impropriety by the council are entirely refuted. The true position has been set out in detail on many occasions by the council.”* **No disclosure of a contract breach known for 18 years.**

- **July 3, 2018, 8.29am, City Centre Manager GCC DRS**: *“As stated, the council’s position is a final one, and we have no intention of engaging in any further correspondence on this matter. I trust you will note the above.”* **Note there is no disclosure of a contract breach at this point, known by some for nearly 19 years.**

- **July 3, 2018, at 3.20pm, GCC Legal**: *“The only point is that in December 1999 we entered into missives with Union Street Developments Ltd (not USP Ltd) (renewing the terms of the 1996 missives with the previous consortium). These missives contained the provision that GCC would obtain title using the GVD procedure. Accordingly, we were in breach of the missives entered into (subject to a weak argument on error). We could answer Souter’s questions on the basis of the above, but I would strongly advise against doing so. To concede now that we were indeed in breach of the 1999 missives will just renew his conviction that he is right and will perpetuate further diatribes.”* So, after nearly 19 years and 8 months, GCC Legal inadvertently admits a known (by some) but non-disclosed historical breach of contract.

- **Feb 2019, Note from GCC Customer Care (not GCC Legal) states**: *“The Council sent the responses which were intended to be the Council’s final position on the matter, subject to any material changes. These are* ***(1)*** *letter of 11 April 2014 from Annemarie O’Donnell of GCC to you;* ***(2)*** *letter of 5 April 2017 from Richard Fisher of GCC to Ken Gerber of Anderson Strathearn, your solicitors; and* ***(3) an e-mail*** *of 9 March 2018 from Richard Fisher to Ken Gerber of Anderson Strathearn, your solicitors. There is nothing in the e-mail of 3 July 2018 which changes the position as set out in those three pieces of correspondence.”*

- **Feb 2019 – Feb 2025**: **USP continues to directly ask GCC:** *"How can three pieces of historic and significantly contested correspondence somehow invalidate a later disclosure by error of a contract breach known but never disclosed in any letters, emails, reports or media?*
- *Yet somehow, a now openly admitted historic non-disclosure of a contract breach according* **to GCC did not meet the benchmark of "issues of new materiality"?**
- **April 2019**: GCC ban USP's Derek Souter from contacting DRS Officers and Councillors due to being "*over-persistent*" and the *"tone of the correspondence*" relating to the consequences of this now inadvertently disclosed contract breach.
- **April 2020**: **Further GCC refused all relevant FOI requests, e.g., March 2019 and 2020** "The other report(s) or reports I'd wish to have a copy of relate to the requirement to amend the aforementioned missives, which would have been discussed, agreed between 26th July 2002.
- ***On file July 2002 letter from GCC Legal to Kidstons, which states the Upper Floors title was ready to be transferred,*** and in Dec 2002, when the amended missives were signed, this was not able to be achieved. The information relating to this was requested but refused via an exemption(s) contained within the Act.

The information contained in the timeline above highlights important points:

1. It is surprising and perplexing, given GCC's Lord Provost and then First Minister McConnell in 2004 were not disclosed the full circumstances, as GCC DRS claimed it had already been disclosed to USP and USP's lawyer (all on file).
2. If the true circumstances had been disclosed between Dec 1999 and May 2004, USP would not have been time-barred. GCC also has on file several signed statements from USP's lawyers detailing what legal redress would have been undertaken against all relevant parties, including GCC, Bird Semple/DLA, Shepherd & Wedderburn, Portfolio Holdings, Birthdays and Superdrug.
3. So why was the attached request submerged and appeared to infuriate GCC Legal to the level it threatened to sue? Of course it did not; then consider if there were any consequences caused.
4. How can GCC deny "allegations of misrepresentation and impropriety", given that it has admitted non-disclosure of a known contract breach and has made no reference to the known consequences?
5. **It is untenable for GCC to continue to claim this week on error contract breach did not cause a 12-year title availability delay, made the project non-viable then and now, and has created a financial chasm. And as illustrated elsewhere in this document, the structure has deteriorated and is now on the verge of being defined as a Dangerous Building.**

1996 CPO Failure: Important Questions To Be Asked and Answered:

1. **Failed when GCC's public sector partners GDA and H. Scot derailed the Year 2000 100% Conservation scheme.** True or False?
2. **Failed again due to a unilaterally imposed belief to be by the GCC minor CPO Amendment Feb 1998, predicted to cause a *"few months delay"*.** True or False?
3. **USP reconciled what then became a 12-year legal impasse, but GCC failed to disclose.** True or False?
4. **GCC is on record praising USP for this and its causal development activities/investment.** True or False?
5. **Given the aforementioned are all true, why do GCC and HES-Scottish Government not believe reconciling the financial, heritage and wider Regenerational delay consequences of this now 27-year delay are their combined responsibility?**
6. **Believed to be pivotal in saving the Egyptian Halls, returning commercial sustainability and kick-starting wider regeneration of Union Street.** *(See Page 64)*.

USP, not USI, *had a demolition application refused in 2011*. USP and USI also funded – ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/E-HALLS 8000+ Petition SUMMARY 2011.pdf*** believed to be pivotal in saving the Egyptian Halls, returning commercial sustainability and kick-starting wider regeneration of Union Street (**see Page 63**). GCC *"The new city centre strategy will review specifically a consideration of whether areas like Union Street should be completely reconfigured." "We need to find the right sources of funding; there are various routes."* E Times June 2012).

USP would have won any appeal due to the refusal report's major errors a) stated it was viable when the Dev Apps proved it was not. It had combined the Ground and Upper Floors values as one title, when legally this was flawed and was to be appealed. However, GCC decided to try for another application and to get the funding in place from all sources: USP, USI, HES, BPRA and GCC. We believed GCC was a good actor and would collaborate, given they knew why the scheme had been delayed by themselves.

Thereafter, planning permission and listed building consent for a hotel scheme were gained in 2012.

None of the consented schemes have been delivered. The Year 2000 100% Conservation scheme was described thus: "*Now, after legal wrangles, majority ownership has been acquired, and an admirable conservation report from good architects and structural engineers. The resulting proposals for a conservative restoration of the whole structure, including the remarkable iron-framed interior, have won backing from Historic Scotland." (Private Eye, Piloti (Prof Gavin Stamp), Jan 2000).*

The building has been continuously marketed over the past 27 years by Chesterton, Driver Jonas, Savills, Knight Frank and latterly Shepherds – ***https://www.shepherd.co.uk/property/the-egyptian-halls-84-100-84-100-union-street-glasgow-glasgow/*** We look forward to the council proving the interest expressed by the current develop if this interest meets the commercial benchmark for an offer to be defined as something to found upon. And if they can then address the commercial viability issues, given gap funding from public sources was pulled at the last minute on the last two previous attempts to save the building.

And there are no extant permissions in place.

Now perhaps the leading contender for the most dysfunctional decision (TOP THREE!): After refusing demolition despite non-viability being proven and then agreed by both GCC and HS in mid-2010, caused by a 12-year grant funding/CPO title non-viability. Both GCC and HS promoted the potential to scope an application that would be funded, yet when a 100% Conservation-based 2012-2013 application was approved it was not funded. And if so we would have seen the wider environs of Union Street regenerated 12-13 years ago. Again, there is independent evidence on record. However, somehow GCC NRS believe an "extant permission should be in place for yet another non-viable scheme". How would that reconcile the "blight" that GCC and GDA/HS-HES refuse to own the creation of due to their lack of collaboration?

And of course, what has the Scot Govt contributed? All but **ZERO**!!! This personifies the essence that is ***https://psychology-spot.com/the-dead-horse-theory/*** and the unwillingness to accept the combined non-viability and structural deterioration has combined to create a chasm that cannot be bridged. And instead, stakeholders refuse to engage or accept reality. And look for a convenient scapegoat to blame.

GCC looks to ignore/discount expert advice since 2013-2025 that it's structurally challenging to remove the Scaffolding, ***https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/news/14285327.warning-over-calls-for-egyptian-halls-facade-to-come-down*** "***We will not be party to removing the facade because of the*** *risks*." TMP (GCC specified architect Feb 2016) and scaffolding removal would increase this public safety risk massively. GCC were provided March 2016 with legal clarification of the liability they would immediately inherit if GCC removed the scaffolding without agreement and ignoring the expert advice **USP and USI cannot and will not compromise their legally binding Fiduciary Duties.**

The Planning Service and Building Standards Service have been engaged in discussions regarding the condition of the building and its potential reuse for over three decades (including discussions with previous owners). As stated, the current owners have had control of the entire property for approximately twenty years (**15 years,** and by 2010, due to a **12-year delay caused by GDA/HS/GCC,** all conservation schemes were non-viable – GCC and HS on record), *and based on that history, it would appear they are unable to progress with any scheme for bringing the whole of the building back into use.*

For GCC this must also include disclosure of key documents, agreements and who knew of a non-disclosed contract breach for 18 years.

Also based on what evidence did GCC out of the blue indeed state the following Aug 2023: *'The dilapidated building is a barrier to the regeneration of Union Street.' The Egyptian Halls has been the biggest barrier for us being able to do anything with Union Street**," it's a blight on the street and it has been allowed to get into that condition**. " We would be willing to have further discussions with Mr Souter and his Planning agent in Savills**, but we would note that we are very keen as a city to progress with plans for this important building which are feasible and have a realistic chance of being delivered** but So far discussions with Mr Souter have not produced this."*

Complete, perplexing misrepresentation, which was countered, but of course no response from GCC.

JAN 2024:
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/ProductiveProblematicNowHopefullyProductiveDiscussions.pdf

JAN 2024:
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/EgyptianHallsSpineTimelineofCorrespondence.pdf

So GCC DRS/councillors/MSPs/Scot Govt Ministers were provided the aforementioned. And yet it's an easy guess ZERO engagement back. And of course, the writers of the CPO Review report make no reference to this; either due to being unaware or by deliberate omission. And also, GCC stated, ***"Anyone with a creative business plan should get in touch."*** Hence, we started discussions with The List, ergo "the interested party", who've made no contact since Dec 2023; astonishing for an alleged commercial entity.

And when one gets to Page 56-60 then one can begin to **determine that their NON OFFER offers no guaranteed payment at all**. Let alone be in excess of the now inaccurate "independent valuation" GCC claims was not progressed despite it being proven it was the "interested party" who walked away. is not a commercial entity, so would not fully comprehend the "creative business plan" they called for, and what they received are not one and the same thing? And since 2010, the Upper Floors has had a valuation and development surplus as calculated by independent Development Appraisals on record. USP has a development deficit to public sector failures, which precluded commercial funding, detailed as follows:

Proven Non-Viability

- **Sept 2000** Buildings at Risk Register states, "Scottish *Enterprise has withdrawn its offer of grant aid, and Historic Scotland has reduced its grant; the project is unlikely to proceed."*
- **June 2010** GCC Econ Dev Report states, "There *is therefore no prospect of the project proceeding without external funding support."*
- **Aug 2010** HS Head of Grants Martin Fairley: "*However, I have made my position clear; the project as it stands is non-viable."*

External Economic Factors

- **May 2015 Bailie Cameron in a letter to Shadow Culture Minister Baker, said, *"As the property recession took hold the project became unviable."* So GCC is highlighting this impact and is NOT blaming the Egyptian Halls owners, unlike now, a decade later It's now alleging based on discounting all evidence it's been provided, given that it does not have the depth of files USP has to hand.**

"Unable to progress with any scheme for bringing the whole of the building back into use." Since 2008 the Upper Floors scheme has been prevented from being implemented by the Ground Floor's proven non-viability for a conservation project due to the financial consequences of admitted (**12-year)** delays by GDA, HS/HES and GCC.

And which GDA, HS, GCC and HES have confirmed as long ago as 2000 and then again in 2010 and since. How GCC believe 25 years later they can attempt successfully to blame USP and USI for the consequences of this, the legal title conveyance errors, mistakes and repeated, long-term failures to account for these consequences is a mystery and will be founded upon.

No applications for planning permission for reuse have been submitted by the current owners since the 2012 consented scheme. For the record, this consented scheme was non-viable, was known before the application; hence, GCC had agreed to combine with HES, USI, and private investors to bridge the known deficit. To repeat, GCC went back on its word (**all on record from independent sources**). And again, one conjectures as to whether the writers of this report are actually unaware of this or decided to ignore this, as, if included along with misrepresentations and falsehoods, this report would not have been able to be tabled competently? Also, what would be the point of submitting another non-viable scheme that was never, ever to be funded? When all stakeholders know only New Build is viable and GCC/HES refuse.

Or let's ask GCC NRS: should a non-viable scheme just be applied for despite all stakeholders knowing it can't be funded commercially and/or with the support of the public purse, which was withdrawn entirely from 2010 to 2015? And as confirmed in Feb 2025, it's still the same situation: somehow source commercial funding for a non-commercial project – Catch 22 meets Franz Kafka!

The consent lasted for five years, up to 2017, and during that time massive efforts were made to get GCC to reverse their broken promise or secure additional funding. In mid-2014 GCC supported the HLF application, but by May 2015 GCC and HES conspired to decide **NO GRANT FUNDING** was to be awarded when they separately met the HLF regarding potential £5M funding via Egyptian Halls Building Preservation Trust (both GCC and HES offered the option to nominate directors). This was bewildering given this was a non-viable scheme which had the opportunity to secure **£5M** and could have brought the approved 2013 scheme to a viable level. Again, GCC and HES require to clarify their combined approach.

GCC/HES were presented in WRD1 - Dec 2019, WRD2 - Sept 2021 and WRD1 & 2 Combined (draft) - Dec 2024. Given GCC still do not agree on what the actual structural condition is, and given HES internally appear to have diametrically opposed views, compare and contrast these:

"We are aware of the structural condition of Egyptian Halls, as described in the engineering reports by Will Rudd Davidson. We recognise that significant investment is required for structural and fabric repairs and conversion to a new use." HES 17th Feb 2025

"Historic Environment Scotland (HES) said the Egyptian Halls required investment for structural and fabric repairs, as well as a modern fit-out. She said the building was in a "fair condition" and "reasonably weathertight" so it could realistically be used again. HES 28th Jan 2025. This highlights the scale and scope of public sector dysfunctionality and reinforces further why no application can scoped until it can be certain LBC can be agreed and approved based upon GCC also agreeing with the actual structural condition not the version they wish fervently to believe it is.

Correspondence received from the owners over the past five years repeatedly indicates that scheme proposals will be submitted for discussion, but no deliverable or realistic proposals have been received.

This is incredibly perplexing misinformation. GCC/HES to repeat received Scheme Options 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and attend joint meetings (all on record) Also, in early 2023, Mackintosh-Thomson Mews concept was submitted to GCC and was to be the subject of joint Feasibility Study. And Sept 2024, GCC was again submitted a Feasibility Study/Core Maintenance/ Scaffold upgrade proposal; to date no response, but again, if any of the aforementioned is acknowledged, this report could not be written.

So again the report writers fail to accurately record development failures caused by the public sector being unwilling to deliver and, when push came to shove, decided to blame USP and USI with a withering arrogance. Let's also factor in GCC when they could not persuade/bully the more appropriate TMP/Addison Conservation to agree to a) temporary repairs and remove the scaffolding. GCC then bypassed their own specified Conservation Bond architect to commission what was a snapshot (The Narro) report with indicative conclusions but lacked structural testing.

GCC DRS/BC in April 2019 stated in no uncertain terms it was to implement this report and recharge USP. It was pointed out by USP that **a)** the Narro report owed USP no duty of care and was therefore to be assessed by USP's professional team; **b)** the TMP GCC-specified architect then said it was not detailed or rigorous enough, had no structural testing and did not change the combined TMP/Addison Cons advice based upon 20 years of studies.

GCC had stated TMP/Add Cons had considerable knowledge of the building, so why was GCC ignoring this expert advice? And also WRD now states you cannot remove the Scaffolding until you discharge the 1991 LBRN/2008 Cons Burden? If GCC removes it? Then it becomes liable for causal public safety and financial liability risk, as per on-record legal statement of March 2016. The CPO Review report does not reference this, so Councillors are unaware of this, one must assume.

Correspondence received from the owners over the past five years repeatedly indicates that scheme proposals will be submitted for discussion

As perplexing as it is inaccurate, given the failure to clarify GCC and the Scottish Government have defined this as a commercial project but then deny the commercial solution: new Build in 2010, then separately in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Proposals have then been submitted based on the actual structural condition, which firstly GCC disagreed unequivocally with. And it then took from mid-July to secure cognisance of via HES. which requires approving Listed Building Consent, and this then led to reworked scheme options, including Mackintosh-Thomson Mews nearly two years ago! (on record), but there has been a singular lack of engagement from GCC.

GCC and HES have known since 1996 that Grant funding was needed; hence, £1.335M was awarded. And since 2010, the Ground Floor LBRN deficit was massively non-viable, but the Upper Floors development had a significant surplus, and the only viable scheme is New Build, which was refused but now is a real option due to the parlous structural condition. The only issue to reconcile is funding the Ground Floor deficit; end of! Further, it would appear, the "owners" (note separate owners USP and USI) are also apparently not afforded leeway due to the Covid pandemic, March 2020-March 2023, yet GCC looks actively to leverage every advantage it can from the pandemic when it suits them. Again, GCC fails to reference HES, stating the *complex Design, Engineering and Funding issues require collaboration;* where's the evidence of any meaningful collaboration from GCC and HES?

To repeat, this has already been disproven as being wholly inaccurate and misleading given it did not reference the known fact all schemes are non-viable due to grant funding rescindments (GDA and HS) and admitted legal title transfer delays caused by GCC. Also, GCC accuses USP and USI of not taking part in meaningful engagement, which, as above, had already been rebutted. Prior to the following perplexing series of disclosures. To repeat GCC states *Correspondence received from the owners over the last five years repeatedly indicates that scheme proposals will be submitted for discussion, but no deliverable or realistic proposals have been received*.

Prima Facie proof of non-engagement by GCC

And now given the following has just been disclosed in July-September 2025 and has now been able to be pieced together July 2025 DV Report "*DVS previously provided valuation advice to GCC with regard to the subjects in 2016 and 2019.* ***An additional valuation, prepared for the Glasgow Building Preservation Trust (GBPT) in 2024, was facilitated by and shared with GCC,*** which was never disclosed to USP and USI or their core professional team, e.g., Shepherd Chartered Surveyors, Savills – Planning. The disclosure of these two reports would have allowed the discussions/meetings in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 with GCC to be far more open, transparent and very probably more productive. And at all further meetings between 2021 and Dec 2024, these 2016, 2019 and 2024 DV Reports were not disclosed.

Given the material errors, one could reasonably conclude GCC would have had to accept these reports at best were to be challenged and at worst failed to adhere to accepted commercial property law that GCC itself had cited and used for the 1996 CPO, Lands Tribunal activity 2002-2006 and the subsequent 2008 Conservation Burden that incorporated at GCC's request the 2008 Conservation Burden.

But no deliverable or realistic proposals have been received.

So to repeat again, this is a signal misrepresentation or unwillingness to accept GCC's deleterious role in causing massive commercial non-viability and causal significant structural deterioration from 1996 to 2025 and all on record for assessment? Or is it a lack of understanding and comprehension by the writers on what is needed when it's a Grade A building? See earlier our note related to denial of actual structural condition negates the opportunity to apply for Listed Building Consent, which is required for Listed Buildings.

Non-viability, known since 1997 when grant funding of **£1.335M** was awarded, is ignored, as well as GCC/Public Sector's role in creating this. Further, GCC and HES reconfirmed non-viability in 2010 and 2015 and refused all grant funding requests, whilst refusing New Build. The essence of a conflicted position reinforced by denial of the causes of this non-viability.

It's also important to reiterate that Listed Building Consent based upon an agreed structural congruence is also required. Neither GCC nor HES actually agree or know what each other thinks or wishes to believe, or do both just ignore the actual condition?

GCC stated on 30th April 2019 it was to implement immediately the Narro 2018 report. USP stated this was impossible, as the Narro Report owed USP no Duty of Care and that it was in effect an indicative study, which had recommended GCC instruct further assessment, which GCC did not undertake.

GCC got WRD1 Dec 2019 and disagreed with the fundamental conclusions, stating the *"building was in no danger of imminent collapse"*. Five years later, it is looking to somehow state it maybe agrees but only in relation to the façade and parapet. What about the floors and walls and the fact the parapet is not tied to the building? The façade is tied to a series of floors with circa 33% of the compressive strength required. What about its Feb 2002 request for another set of Temporary Repairs required to protect public safety? Can it be reinforced? This was nearly 24 years ago.

To repeat, if there is no agreement on the actual Structural Condition, then Listed Building Consent cannot be applied – no proposals apart from New Build can be submitted yet. GCC-HES says **NO** to this despite knowing all other options are non-viable as per the 30th April 2019 meeting, which both GCC and HES attended to discuss the latest iteration of Development Appraisals and the wish to establish mutual collaboration and co-operation based upon acceptance of the facts – not the strongly held opinions.

For the record, USP then instructed these detailed Structural reports 2019-2024:

WRD1 Dec 2019 with four broad scheme options (all on record): *the following potential collaborative proposals are being considered for the future redevelopment of the Egyptian Halls:*

Option A *– Existing building preservation, ergo Year 2000 approved scheme, all but impossible to achieve due to approximately 85% of the structure needing to be replaced and being commercially non-fundable.*

Option B *– Façade retention - 2 storey extension ergo Year 2013 approved scheme; culturally acceptable, commercially non-fundable.*

Option C *– Façade retention – 4-storey extension; potentially culturally acceptable, potentially commercially fundable.*

Option D *– Demolition and New Build – structurally easier to achieve, culturally unacceptable, commercially fundable depending on Planning*

If the required remedial works cannot be delivered due to technical constraints or financial restrictions, then alternative options for collaborative proposals should be considered to enable any future developments to be realised. And no response for five years apart from to publicly deny the scale of the now structural issues, e.g., *the building is in no danger of imminent collapse*. Yet 5 years on GCC now agrees with this, possibly after touring the Upper Floors for a couple of hours early Dec 2024

Sept 2021 WRD 2- Covering letter- no response or engagement for 5 years by GCC *"This second stage Building Condition Report sets out the results of intrusive investigations and laboratory testing into all aspects of the current building structure – central staircase, floors, roof, structural columns and façade and represents the most up-to-date assessment of the building's condition.*

We have already shared this report with Historic Environment Scotland, who agree with its overall findings. Our aim is for the Council to also endorse the findings of the second stage Building Condition Report in order that we may move forward to consider the future of the building collectively with you, HES and other stakeholders: no response during the pandemic.

WRD1 & 2 Combined Survey (draft): discussed Sep 2024 and Dec 2024, reinforces WRD1 and WRD2

In light of this, GCC must also concede the pandemic had an impact on the discussion and delivery of all project options, not just USP or USI.

Since WRD1 & 2 Summary was issued in July 2024, a subsequent proposal for a Feasibility Study was submitted to GCC in Sep 2024, again setting out the development options that would be developed, if there is agreement on the structural condition, as there can be no formal planning application until this is clarified. Note that WRD 1 set out these options as far back as Dec 2019; again, no response from GCC

Grant funding rescindments would cause the scheme to not progress in Dec 2000, and non-viability confirmation from GCC and HS came in mid-2010. Of course this scheme was not funded by GCC/HES in 2013 (see on record independent opinion). At this juncture two of the four senior GCC Officers stated the Egyptian Halls was heading for the same fate as the Springburn Baths (on record) – it would be demolished. Then in 2015, its attempt to secure up to **£5M** funding from the Heritage Lottery Fund, the Egyptian Halls Building Preservation Trust, was derailed when GCC and HES met the HLF separately and confirmed no grant funding was available going forward (all on record).

Let's be unequivocal: GDA/HS derailed the Year 2000 scheme, then GCC's CPO Amendment caused a 12-year delay. GCC and HES stated in 2010 all conservation schemes were non-viable, yet in 2015 conspired to torpedo an already difficult grant application. Today both are attempting to airbrush past conduct, errors and mistakes and somehow shift all the blame onto USP. USP must question what internal oversight procedures GCC and HES have if they can so easily attempt to achieve this.

The failure to gap fund in 2013 caused massive deleterious side effects as USI resiled from loaning USP its **£3M+** development surplus. The time-constrained BPRA Upper Floors funding of **£3M** then also evaporated, as well as HES's **£1.5M** grant. Not forgetting the derailing of the 2015 HLF application, both GCC and GES are proclaiming it is supportive of the project objectives. Now we have this report; it appears both don't want USP and USI to succeed. From being GCC's Partners in Dec 1999 to being "Outcasts" in Jan 2025. An appalling and brutal attempt at clandestine appropriation!

Acknowledged Project Benefits: Egyptian Halls (subject to Feasibility Study)

- ***The preservation of the world-famous Egyptian Halls***
- ***£20M+ Development begins much-desired Union Street regeneration***
- ***154+ bedroom, circa 3-4-star hotel on the USI-owned Upper Floors***
- ***Bars/Restaurants on the USP-owned Ground Floor* or *Gourmet Food Market/Restaurants***
- ***200 jobs – 30+ Modern Apprenticeships***
- ***Deliver an EXTRA £300k-£350k Business Rates p.a. 15-20 years: £6M+***
- ***Meets GCC - Scot Govt's Economic Growth, Tourism, Training, and Cultural strategies***

Acknowledged Project Benefits: Mackintosh Thomson Mews (subject to Feasibility Study)

- **Regeneration, connectivity, economic additionality, job creation gains are significant**
- **Preservation of the Egyptian Halls**
- **Establishment of a new build on the site of the Mitchell Street Car Park Site, which does not compete visually with either the Lighthouse or Egyptian Halls**
- **An upgrade for the Lighthouse, establishing a "new location" with strong commercial opportunities to be realised**
- **The creation of a new arcade linking Central Station and Buchanan Street.**
- **Creation of an upgraded route to and from Buchanan Street via Mackintosh-Thomson Mews and urban realm improvements for Mitchell Lane, Union Place, and Gordon Street.**
- **This would lead to the rebirth of the once-famous City Centre Merchants' Wynd**
- ***Deliver an EXTRA £600k-£7000k Business Rates p.a. 15-20 years: £10M+.***

GCC have also stated this, which is inaccurate bordering on a falsehood: "*The council said the owner of the Egyptian Halls recently refused a bid to buy the building from a group led by arts guide The List and real estate company Ediston. Council papers said the proposals included a new food market or restaurant development on lower floors, with a hotel on upper floors.*"

To repeat, this is a carbon copy of the 2013 scheme: Food Court/Bar-Restaurants on Ground floors owned by USP and hotel on the Upper Floors owned by USI. We now know GCC are pursuing this, resulting in delay, exercise time, accelerating deterioration and extra cost founded upon no "informal offer" but instead a vague offer of Profit Share. Where is GCC's due diligence regarding this?

USI, with a significant surplus, was denied the approved 2013 hotel due to Ground Floor deficit, which GCC had promised they'd part fund. Now GCC also wishes to CPO the Upper Floors and also somehow the Ground Floors, which is perplexing given USP's asset value was destroyed by GDA, HS-HES and GCC errors and wrong decisions. GCC, for the record, used the Deed of Conditions extensively during the 1996 CPO process, the 2005-2008 Lands Tribunal adjudication, and then the addition of GCC's 2008 Conservation Burden. So precedent has been established and would be referenced if needed.

3.4 Building condition 3.4.1. A report by the structural engineers employed by the building owners (July 2024), notes the continuing decline in the condition of the building. It notes that since the engineers' involvement from 2019.

Further to this assessment, the now addition of the DV reports 2016, 2019, 2024 and 2025 also detail that GCC accept and have been briefing since 2016 the District Valuer the structure needs strengthening but refused to agree with Add Cons/TMP/WRD, who have been stating since 2014 there are major interconnected structural issues. Again, this also calls into question Points 3.41 and 3.42, which fail to reference these key, fundamental structural issues. So again, fundamental supporting statements underpinning the CPO Review are materially flawed.

For context Proven Deterioration – Structural Engineering Chronology 1980-2025 (45 YEARS)

December 1990: External inspection reveals the building to be in poor condition, with the upper floors vacant for over 10 years (now 45 years+)

January 1991: An LBRN is served. Glasgow District Council considers a CPO (granted 1996)

August 1995: The Scotsman reports that consent has been granted for restoration. *The building currently suffers from weakened concrete floors and rotten windows, and external walls require stabilisation. Proposed works stone-cleaning, re-roofing and rot eradication.*

September 1995: Local planners report that the condition is deteriorating with extensive stone repairs required. Repairs are undertaken following an Urgent Works Notice.

Feb 2002 GCC attempts to force USP to discharged the 1991 LBRN **;** USP then points out that GCC still has the title to the Upper Floors as the CPO title transfer cannot be finalised. The LBRN works reads remarkably similar to parts of the 2025 Defective Notice, yet according to the CPO Report all of this has only occurred last few years despite the approved 2000, 2005 and 2013 schemes detailing increasing deterioration and structural reports from 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2021 and 2024.

GCC DRS Dec 2009: *In terms of the "floors"—the concrete infill—in my opinion that has never been entirely safe to walk on. When the material was tested circa 2000, some of it was unable to be cored and fell through to the floor below. It is clear from the original construction that it was never intended for that purpose; however, its continuing security and stability are indeed an issue.*

TMP Aug 2009: *The building's stability is dependent on the interrelationship of many elements. Increasing distress in one element compounds the risk for the rest, and all move towards failure. Not until well into their decay do many of those elements show few outward signs of distress. The reality is the decay is well embedded and cannot be reversed. This building is very close to the point – if it isn't already there – where recovery is not an option.*

Addison Conservation Nov 2014: ***"Standing on the scaffolding with only an hour of background reading and then handing out suggestions is unprofessional and incompetent***. *Regarding the overall frame, we might sympathise with a Building Control statement based on the old adage that if it looks stable, it is stable. But this is a dangerous assumption set against a potentially wobbly matrix of 1000001 chemically interacting components, including lime concrete, wood, nails, iron, steel, rivets and iron lathes.* ***We have used radar, boreholes, probes and stone analysis to help us understand!"***

February 2016: Glasgow City Council stated the following in conservation-related correspondence: "The *Council acknowledges that George Morrison and John Addison have considerable experience, expertise and knowledge of this building."* Why does GCC continually ignore this and fail to respect both the spirit and specific obligations of the 2008 Conservation Bond? Is this because it specifies TMP's George Morrison as the architect to discharge the 1991 LBRN?

WRD Dec 2019: July 2019 onwards, commissioned GPR scans and core testing from specialist experts. and state: The *building is now in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable, primarily due to the deterioration of the roof and upper floors from continued water ingress over a prolonged period and the fundamental lack of robustness in the structure,* ***with the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure which could have serious consequences****, with the risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings. Key decisions now need to be made. While these decisions may be a difficult compromise for some parties, it is no longer possible to leave the building in its current condition.*

SAVILLS Sept 2021: *Once GCC has had the opportunity to consider this second-stage Building Condition Report, all parties will need to engage in a grown-up discussion and agree practical steps and timescales to secure a long-term future for the building.* ***It is envisaged there will be a requirement for third-party review and verification of all matters given the serious state of the building*** *and the depth of funding support and timescales that will be involved to recoup any public monies that might be deployed in the short term to help provide a long-term future for the building, which has been largely vacant for 40+ years.*

WRD1 & 2 Combined (Draft) July 2024: *Designed by Alexander 'Greek' Thomson in 1871, which has unfortunately deteriorated significantly due to a lack of intervention over the previous 40 years and has now reached the point where appropriate measures need to be taken to save the building from being lost forever through material deterioration that is beyond feasible recovery.* ***Elements of the structural fabric are now considered to be in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable, which has primarily been caused by the deterioration of the roof and the upper floors from continued water ingress over a prolonged period of time and the fundamental lack of robustness in the structure,*** *with the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure which could have serious consequences with the risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings.*

GCC have not produced anything comparable and also have their shared obligations with USP as per the 2008 Conservation Burden. **FYI** The April 2018 Narro Report for GCC had recommended detailed and rigorous testing to be undertaken but this did not happen, one assumes due to funding constraints.

Top Line Structural Conclusions

- **Floors are circa 33% of the required commercial strength, and cannot be walked upon safely**
- **Massive , dead weight stairwell requires to be assessed and strengthened/removed?**
- **Roof requires to be replaced**
- **Rear wall requires to be replaced (approved 2013)**
- **Façade stonework increasingly fragmenting and friable 1995 onwards; evidence on record**
- **Massive dead weight parapet is balanced atop the structurally weak façade and is not tied to the floors or structure**
- **Nov 2019 – A protective Crash Deck was designed and constructed as a safety feature should the parapet move forward onto the scaffold**
- **Nov 2019, 75+ parapet stones were removed temporarily to protect public safety**
- **GCC also fails to take cognisance of *How This Unique Structure has Worked for 150 Years*. *"The façade can't stand without the support of the floors, walls and stairs – not today's modern orthodoxy, but it works."* http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html**

- **Egyptian Halls Potential Progressive Collapse Scenario – GCC again fails to take cognisance of *http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html***
- **GCC has been asked to assess if it's now a Dangerous Building but appears to ignore this**

So if we accept the premise this a world renowned Grade A architectural masterpiece which requires expert analysis, assessment and recommendations, which both GCC and HS/HES have had since .

TMP/Add Cons performed an intervention circa 1998 to save the structure and then again 2000, 2005 and 2012 and then 2013-2024. Yet GCC appears to have decided to impose a Defective Notice prior to another Conditions Survey being carried out, surely the cart before the horse yet again. And again, an absence of collaboration with the co-owners and their expert team. GCC also does not have in-house specialist Conservation-accredited structural engineering/architectural expertise.

GCC's CPO Review contains numerous significant falsehoods and misinformation relating to the approved building/construction works carried out since 2008 as defined by GCC's specified Conservation Bond architects (all on file) as per the review, which is founded upon FACTS. ***"The Egyptian Halls has been vacant and derelict at the upper floors (only the ground floor is partly occupied) for over 30 years and has been on the national Buildings at Risk Register since 1990. Scaffolding has been in place for 15 years but is not being used to facilitate repairs, conversion or maintenance or serve any structural need and is causing environmental, social and economic blight.***

To repeat, wholly misformed, inaccurate and dangerous opinion and potential negligence due to ignoring the FACT the Scaffolding is protecting public safety, which GCC stated was present in Feb 2002, yet GCC 2025 apparently fails to reference this fundamental issue known for 23 years. This is despite the on-record chronology of architectural/structural studies submitted to and discussed with GCC and HES

1) From GCC Conservation Bond specified architect, does GCC just discount this summarily?
2) From WRD (July 2019 onwards), who recommended the Protective Scaffold. And yes, it's a further protection of Public Safety, which does GCC just also discount entirely?

GCC is still not willing to take full cognisance of fundamental public safety issues. And appear to downplay the actual structural deterioration and causal protective measures required due to 45 years of unchecked decline caused by the public sector. And now tries to blame it on USP and USI.

Scaffolding Removal without discharging 1991 LBRN – Summary

- Deed of Con Architect-TMP on record many times stating Scaffolding cannot be removed until it's defined as being safe to do so based upon identified public safety risks being reconciled fully.
- Skim from 2016: ***https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/news/14285327.warning-over-calls-for-egyptian-halls-facade-to-come down/#:~:text=AN%20architect%20involved%20in%20the%20Egyptian%20Halls%20project,and%20scaffolding%20from%20the%20A-listed%20three%20storey%20building.***
- Feb 2016 GCC states: ***"the Council acknowledges that George Morrison and John Addison have considerable experience, expertise and knowledge of this building."***
- March 2016 Kidstons letter on record details what action USP would take if GCC removes Scaffolding.
- WRD1, 2 and 3 state similarly that the Scaffolding cannot be removed prior to LBRN discharge.
- Dec 2019, the Scaffolding is upgraded via a Protective Crash Deck on the advice of WRD
- Both TMP and WRD state It's increasing protecting Public safety and is ***"approved building/construction works"***
- All on record, all submitted previously and available again for GCC to assess and reference the evidence below, e.g., WRD1 states

Structural Studies and Reports Chronology:

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2018.pdf

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2019-2023.pdf

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2023.pdf

Structural Condition Visual Aids:

Deterioration Timeline:
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/Deterioration Timeline 1980-Oct 2022.pdf

LBRN Discharge Visual Aide Memoire
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/E-Halls LBRN Repairs Aide Memoire-June2023.pdf

How This Unique Structure Has Worked for 150 Years. "The façade can't stand without the support of the floors, walls and stairs – not today's modern orthodoxy, but it works."
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html

Egyptian Halls Potential (unlikely!) Progressive Collapse Scenario:
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html

Conservation Bond specified architect's expert advice, which was ignored by GCC
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Approved Building and Building Work 1998-2019.pdf

Although there have not been any drastic changes, there has been an ongoing incremental decline, and the risk of a significant failure will only increase without appropriate intervention.

This is a wholly disingenuous, dangerous and massively misleading statement and displays a startling lack of structural comprehension. For crucial context let's reinforce what WRD 1 Dec 2019 actually states: ***"The building is now in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable with the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure which could have serious consequences, with the risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings."***

July 2024 - ***Elements of the structural fabric are now considered to be in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable, primarily due to the deterioration of the roof and the upper floors from continued water ingress over a prolonged period of time and the fundamental lack of robustness in the structure, with the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure which could have serious consequences with risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings.***

How can any definition define this as **"*ongoing incremental decline*"?** Refer, again, too, to the Buildings At Risk Register 1995 (**25-30 years earlier**): ***"The building currently suffers from weakened concrete floors and rotten windows, and the external walls require stabilisation."***

GCC further continue to downplay massively the interconnectivity of identified major structural deficiencies they stated were not present in Feb 2020 but somehow are apparent in Dec 2024 but are also somehow incremental ***decline***. To repeat, the WRD1&2 Combined Draft report of July 2024 is similar in its WRD1 & 2 findings – so to repeat the obvious, it's wholly disingenuous to state the aforementioned.

Building Standards in December 2024 concurs with this position **Again, to repeat, disingenuous,** see above, and if concurring, would also be in agreement the scaffolding cannot be removed until the full LBRN works are discharged.

While the roof covering appears to be preventing water ingress, the building remains open to environmental conditions. Expert advice from both TMP and WRD notes the front elevation shroud from 2009 to Jan 2025 has dried out the façade, and internally the effects of unchecked water ingress from 1980 to 2009, again showing a distinct lack of knowledge by the report writers or deliberate non-inclusion.

Again, the GCC and wider stakeholders are reminded they can access the following:

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2018.pdf

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2019-2023.pdf

The effects of this on the building's preservation were also previously discounted by GCC when rescinding the Ad Hoarding and denied as being *"approved building/construction works"*. There is now no in-place shroud that has been protecting the façade since Jan 2025, as currently there is no Ad Hoarding income to fund it, with unchecked water ingress now affecting the façade after 16 years of protection. Again, there is no cognisance of this prior to the Enforcement action from Sept 2018-Dec 2024.

Why are GCC so satisfied with what is a non-strategic decision, given USP has been protecting Public Safety since 2000 via Scaffolding/Electricity at a cost of circa **£700k-£800k?** TMP's George Morrison will again reinforce the scale of benefits compared to somehow capping the parapet to arrest the non-quantified volumes of water ingress assessed by a circa 30-45 minute tour of the roof/parapet area.

The upper storeys remain in an entirely unoccupiable state, and it is clear the continued decline in the overall building fabric will continue through a prolonged lack of occupation and ongoing maintenance.

The Upper Floors have been vacant for **45 years**, exposed to all elements until the scaffold was erected and the protective shroud began to act as a wind and rain shield. This is confirmed by TMP/Add Cons and WRD. Again, refer to the earlier Structural Condition Chronology. Note: in February 2016 Glasgow City Council stated the following in conservation-related correspondence: "*The Council acknowledges that George Morrison and John Addison have considerable experience, expertise and knowledge of this building."* Why then does GCC continually ignore this and both the spirit and specific obligations of the 2008 Conservation Bond? Is it because the TMP, the specified architect, won't accede to GCC's strong opinion?

And we now have this to assess TMP has been involved since 1997 and is the GCC and USP specified Conservation Burden architect with now 27 years unbroken project involvement/experience

1997: GCC/HS approved the removal of the cast iron frame, which would have caused Demolition.

2000: brilliant TMP 100% Conservation scheme retains the cast iron frame; it needs £2.5M grant funding.

2013: Another brilliant TMP scheme, but by now the cast iron frame is structurally too weak, so a process of structural cellularisation is developed by passing the cast iron frame. Needs £5M grant funding.

2026-2027- TMP to work on the only realistic option: Façade Retention, which then means the unique cast iron frame is lost and also requires grant funding in excess of £25M+.

Summary: The current Defective Notice if implemented will severely damage the scoping of the planning of the structural and architectural appraisal of the only option left; façade retention

3.4.3 There is notable ongoing concern for areas of the front façade, in particular the front parapet wall and cornice. This dates back to **1995,** so **30 years** later GCC is attempting to avoid responsibility for the consequences of their actions? We also now have GCC's Feb 2002 correspondence detailing to USP Ltd that the 1991 LBRN has to be discharged in full so as to protect public safety. However this was yet another GCC error/mistake/knowledge gap, as GCC were responsible 1996 to Jan 2010 for all Maintenance/Repairs under the T&Cs of the 1996 CPO. And which GCC should have actioned and then recharged accordingly, as it detailed then (23 years ago) it had the legal right to do so.

Why has the Scottish Government not been called to account for the baffling actions of both GDA and HS? There is a signal failure to comprehend that the interrelated structural elements are all combined and conjoined. Note: GCC and HES have been presented since 2009. "*The façade can't stand without the support of the floors, walls and stairs – not today's modern orthodoxy, but it works."*
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html

This has significant historic movement with an uncapped wallhead. This is because the parapet is not tied to the building, of which GCC has been advised for 28 years, and in Jan 2020 GCC just denied the possibility outright, and now five years on is attempting to somehow accord this some form of recognition but, as ever, doesn't get this right. Both the approved 2000 and 2013 schemes included works to reconcile this. GCC's approved (1997) scheme had no idea about this.

Hence, if implemented, it would have caused the Egyptian Halls to collapse (all on record). Also, a GCC Building Control March 2008 email to USP set this likelihood out since **YEAR 2000 – 25 YEARS AGO.** Please do skim the following. **Egyptian Halls Potential (unlikely!) Progressive Collapse Scenario:** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html*** And also conjecture what happens if the electricity substation in No basement of No. 88 was knocked out for a week, a month, even more.

And stone joints are exposed to continual water ingress. Without intervention this will lead to the type of significant failure noted in the engineer's report.

This dates back to 1995 (**30 years ago**) and is noted by TMP/Add Cons since 1998 and specifically 2000, 2005 and 2013 approved schemes. And the 2014, 2015 and 2016 and WRD 2019, 2021 and now 2024 structural studies. Between them the combined public sector GCC, GDA, and HS/HES-Scottish Government failed to collaborate and failed to deliver. However, instead of being transparent about this and developing a collaborative approach with the actual owners, GCC now attempt to ignore all of this and frame USP and USI for what was an avoidable serious conservation failure 25 years ago!!!

Timber packing to historical temporary supports installed on the rear wall showing signs of significant rot.

The approved 2000 scheme preserved 100% the entire building the subsequent 2013 scheme included works to replace the Rear Wall and Roof and bypass the floors due to irreversible decline.
Again, one would state this is very detailed and not readily understood. Temporary Works were scoped and costed at the suggestion of GCC Building Control and submitted in Sep 2022. GCC BC state they did not get this, but it was submitted to a Senior Officer and was assumed to have been circulated?

3.4.4 In order to prevent a significant deterioration occurring, which would result in an immediate public safety issue, a defective building notice using Building Standards powers is being served on the owners to address the condition of the façade and parapet wall.

Again, somehow, based on a vvv limited "tour" 5th December after a sparse and cursory assessment of WRD 3 - July 2024, GCC set out a series of repairs which do not take cognisance of the actual interrelated structure. Please click to ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html***

And apparently scoped by GCC without recourse to the following proof: USP and USI did not create the proven on-record Deterioration/Repairs which started 45 years ago. Given here is GCC 2002 requesting Temporary Works - approaching 24 years ago. From **Feb 2002,** coming out from the 6000+ emails/letter archive is massively relevant as it speaks volumes about the knowledge gaps USP/USI keep uncovering and calls into question yet another CPO Review assumption that Deterioration consequences require immediate action given these issues have been confirmed since at least 1991-1995

- GCC states Temporary Works are required urgently? And surely now, nearly 24 years later the concept of repeat Temporary Works scoped as a Defective Notice, which GCC reinforces states *These repairs are necessary to prevent a further deterioration, but they are not the comprehensive and long-term solution which is required to secure the future of the building.* QED in effect Temporary Works

- GCC states these works are required to protect public safety And of course from 2002 to 2009, there was no Scaffolding in place to protect public safety. And only post the Scaffolding being in place was it possible to record any façade fragmentation. Note GCC's 2025 Defective Notice makes no comment on public safety; yet in 2002 public safety was a fundamental requirement.

- GCC stated USP has to implement the FULL LBRN. NB this is near 24 years ago. NB it's not a set of partial or limited repairs asked for, which does call into question the scoping of the March 2025 Defective Notice; one has to assume this 2022 assessment was not considered? And of course GCC is also failing to disclose a known contract breach, which, if it had this scheme, would have been funded 23 years ago

- USP at that juncture early 2002 had to make the Planning Officer aware that GCC still had the title to the Upper Floors as the CPO title transfer had not been finalised, and that according to the CPO T&Cs, GCC was liable to carry out Maintenance/Repairs and as USP knows to its financial detriment, this was never done from then up until USP reconciled the consequences of GCC's disastrous CPO Amendment. And yet the CPO Review Report Feb 2025 appears to look to position/reinforce that significant deterioration has only occurred these past few years???

- Despite, of course, the approved 2000, 2005 and 2013 schemes detailing increasing deterioration and structural reports from 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2019, 2021 and 2024. And to repeat the 2002 GCC assessment. One can only surmise yet another prime example of a knowledge gap at GCC nearly 24 years ago, which apparently no one currently is aware of.

Once repairs are actioned by the owners, or the Council, if necessary, further action will be considered and taken as appropriate to secure the removal of the scaffolding.

Again founded upon a denial of the actual structural condition and the resultant causal non-viability caused by GCC, GDA, and HS. And a denial of GCC's efforts to sledgehammer through this removal whilst attempting to avoid the stated and reinforced public safety issues.

And it appears that this specific section of the report is written by Officers who either have not been provided with the significant canon of structural and architectural reports and/ or have no effective Conservation-accredited structural engineering expertise.

We realise GCC believe the following in August 2018 from GCC: "*DRS does not agree with your view (**note it's the opinion of TMP/Add Cons and now WRD/TMP**) that the scaffold cannot be removed, providing appropriate measures (i.e., maintenance works) are undertaken to ensure the façade is secure. I'm sure the ward councillors are aware of your arguments for the retention of the scaffold from your correspondence."* Not USP's arguments but expert advice from conservation-accredited engineers.

In April 2019, Building Control stated, ***"It's a building, walls-floors-façade: sort the façade and the rest can follow." However,*** this cannot happen until identified massive public safety risks are reconciled or a) the LBRN discharge is funded and is signed off by both the specified architect and GCC's Director of Planning; b) GCC takes full liability for the aforementioned massive public safety risks this would create as put on record to GCC in March 2016. Further, to repeat, this is diametrically opposed to the expert advice GCC has been provided since 2008 by the specified Conservation Bond architect. And this is reinforced by detailed analysis from Addison Conservation 2000-2019 and WRD 2019-2024 (all on record)

There is also no reference to the existence of and primacy of the 1991 LBRN. This without doubt will already encompass what any Defective Notice would reference as works to be carried out.

For the record, HES has stated it agrees with TMP and WRD's analysis and recommendations 2010-2024, so why can't GCC? Also for clarification, all studies from TMP/Add Cons 2008 up to 2024 WRD 3 are from specialist conservation-accredited structural engineers. So will the Conditions Report the GCC is about to commission actually be allowed to be an independent study? and to ensure this will be provided with unfettered access to the canon of reports detailed earlier.

However, GCC is to commission a repeat of the 2018 Narro report, again with no specialist testing. And ignores the obligations of the legally binding Deed of Conservation Burden. And it's likely there will be a challenge to GCC defining the works to be actioned before this Conditions Survey has been undertaken.

Separate ownership and separate Repair obligations are not referenced despite GCC being advised of the legal primacy of this many times, but again, if referenced, does the report become untenable?

Furthermore, the Scaffolding in place is protecting Public Safety. GCC appears to believe it is not, but it has never agreed to take on 100% of the public liability implications of this.

Again, to repeat, the Scaffolding has cost **£700k-£800k,** protecting public safety while the public sector, spearheaded by GCC, evaded responsibility for the consequences of their easy-to-find errors, mistakes and misrepresentations.

However, a sustainable long-term solution is required for the building, and if this report is approved, officers will seek proposals and investigate the use of CPO powers to facilitate this.

Again, GCC, GDA-HS/HES' track record of acknowledged non-viability, and long-term failure relating to four previously approved applications 1997, 2000, 2005 and 2013; including on record significant structural assessment errors. contract breach non-disclosure and misrepresentation should see them refused

However, the surprising failure to provide the evidence that an "informal offer underpinned by an independent valuation" (which, as it turns out, is clearly not **independent**, as GCC facilitated (funded?) this via GCBPT, which it funds and has strategic Board member representation) was not followed up by the interested party, and not USP nor USI will see this reviewed. Also the interested party has breached commercial confidentiality. Given that you believe it was an offer, then the T&Cs that underpin this have to be observed (on record for assessment)?

3.5 Advertisement on the scaffolding

Do GCC really believe rescinding the Ad Hoarding income assists in reconciling the ***blight*** on Union Street, bearing in mind the fact GCC/GDA/HS-HES have been the prime influence in causing the building's current state? Scaffolding has to be paid for, as it's protecting public safety, so it can reinforce a non-viable building to repair, which is on the cusp of being defined as a Dangerous Building.

This performative achievement does nothing to address core issues, e.g., GCC from Sep 2018, when GCC refused to meet to discuss why this income was needed and what it was being spent on.

A definite lack of balanced strategic oversight and far less accountability! **£350k** in income for working capital has been lost to date that would have been spent on the scheme – such as scaffolding upgrades and Maintenance. And the submitted Sept 2024 Feasibility Study has yet to be commented on by GCC.

Ad Hoarding Income: The Facts

GCC, we have been briefed, also leaked to the Herald and Times a fantasy opinion that the Ad Hoarding was generating **£70k** per month x 15 years = **£12M.**

FACT: It generated **£1.5M** over 15 years or £100k p.a., of which **£700-£800k**+ was spent on scaffolding c

FACT: Ground Floor Rents have declined from **£220k** in 2005 to circa **£50k** in 2024, with a major factor being the presence of the scaffolding. Circa **£1.6M** of Rental income was lost due to this.

OPINION: *Approved building/construction works* have been carried out as detailed by GCC's specified expert architect. GCC decided to ignore this as they pursued a non-engagement agenda. And pursue a deliberate strategy of denying income despite this being spent on Public Safety, which has proven In essence because they could and are allowed to do so because they mark their own homework.
3.51 Advertising Consent was initially granted on a temporary basis for one year in 2000, which expired without being implemented. Have no recollection of this? A later Advertising Consent was granted on 22 July 2008 (reference 08/1320/DC). However, scaffolding was not erected until 2009. The consent allowed for the erection of a shroud/banner image of the Egyptian Halls on the scaffolding and for an advertisement hoarding facing Union Street while approved works to the building were being carried out. ***No approved works were ever carried out.***

Structural Non Comprehension 1995-2025 (30 years and counting)

GCC continues to promote dangerous falsehoods and misinformation relating to NO approved building/construction works carried out since 2008, especially in relation to the unequivocal requirement for the Scaffolding platform to be in place as defined by GCC's specified Conservation Bond architects and Addison Conservation and now also WRD. And also, the CPO Media release details the following incredibly perplexing and fundamentally inaccurate opinion, which ignores all expert advice. *The Egyptian Halls has been vacant and derelict at the upper floors (only the ground floor is partly occupied) for over 30 (**45**) years and has been on the national Buildings at Risk Register since 1990. Scaffolding has been in place for 15 years **but is not being used to facilitate repairs, conversion or maintenance or serving any structural need**, and is causing environmental, social and economic blight.*
To repeat, a wholly misinformed, inaccurate and dangerous opinion. Despite the on-record chronology of architectural/structural studies submitted to and discussed with GCC and HES

- From GCC's Conservation Bond specified architect; now given this opinion is founded upon the expert advice and knowledge GCC has acknowledged TMP has! Why does GCC just discount it?
- From WRD (July 2019 onwards), who recommended the Protective Scaffold. And yes, it's a further protection of Public Safety, which GCC just also discounts entirely?

To put into context, GCC appear to be still unaware of fundamental public safety requirements and/or hope to ignore these and the responsive protective measures put in place due to 45 years of unchecked deterioration caused by the public sector. And which GCC now tries to blame on USP and USI.
Scaffolding Removal without discharging 1991 LBRN – Summary

- Deed of Con Architect-TMP on record many times stating Scaffolding cannot be removed
- Skim from 2016 ***https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/news/14285327.warning-over-calls-for-egyptian-halls-facade-to-come down/#:~:text=AN%20architect%20involved%20in%20the%20Egyptian%20Halls%20project, and%20scaffolding%20from%20the%20A-listed%20three%20storey%20building*.
- Feb 2016 GCC states: "*the Council acknowledges that George Morrison and John Addison have considerable experience, expertise and knowledge of this building.'*
- March 2016 Kidstons letter on record details what action USP would take if GCC removes Scaffolding.
- WRD1, 2 and 3 state similar that the Scaffolding cannot be removed prior to LBRN discharge (see below)
- Dec 2019, the Scaffolding is upgraded via a Protective Crash Deck on the advice of WRD
- Both TMP and WRD state It's increasing the protection of Public safety and is *"approved building/construction works"*
- All on record, all submitted previously and available again for GCC to assess and reference the evidence below, e.g., WRD 1 state.

Extract WRD 1 & 2 Combined Studies (Draft) July 2024 reinforces why Scaffolding is required

*Designed by world-famous Alexander 'Greek' Thomson in 1871, it is one of his most celebrated remaining completed works, which has unfortunately deteriorated significantly due to a lack of intervention over the previous 40 years and has now reached the point where appropriate measures need to be taken to save the building from being lost forever through material deterioration that is beyond feasible recovery. Elements of the structural fabric are now considered to be in an unsafe condition and structurally unpredictable, which has primarily been caused by the deterioration of the roof and the upper floors from continued water ingress over a prolonged period of time and **the fundamental lack of robustness in the structure, with the potential for a trigger event to cause a structural failure** which could have serious consequences with the risk to public safety and damage to surrounding buildings.*

5.95 Structural System and Relationship with Building Frame *The stonework elements act as a primary heavy load-bearing element supporting the primary wrought iron beams of the floors and roof, as well as providing the external cladding of the building. Although of sandstone construction, it is a very 'open' structure with many large continuous window bays creating the façade's elegance. As such, it cannot be considered a monolithic stone wall in the traditional sense – rather, it is a series of connected structural stone elements. The key structural consideration is the integration of the primary iron frame and the heavy stone façade, and the interdependence of one on the other. The wrought iron roof/floor beams bear onto the heavy stone façade, which provides a load-bearing support, whilst the frame in return provides the lateral support to the façade, transferring lateral loads into the floor diaphragm and into the stiff stair cores.*

7.3 Scaffolding to Union Street *There are various reports and discussions regarding the requirements for the scaffolding (which was erected in 2010) to be removed from Union Street. As noted in the Addison reports (appendix J) he has continuously advised that the scaffolding should remain in place to help protect the weathered stone façade from the elements whilst also importantly providing a barrier to prevent the risk of any masonry (particularly the upper parapet level) stonework falling from height onto the street and posing a significant risk to the health and safety of the general public. It is noted that debris has previously fallen onto the scaffold top. From our inspections and review of the parapet, we would agree that until a permanent solution has been implemented, the scaffolding is of fundamental importance and must remain in place until an appropriate permanent solution is found which addresses holistically the issues with the robustness of the roof/floors, the structural frame members and the restraint to the stone façade.*

7.4 David Narro Report (GCC commissioned bypassing TMP, its Conservation Bond specified architect)

The most recent previous report on the condition of the Egyptian Halls structure was completed in April 2018 by consulting Structural & Civil Engineer David Narro Associates, which was commissioned by Glasgow City Council. From our review of this report and our own subsequent further surveys, structural testing, and calculative assessment, there are two key issues where our findings differ from those included within the DNA report, which are noted as follows:

7.41 Parapet

It is noted within the DNA report that there may be the presence of metal tie rods which connect the stone masonry parapet sections back to the cast iron segmented roof beam along the front wall head. "There appears to be metal rods tying the stones back to the inner cast iron segmented roof beam, suggesting the parapet relies on these rods and not gravity balancing of the stones. Further investigation into the parapet construction and the condition of the tie rods is of concern."
(Extract from David Narro Associates Report, April 2018)

From the structural material testing completed by Henderson Thomas, which included GPR scans along the full length of the parapet and locally opening up in the suspected potential tie rod locations, the results ***concluded that there are no metal ties present and that the masonry parapet is currently in place by utilising its own self-weight and base mortar joints to resist sliding and overturning failure****. Refer to the appendix for the HTA report, noting this.*

7.42 Robustness Dealing

As per John Addison's reports, it is noted within the DNA report that there is an inherent lack of tying between the iron framework components, which would not be satisfactory in accordance with current design codes of practice and industry guidance. *It is noted that within the DNA report that through the use of appropriate tying straps and restraint bracing, the robustness requirements for the building could be achieved without significant effect on the existing fabric of the building.*

"In general, although there is an inherent lack of tying between main floor and frame elements, the structure does not show signs of excessive deformation or deterioration, and with the judicious installation of some tying straps and restraint bracing, the building can be repaired to a level which would allow it to function as it was originally intended." *Although modern building standards will require certain upgrades to fire protection, fire escape considerations and tying, this should be achievable with minimal impact on the existing structure." (Extract from David Narro Associates Report, April 2018)*

We do not agree with this assessment, and it is our opinion that due to the current condition of the floors (following evidence of recent material sampling and testing results), the requirement to achieve satisfactory robustness and to prevent disproportionate collapse is of critical and fundamental importance, and we do not expect that this can be achieved in this way. A more onerous solution will be required, which is later discussed in section 12.3.
We would note that to achieve satisfactory remedial details to suit the requirements of the current British/European standards and the building regulations, there would be a considerable impact on the existing fabric of the building, which will be technically difficult to deliver safely and would likely be financially onerous

3.52 Despite this, unauthorised large-scale advertisements continued to be displayed on the scaffolding, prompting a series of enforcement actions by the Council's Planning Enforcement team.

There was also no agreed-upon definition of what were to be "approved building/construction works". As all stakeholders believed that after a 12-year delay, a new scheme would be funded. And GCC Conservation Bond architect detailed what it believed were significant "approved building/construction works", but GCC chose to ignore this advice, instead stating as a justification that internal discussions and meetings had decided to rescind the Ad Hoardings appearing.

No action was taken until Sept 2018, remarkably two months after GCC Legal had inadvertently disclosed that GCC admitted they had breached the Dec 1999 CPO contract with USD, but the advice was to not disclose this. For the record, GCC DRS did not disclose this to its own Econ Dev Committee in Dec 2022, or either to their then Lord Provost in April 2004 or to then First Minister McConnell or to USP and its lawyers, despite stating they had! Surely, this misrepresentation will be reviewed!

Especially as we also now know DRS/Legal deliberately did not disclose the CPO Contract Breach Dec 2002 Econ Dev Committee meeting, nor did it disclose then the very real legal liability GCC would have faced if this had been disclosed? One must question, again, if there were functioning ethical oversight and accountability protocols circa 2002-2004, and just what were certain Councillors briefed or not.

Action included the Council seeking an interdict at the Court of Session to prevent further unauthorised advertising on the scaffolding surrounding the listed building. An out-of-court agreement was reached, leading to the cessation of further banner advertisements on the scaffolding.

Agreed, but this could have been achieved by a simple email exchange, saving scarce resources (**£40k** legal fees, USI and **£15k** GCC), which would have been allocated to Maintenance. GCC must have money to waste despite its public statements to the contrary.

Moreover, the Ad Hoarding income could have been mandated to GCC to hold for maintenance/scaffold upgrade (necessary as there is no safe access to the façade until it is upgraded). And it's now needed, so will GCC now blame USP and USI for not having the income to fund this? Jings, if so, this becomes so serious for Scotland's democratic checks and balances. Could GCC really get away with rescinding a much-needed income stream based on abuse of power, ignoring expert advice, and then blaming the lack of income on the companies it cut by 80% of the income for no proven benefits? Perplexing to the ninth degree! And of course not taking similar action against Hoarding promoting GCC's own People Make Glasgow campaign **300M** away from 2018 till the present day, a period of discrimination and bias of SEVEN YEARS!

And the following is surely a prime example of cutting one's nose to spite one's face. Given as stated and stated and stated to continue to access the scaffold platform, it has to be upgraded, which will cost circa **£100k+** and would have been funded out of the Ad Hoarding income that did not accrue since Aug 2023.

And now access to the platform, and of course, whatever Repairs work cannot be carried out until the Scaffold platform is upgraded. Further, it's a possibility the Scaffold platform may become unsafe to be tied to the various floors given the measured, proven massively reduced commercial strength – circa 30%!!! USI is of the opinion this was also actioned to reduce income, as GCC believed massive income was being syphoned off, which is patently nonsense.

It would also appear the Scottish Government has no locus over any of GCC's activities, having failed to ask GCC since Aug 2018 to explain why in 2004 they failed to disclose the actual true position to Scotland's then First Minister, who'd taken a personal interest in why the Egyptian Halls project had stalled, and, to repeat, ***'He feels that the Council's actions may be putting the project to repair and restore the building in jeopardy.*** *I would be grateful if you could reply directly to Mr Souter, outlining the Council's position. Can you also let me have a copy of the response for our records?"*

The current FM, John Swinney, has been asked again if he believes the FM Office being misled significantly is important enough to revisit. Given the future existence of this Grade A architectural masterpiece is on the line, he will need to decide one way or another PDQ. Or will the SNP administration just sit on their hands despite the unequivocal proof its agencies – GDA and HS – were instrumental in creating the environment for a raft of factors and never predictable consequences to coalesce so catastrophically?

3.53 As part of the resolution, the owners of the Egyptian Halls gave a formal undertaking to the court not to cause, undertake, or permit any advertisements on the scaffolding without prior consent from the Council.

And how can maintenance, scaffolding upgrades and a creative business plan be developed when income is cut 80% due to having to have in place scaffolding to protect public safety, which costs £50K per annum? So is Demolition and New Build now the only options, as if the Scaffolding is removed due to being unaffordable, the Egyptian Halls will become a Dangerous Building immediately.

The court's formalisation of the undertaking ensures compliance. This long-running process has ultimately achieved the Council's aim of prohibiting inappropriate large-scale advertising that detracts from the visual amenity of the conservation area. Since the agreement, no further banner advertisements have been displayed on the scaffolding.

However, GCC's own sign remains installed on the Met Building, despite planning permission having expired in Sep 2014. This is a prima facie example of one rule for the Egyptian Halls and another for the Met Building – one of which uses Ad Hoarding income to fund maintenance, scaffolding, electricity, studies and reports, while the other displays a People Make Glasgow Advert FOC.

All in all, a totally misinformed action by GCC, which believed the Scaffolding was not protecting public safety. When in fact it's now being uncovered that GCC issued a strong request for USP to implement in full the 1991 LBRN so as to protect public safety. This was back in Feb 2002, so given that GCC-Scot Govt refuse to accept the financial consequences of their combined errors and lack of joined-up Govt, the scaffolding has been both protecting public safety and making a significant contribution to the preservation of the façade. Basically GCC either don't comprehend this or just choose to discount this as they seek to achieve some form of performative leverage. Pats on the back for all connected with this waste of time and resources.

4.0 Voluntary Acquisition by Council

4.1 Glasgow City Council has no intended use for the building and is not in a financial position to make a voluntary acquisition at this time.

USP and USI believe this can be assessed to check all options open to allow GCC to have a significant presence and have recommended an effective approach to achieve this, as of 3rd Feb 2025.

5.0 Current Proposal – 5.1 The Council has been approached by an interested party which wishes to acquire the Egyptian Halls building with the intention of delivering a mixed-use repurposing proposal. This proposal is at an early stage and is considered to be commercially sensitive; however, plans would comprise a new food/restaurant market development on lower floors with a hotel on upper floors.

This is very surprising indeed and *is considered to be commercially sensitive. Firstly,* it's somehow accepted by GCC that The List's (sic) offer is to be treated as the aforementioned. But The List can disclose to GCC what it had agreed was also ***"commercially sensitive"*** with the Standard Security holders. Surely GCC is demonstrating considerable bias against the co-owners and the project investors.

Also for GCC to define the following as being commercially sensitive is bordering on a lack of commercial acumen given the willing buyers asked for a purchase price and were advised to offer purchase prices separately for the Upper Floors property and also for the Ground Floor properties.

The response back did not meet the threshold for contractual assessment. Therefore at no time was there contractual congruence between the apparent willing buyer and the willing sellers (USP and USI). Therefore, the foundation underpinning this report is all but untenable from this juncture onwards.

However, let's continue the assessment of what it is, and it's stretching the definition between nascent and embryonic **POTENTIAL offers.** ***"We would like to formally offer you £2m for the building. This would be made up of 10% of the profits of the business per annum, capped at a total value of £2m, paid over as many years as necessary."*** One does conjecture that GCC has to therefore state this to be "***commercially sensitive",*** as in fact the "interested party" has actually offered **ZERO**.

And if detailed in the Report, would see questions asked as per detailed below. Let's also factor in GCC, HES and the Scottish Government have all stated since circa 2010 this was a commercial project, and we must find a commercial solution – despite simultaneously saying commercial projects were all non-viable and without external funding no scheme could happen. Again the essence of cognitive dissonance for all to assess, including local MSPs and Heritage journalists, (many are willing conduits for GCC.)

GCC also have no ownership interests, have invested zero funding and are the prime cause (along with GDA/HS-HES) of a 27-year delay. They appear, instead, to believe what they are told by non-owners, who have made no actual offer to purchase the property from the known co-owners as had been asked. Moreover, it would seem GCC still have fundamental, irreconcilable challenges believing what the actual owners say or what their core professional team advises, as well as GCC's specified scheme architect? Is this actually blatant bias, lack of conservation knowledge, lack of valuation and commercial transactional experience actually being passed off as development assessment?

The lower floors, it should be noted, are owned by USP Ltd and the separately valued Gourmet Food Market concept discussed with GCC 2013-2014, whereas the upper floors are owned by USI Ltd and separately valued. Despite being approved in 2013, both were derailed when GCC failed to provide the funding they had promised (this is on record from an independent professional planning consultant).

The proposed scheme would retain the existing building and would include a modest extension to the roof to create additional floor space

Firstly, this ignores the separately owned Upper Floors are for the Hotel schemes and the separately owned Ground Floor properties for Bars, Restaurants-Gourmet Food Market. Therefore there is no proposed scheme currently apart from in the minds of the interested party, who, to reinforce, have not made any relevant offers to purchase these separately owned and valued properties. SCT-GCHT, HES and GCC, none of whom have any ownership locus; yep, as remarkable as it is perplexing, but we'll continue. A two-storey extension was approved in 2013 (separate Upper-Floors hotel); if it had been a three- or even a four-storey extension, the extra value would have bridged the deficit left when GCC failed to deliver its agreed share pre-application, which is proven by independent commentary.

To repeat (2010-2013), the entire USI Upper Floors surplus/ Developer's profit (£3M+ was allocated to assist in reducing the Ground Floor deficit – something GCC appears to have forgotten. Skim the following link ***https://www.ipetitions.com/petition/save_the_egyptianhalls/*** *(see Page 59)*

Note the detail, the collaboration and how close this came to fruition in 2011-2012. Note the scale and quantum of the USI-offered contribution to reduce the deficit to an amount which, of course, GCC and the Scottish Government could have and should have provided. And of course, the GCC "promised" to fund pre-2012 application approval (independent evidence attached in case anyone needs the proof)

Again another example of voluntary private sector contribution that's just been airbrushed out of the current GCC landscape it appears. And beyond doubt USI will reinforce this to the nth degree

Given Skyline Changes were obviously being planned, why was a CPO Review instigated Feb 2025?

The latest policy announcement relating to Glasgow's skyline, June 2025, is noted in the Herald Scotland

https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/25212372.major-changes-glasgow-skyline-horizon-new-policy-agreed/?ref=ebbn&nid=1388&u=dd4cdf1fd1f802e39820d1128c5e9230&date=030625

Given this policy was already in the pipeline, the decision by GCC to initiate a Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) Review is even more perplexing, **especially considering the option to increase the number of upper floors has been consistently tabled since 2010 through to 2023/2024 as a way to reduce the long-standing and growing financial deficit, the only obstacle to project delivery since 2010.**

Furthermore, this expansion was intended to be a central feature of a joint feasibility study between GCC and Ediston (Spring 2023), which was later cancelled without explanation. USP also submitted separate feasibility study proposals in mid-2024. These events suggest the existence of internal knowledge gaps within GCC itself.

For the record, the opportunity to expand upwards from **two to four storeys** was effectively allowed to atrophy 15 years ago. At that time, this would have revitalised Union Street, created hundreds of jobs, and generated circa **£10M** of business rates. Crucially, it would also have preserved this Greek Thomson architectural masterpiece.

The lack of joined-up Government was, of course, proven earlier in 2010 when then Culture Minister Fiona Hyslop declined to provide extraordinary funding. This preceded critical decisions in 2011–2012 to reject a four-storey extension that would have secured the final tranche of required funding by increasing the Egyptian Halls valuation by **£3M**, complementing an already confirmed **£10.5M** from USI, HES, USD and BPRA funding.

Combined, these funds would have brought the deficit close to zero. Then a three-storey extension was refused, with only two storeys ultimately approved. This forced GCC's DRS to seek extraordinary internal funding, culminating in the under-delivery of the then-approved scheme that should have been completed 15 years ago.

Yet now a serendipitous opportunity arises! Given *"a significant change from the past decades, where buildings have been capped well below what might be expected in a city of Glasgow's size and growing international profile. Glasgow is unique among Scottish cities in having the scope to build upwards, building towards the kind of city centre population density that's commonplace in European cities.* Councillor Ruairi Kelly, Convener for Development, added, *"Tall buildings will play a significant role in our ambition to grow the city centre population, and encouraging major construction projects will be a boost for the local economy and employment."*

This will directly benefit the already planned GCC NRS initiatives. It could also significantly increase the development value of the USI-owned upper floors, providing greater flexibility to contribute toward reducing the known ground floor deficit, which must be addressed regardless of ownership, whether by USP or others. However, this requires GCC/Scot Govt collaboration, which to date has been a soundbite and all but a chimaera.

Early review suggests that this proposal could be acceptable in principle in Planning terms.

Again, a disingenuous statement given it ignores the agreed parlous, dire structural conditions, e.g., a trigger event could cause progressive collapse, and ignores four failed applications caused by GCC-GDA-HS/Scot Govt.

And that both GCC and HES have stated since 2010 conservation-centric schemes are all non-viable. And to repeat, there had been no offer, so USP and USI are mystified as to how there can be a competent proposal. And also what is envisaged is a carbon copy of the 2012-2013 approved application. What is there to review?

To repeat, this was not delivered due to GCC failing to contribute their agreed gap funding contribution. And of course this project was praised by The List on 6th Dec 2023 (comments in blue): *"It's unfortunate that hotel development couldn't complete, as I am sure it would have been wonderful."* Now GCC and The List, the SCT, local Heritage Groups and an MSP or two are seeking to gazump the legal owners; GCC themselves are on record stating "***have committed a very significant expenditure on site assembly***" So why does GCC-Scot Govt not compensate whoever owns the Ground Floor properties for the consequences of proven errors, mistakes and misrepresentation from 1997 to 2025? *Taking into consideration the large deficit* **(this is attributable to the Ground Floor Properties only; the Upper Floors have a sizeable surplus that, once mature trading is reached, will increase)** *we are going to have to overcome, the current value of the building* (there is no plan in place on how to achieve this, and the deficit is apportioned to the Ground Floor properties no matter who owns them*), "not to mention the undertaking of the development".* Again, this makes no reference to the Deed of Conditions, Conservation Burden, LBRN obligations costs, structural challenges, complexities and the advice from GCC-Scot Govt that this is a commercial project. This is, perhaps, not surprising, as it is not addressed by the SCT, MSP Sweeney, GCHT or GCC, as they continually repeat untenable structural opinions. One would think none have heard or read this despite all being at the Save the Egyptian Halls initiative, fronted by the SCT (which they did not invite the co-owners to). ***"There are some complex issues around Egyptian Halls. Solving those issues will need some creative solutions. It needs creative approaches to design and engineering, but also creative approaches to funding. It also needs a commitment from all involved to continue to discuss and test a wide range of options."*** HES Feb 2020 Thomson Symposium.

5.2 The proposal would also require to be assessed against the evaluation criteria to be developed in accordance with section 8 below.

GCC and any serious, funded "*interested party*" will require to adhere to the legally non-variable LBRN and the registered and legally Deed of Conditions/Conservation Burden and take full cognisance of this (none of which is referenced in this report). If GCC were being fair, honest, transparent, collaborative and showing equal favour, they would have clarified they and the Scottish Government have defined this as a commercial project – and the only commercial solution is New Build. However, this was denied to USP in 2010, 2016 and 2019. In parallel, there is a material failure to assess for balance the on-file Development Appraisals from 2008-2019 (the 2012 example is very prescient), showing a significant Upper Floors surplus – this, despite GCC being on record praising USP for this activity.
If this goes to the SPSO or the Lands Tribunal, commercial property case law will require to be adhered to. To repeat, GCC used the then-existing Deed of Conditions when developing the 1996 CPO with the original Ground Floor consortium and at the 2002-2008 Lands Tribunal action. Is this a reflection of deciding to use the law or not use the law as and when it suits?

5.3 The Council understands an informal offer to purchase the building was made by this interested party at a figure in excess of an independent valuation, but this was not progressed by the owners.

GCC surely cannot be founded upon this; based on the broadest of commercial property law, the willing buyers asked for a purchase price and were advised to offer separately for the Upper Floors property and also for the Ground Floor properties. Email extract 8th Dec 2023

You highlight the wish to acquire the building, and I've clarified

- *The actual state of the building and the approximate costs*
- *That the USP-owned Ground Floor properties has a significant deficit as per apportioned Deed of Conditions as they have to pay 100% of the 1991 LBRN discharge costs (see attached)*

- *And the USI-owned Upper Floors a decent surplus as per apportioned Deed of Conditions, given they have ZERO cost liability for the 1991 LBRN discharge costs (see attached).*

Any offer should take cognisance of this ownership model given this. So can I ask that a Private & Confidential offer is made for each company and that would then be assessed by the Directors/investors?

The response back did not meet this criteria. Therefore at no time was their contractual congruence between the apparent willing buyer and the willing sellers (USP and USI). Therefore the foundation underpinning this report is untenable. However this "interested party" then fails to perform unequivocally with no follow-up activity despite being asked via email FOUR times to establish a commercially acceptable threshold to allow a developing proposal to be considered by the two willing sellers, no proof of funding, no source of funding, no timescale to pay, no proof of Heads of Terms or comprehensive due diligence? Also there is no mention by the List that this was based on an independent valuation.

The first this was referenced was in the GCC report. Why did the List not disclose this? Given The List is a media sales entity appears to have made this sales pitch fundamentally weaker to the point it's untenable. And does the alleged independent valuation that The List offered above the figure calculated actually exist? GCC is asked to evidence its existence, given it's in the CPO report. Further, the assertion that an independent valuation was discussed with USP or with USI is an egregious falsehood. No professional Chartered Surveyor assessed the building formally on behalf of the List. The List were advised from the outset there were separate valuations for the Ground Floor and for the Upper Floors.

Again, it had been asked, how could GCC state this? Maybe it was inadvertent or even deliberate misrepresentation? Given it assists GCC establishing the case for a CPO Review, but surely not GCC being economical with the actualité again? But as we now know this is 2024 updated version of the GCC-commissioned 2016 and 2019 reports and was further updated in July 2025 but contains material errors, flaws and mistakes, and therefore the bulk of the assumptions made are markedly questionable at best.

One would have also expected this independent "desktop" valuation to be caveated as follows: "*The figure reference is provided for indicative purposes only, based on the limited information available at this date. We have not inspected the property and have not been provided with a Report on Title, lease or other relevant legal documentation. This desktop valuation should not be relied upon and is provided with no liability on our part."* This casts further doubt on the provenance of the claimed "*independent valuation"*.

"Independent Valuation" claim untenable due to ignoring actual Title Deeds and RICS guidelines

We're now aware of the 2016, 2019, 2024 and 2025 District Valuers Reports but as yet have not been disclosed the 2024 DV Report, given it's surmised it's optimistic in relation to securing the grant funding denied to USP since 2010. And if so, this blatant discrimination/bias will have to be accounted for fully. It does seem SNP Scotland can be anti-business. Across these reports the DV was correct in using the then-relevant Deed of Conditions and it should be noted the DV did for the GCC 2016 DV Report use the correct Deed of Conditions/Repairs apportionment at that time. However, the DV then did not use the current applicable version for the 2019, 2024 and 2025 reports, which is very surprising but understandable, as we surmise the 2024 was just updated at speed.

See legal advice shared with GCC 21st October 2024 – Ken Gerber/Mitchells Roberton

If one were to download the title sheets for the constituent parts of the building, they would see that these do not make any reference to the 2008 Deed of Conditions, but they do contain the current and valid 2017 Deed of Conditions. My clients tell me they have been informed via GCC DRS that the District Valuer believes he can make certain assumptions; however, the use of Rateable Values is founded upon the use of current Rateable Values (2017 onwards), ***and my clients have pointed out that such is actually not an assumption but is the accepted manner of proceeding as decided and as recorded on file via the Scottish Assessors website based on Rateable Values assessed and calculated by your Council or your Council's appointed Valuation Board.***

RICS Standard Practice – The following general guidelines are adhered to as follows:

Title deeds: For residential properties in Scotland, particularly common tenement buildings, the title deeds specify the owners' responsibilities for common repairs and the formula for apportioning costs (the Egyptian Halls is in effect a Tenement Building.)

An **RICS Red Book valuation** report may reference title deeds to assess how repair obligations are apportioned, but this is a complex issue often clarified by specific legal documents like a lease or a transfer deed. While the Red Book itself is a set of global valuation standards, a valuer will investigate legal and title issues, including the lease, to identify any constraints or obligations that affect value and a property's condition, and this includes repair responsibilities.

How title deeds and the Red Book relate to repairs

- **Valuation focus:** A Red Book valuation report is primarily an opinion of a property's market value and condition, not a detailed building survey. However, a valuer will identify any legal issues that could impact this value. Separate ownership, separate Repairs Apportionment, legally non-variable LBRN discharge, and the 2008 Conservation Burden are all missing from DV Reports.
- **Title deed investigation:** A key part of the valuation process is reviewing title documents, which can include details on who is responsible for what repairs. Uses wrong Deed of Conditions; why?
- **Apportionment clarification:** For properties with a lease, the lease document is the primary source for determining repair responsibilities. The title deeds will also confirm the lease terms. A valuer will use these documents to understand if responsibility is shared or if one party is solely responsible for certain repairs. DV does this but does not use the current Deed of Conditions that's referenced within the title Deeds for 84, 88, 96, 100 Union Street (Ground Floor) and 92 Union Street- (Upper Floors)
- **Impact on value: The** extent and cost of repairs, and who is responsible for them, directly impacts the property's value. If a leaseholder is responsible for a large and costly repair, this could affect the property's market value. Agreed 100% as per Dev Apps on file 1999-2019

Key Fundamental not actioned – WHY?

- **An RICS valuer will check title deeds and lease documents as part of the valuation process to identify any repair obligations.** We do not know which documents the DVs were briefed on, but as Mr Gerber stated in an email to GCC on Tuesday 21st Oct, *"To summarise, GCC are correct in using a Deed of Conditions, but they are not using the current applicable version. They did it should be noted use for the GCC 2016 DV Report the correct RV's at that time.*

For the record, the actual owners, USP and USI, after taking soundings from the separate standard security holders, made a commercial decision given they were actually unsure whether the List wanted the Upper Floors and maybe the Ground Floors; they certainly had no idea about the LBRN obligations, the actual structural position and the existence of both the Conservation Burden and causal Deed of Conditions. This "nascent" approach was assessed but did not present full value for the valuable development option that is the separately owned Upper Floors. Nor did the List communicate it had access to the funding required to discharge the 1991 LBRN.

However, one forms the distinct impression GCC do not – or choose not to – understand this either. Looking more closely at the "*informal offer",* claimed to have been made and highlighted in numerous articles, as "*we would like to formally offer you* ***£2m*** *for the building. This would be made up of 10% of the profits of the business per annum, capped at a total value of* ***£2m*** *paid over as many years as necessary."*

To repeat and reinforce the meaning of the words *"we would like to formally offer you": who are "we" a*nd who are *"you"* in this email? This is not even close to any semblance of an offer. Moreover, the alleged offer of **£2M** was not immediate but **£2M** over a period of, e.g., five years or 10 years (it is difficult to pinpoint as this was never discussed).

Therefore, it is not the same value unless interest is factored in, such as 6% per year cumulative. As noted above, it is akin to buying on Hire Purchase but without guaranteed payments and no credit history.

What investment might fund these non-guaranteed payments out of non-guaranteed potential future profit from the assets they want but don't want to offer market value for, as per the independent development appraisals provided to GCC 2008-2019? Similarly, as with HP, the ownership of goods and services – in this instance the property – would rest with the owners. In effect, the properties represented in both the Ground and Upper Floors with separate title deeds could not be used as collateral, as they have not as yet been purchased or paid for.

To finish the 8th of Dec email 2023 Derek Souter stated, ***"Happy to field any comments/aspects for clarification. Have a relaxing weekend."***

And this was followed up on the 14th, 18th and 20th Dec., all on file

Subject: *Re: Egyptian Halls, Glasgow – Mackintosh-Thomson Mews – POTENTIAL OFFER*
On 14 Dec 2023, at 09:57, Derek Souter <derek@djscm.com> wrote: Lloyd, morning. ***Just wondering if William/You want access for a "tour` ' after Christmas or early New Year?*** *Derek*
From: *Lloyd Dignan <lloyd.dignan@listmarket.co.uk>* ***Date:*** *Monday, 18 December 2023 at 15:02*
To: *Derek Souter <derek@djscm.com>* ***Cc:*** *William Burdett-Coutts <wbc@assemblyfestival.com>*
Subject: *Re: Egyptian Halls, Glasgow- Mackintosh-Thomson Mews- POTENTIAL OFFER*

Hi Derek, ***We will need to get back to you, it depends on availability which we will need to figure out over the next week or so.*** *Regards, Lloyd*

Date: *Wednesday 20 December 2023 at 14:16* ***To:*** *Lloyd Dignan <lloyd.dignan@listmarket.co.uk>*
Cc: *William Burdett-Coutts <wbc@assemblyfestival.com>*
Subject: *Re: Egyptian Halls, Glasgow- Mackintosh-Thomson Mews- POTENTIAL OFFER*

Lloyd Afternoon ***I'd prefer after New Year if we can?*** *Have a relaxing Christmas when it comes and a Happy New Year when it comes. Thanks Derek*

Therefore, there was no failure to progress by USP and USI and this renders even more the claim at 5.3 ***"an informal offer to purchase the building was made by an interested party in excess of an independent valuation but this was not progressed by the owners"*** **as being utterly untenable**
Further and pursuant to this, repeat and separate offers for Ground Floor properties and Upper Floors were asked for and again not provided – even the approach asked for was not adhered too.

Contractual Bad Faith- confirmation discussions were confidential 16th Oct 2023 ***Ok great thank you, that would be helpful. As we have said, nothing you have disclosed has been shared outside of myself and William as agreed. Morning Derek, Of course, all our conversations are kept confidential. Look forward to receiving the cost plan and your valuation for sale.*** *Regards, Lloyd*

The mystery "*independent Valuation".* As stated since March 2025 in the CPO Review this has been called into question due to being wholly inaccurate regarding an "informal offer" and that this "was not progressed by the owners". And unequivocal proof has been provided but to date ignored by GCC

However it has now came to light (July 2025 DV Report) that even the claim there was an *independent valuation* as a baseline for comparison is at best tangential, misleading and at worst fabricated. In fact this refers to the District Valuer 2024 Valuation defined as such by the District Valuer in the 2025 DV iteration *An additional valuation, prepared for the Glasgow Building Preservation Trust (GBPT) in 2024, was facilitated by, and shared with GCC.* So to repeat it's not an *independent valuation* given GCC was involved in its development; very likely to be funding it and providing the previous 2016 and 2019 GCC commissioned valuations as background/framework. We have yet to be provided with the 2024 DV Report but are 99.99% this repeats the previous reports and is included in the 2025 Report.

So on every key point across Section 5 there are signal and proven inaccuracies, no offer was made, no tenable independent valuation existed to assess against, and the interested party failed to progress on FOUR chronological occasions. On the face of it, there has been little or no effective fact-checking; if there was, then this would not have developed to this now untenable position. Therefore the Current Proposal as submitted for approval unequivocally is out with all parameters of accuracy, objectivity, transparency, and deliverability. The fact it was approved requires it to be reviewed by an independent process.

Key Points Summary re "Interested Party":.

1. It's not a formal offer, it's not an informal offer; it was defined as a Potential Offer, which was then never made! **FACT**
2. It's not even a guaranteed sum; it's akin to Hire Purchase but transfers ownership before it's paid for! **FACT**
3. No offer has been made for the Ground Floor properties as asked for by the owners. **FACT**
4. No offer has been made for the Upper Floor property as asked for by the owners. **FACT**
5. No independent valuation was carried out of the separately valued Ground Floor 99% **FACT**
6. No independent valuation was carried out of the separately valued Upper Floors 99% **FACT**
7. No offer in excess of an independent valuation has been made or could have been made. **FACT**
8. The alleged interested party failed 8th, 14th and 20th December 2023 to follow up interest." **FACT**
9. The alleged interested party has breached the private and confidential undertaking it provided, so it is now excluded from any future discussion for this egregious bad faith. **FACT**

And this makes the GCC report even untenable due to the Proposal it is founding upon being fundamentally inaccurate, misrepresentative, and in breach of agreed confidentiality **And has GCC used legally commercially sensitive information that should not have been disclosed to it?**

And from a commercial perspective, we were presented with a buyer with no proof of funds or proof of source of funds who claimed an offer in excess of an independent valuation was made (no evidence provided) and that there was no follow-up from the owners (an egregious falsehood), yet they are granted a seat at the top table with GCC and the heritage bodies, while the actual owners are discarded.

GCC appear to be adopting Distributive Negotiation tactics (favoured by the USA currently) as opposed to Integrative Negotiation tactics favoured by USP, USI and the Standard Security holders, as well as the SNP government, in many media releases ***https://blogs.iu.edu/keep/distributive-negotiation-vs-integrative-negotiation***. Both USP and USI would appeal separately any CPO via the Court of Session and also seek a Lands Tribunal adjudication.

Mysterious mention and reference to Ediston?

Feb 2025 GCC also claim the following: *The council said the owner (co-owned) of the Egyptian Halls recently refused a bid* (for the record, the co-owners never received any bid(s)) ***to buy the building from a group led by arts guide The List and real estate company Ediston***. For the record, the co-owners have never met anyone from Ediston. However, there is more to this than meets the eye indeed. Given Sept 2022, GCC's Chief Exec's office stated, ***"Officers have been working over an extended period of time to try and realise the shared ambition of bringing this building back into productive use. In pursuit of this, the GCC requested information to allow them to review feasibility options. It is hoped that the outcome of this will allow progress to be made.*** Hence, this in conjunction with the Car-Free core city centre zone prompted the Mackintosh-Thomson Mews concept to be expedited/developed and presented to GCC, and GCC agreed to fund a Feasibility Study via Ediston in early 2023.

Basic Due Diligence Questions

- What would happen to any financial agreement if SS holders transferred ownership and the alleged/proposed food hall business subsequently failed?
- What if the Upper Floors Hotel failed, too, and we'd transferred the Upper Floors with no control on the title deeds? This is akin to buying on Hire Purchase with no credit history and with no guaranteed payments.
- What funding would meet these non-guaranteed payments out of non-guaranteed potential future profits?
- As with Hire Purchase the ownership rests with the seller until it is paid in full; this means they would not control the titles and therefore would not have any collateral?
- The List had been asked for an offer for the separately owned Ground Floor and separately owned Upper Floors. The List did not respond from 8th December onwards. How can that be the fault of the willing sellers?
- Also note the alleged independent valuation, which this "informal offer" was in excess of and founded upon by GCC when deciding to implement the envisaged CPO review. This surely cannot exist if it is a Profit Share offer, as there are no financial projections?

The Big Game Changer – Mackintosh-Thomson Mews Concept:
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page4.html *Mackintosh-Thomson Mews + Golden Z + Avenues + Frasers = the equal of or better than St Christopher,* ***https://www.stchristophersplace.com/*** *which takes one from Marylebone to Regent Street and back. Glasgow can deliver better than this.*

Ediston agreed via GCC to fund a feasibility study, and USP would fund the required Scaffolding upgrade needed to afford access to the façade and parapet. GCC then resiled from this; the senior GCC Officer promoting this initiative had left, and the new Officer had decided not to progress, as Ediston apparently believed it was not a prudent use of scarce funding. Somehow another knowledge gap appears. In light of the above, it's perplexing a CPO Feasibility Review has been mounted by GCC, and the List would become a back-to-back buyer, given their proposal is not remotely even a conditional offer and was not refused – the List themselves did not respond or follow up. No discussions of acceptable Heads of Terms were held, so how could it be developed with no due diligence, no assessment of the entity that would fund the payments and no certainty of payments? The expectation that USP and USI would transfer the title deeds for no guarantee of payment is also as perplexing as it would not be remotely a commercial decision.
Note, too, there is no mention of the independent valuation GCC reference as one of the primary factors this "informal offer" was founded upon by GCC when deciding to implement the envisaged CPO review. This cannot exist if it's a Profit Share offer. GCC must also clarify this as soon as possible.

Moreover, GCC are at considerable pains to advise consistently this is a commercial project, yet when USP and USI act in their best commercial interests, as is their inalienable commercial and legal right, they have been sandbagged by GCC

If one refers to the estimated costs from Hardies Cost Consultants specified by GCC's Conservation Bond specified architect, which reference LBRN specification – mandatory due to being legally non-variable (GCC on record 2005 and 2009), at a basic level, there is no Developers Profit, no Site Assembly costs (Option 2), which sees the "informal offer" proposal for a "modest extension" come in at **£20.7M**. So with at least another **£4-£6M+** of costs, this amounts to **£25-£27M+.**

How a back-to-back buyer reconciles this, given separately owned Ground Floor values are at circa **minus £25M+** and separately owned Upper Floors with a value of circa **+£5M-£8M** is indeed a conundrum. The absence of this information is not referenced in the CPO Report, as it claims a lack of engagement from USP and USI despite the on-record information. Again, Fact-Checking is a constantly recurring issue. If the List had actually engaged fully, they'd have been briefed on this, but they declined to engage. **EVIDENCE ON FILE BUT IGNORED BY GCC TO SUIT ITS FABRICATED APPROACH**

Furthermore, their favoured architects had no idea of either of these – they were stunned on Oct 2023 when I informed them of this at the ATS General Meeting. Neither did the SCT, who, when informed, ignored this altogether. Given the aforementioned, any Councillor should now be asking how an "interested party", whose unproven and unsatisfactory commercial offer was **NOT IN FACT** rejected by the owners but that the interested party failed to follow it up by having further discussions **FOUR TIMES** as offered by the **WILLING SELLERS**, can get GCC to jump through hoops. The scheme proposed would cost circa **£25M+**.

Unless GCC has a cunning plan that it can't divulge, as it would then have to adopt a fair and honest approach. Maybe it's Ediston using Pension Fund leeway allied to the GB Govt **£50B** fund for genuine asset development (**National Wealth Fund??),** which Mackintosh–Thomson Mews certainly has the potential to be game-changing for Union Street, Mitchell Street and Mitchell Lane. Does GCC not like or admire entrepreneurial activity? Aha, maybe you have to be a heritage "*mover and shaker*"

It's evident that a familiar and disappointing approach of opinion and causal belief displaces actual facts based on legal obligations. A prime example is when, on 30th April 2019, GCC and HES openly disputed the provenance, credibility and integrity of the scheme costs specified (Hardies) and scheme valuations (Shepherd) and separate site assembly costs (EQ Chartered Accountants). Yet failed to commission the Peer Review process promised of the aforementioned. And again, why is GCC interfering in a potential commercial transaction and only getting one side of the story? Again, this will form part of any appeal(s), if required. USP, Ground Floor owners, and USI, Upper Floor owners, will be ensuring their separate provable significant investments are recouped. To repeat, the List's Valuation Surveyor has had no access, so how could they get a professional "independent valuation" that could then be assessed by Shepherd Surveyors? Could GCC's new "partners" have been embellishing or even inaccurately inflating the scale, level and provenance of their involvement? Regarding Ediston's "alleged" stated interest, which was rebuffed according to GCC, to repeat, this becomes even more confusing. In circa 2019 Ediston was approached by USP's Derek Souter (via Shepherd Surveyors). They declined the opportunity to meet but did express an interest in a New Build on the NCP Mitchell Street site. GCC appear to be unaware of this, and again this indicates a report very light on facts and fact-checking.

Again, this is yet another indication of a report very light on facts **(SOME WOULD SAY AKIN TO A PAUCITY OF FACTS)** and fact-checking, to say the least. However, as per earlier emails highlighted, this could and should be looked at again, especially given the following: *"Glasgow will be one of the first city regions to benefit from/provide deeper, more focused investment from the National Wealth Fund" (**https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czxknwyxk09o**)*. The Standard Security holders are to reach out via an intermediary to meet Ediston (**for the first time**)

6.0 Planning Policy

6.1 It is considered necessary for the proper planning of the area that the property is returned to active use and repurposed to align with the City Development Plan's aspirations to repair, restore and enhance historic assets, improve the amenity of the Central Conservation Area and boost the vibrancy and economic competitiveness of the City Centre. The overall aim is to regenerate the building and, by doing so, improve and enhance the area surrounding it and the Union Street entrance at Central Station.

USP and USI have been working to deliver this since 1998 (all on record). One must ask if GCC and HES can now state the same, given their proven errors, mistakes, incompetence and non-disclosure.

Bringing this deteriorating building at risk back into productive economic and sustainable reuse aligns further with key policy objectives in National Planning Framework 4 (Policy 1 and 2) for tackling the climate and nature crises, climate mitigation and adaptation and (Policy 7) the reuse of existing buildings and historic assets.

We reference our response to Point 6.1 above and add the fact of USP being praised by GCC, notably on record in 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2010.

6.2 and 6.3 As with point 6.1 above.

These outcomes create the rationale for the CDP's policies and proposals.

6.3 to 6.8 USP, USI and Standard Security Holders agree 100% and would bring GCC's attention to GCC's Bailie Cameron's correspondence to Culture Minister Hyslop in which the envisaged scheme being scoped would have delivered on these strategic objectives 15 years ago.

This was not achieved due to GCC failing to provide the gap funding it had agreed to contribute (all on record) or, indeed, the then Culture Minister failing to approve ***"extraordinary funding"***. Would this have been approved 15 years ago if GCC had in fact disclosed the actual true position and took ownership of the consequences of its unilaterally implemented Feb 1998 CPO Amendment founded upon a materially flawed and inaccurate structural assessment by a non-conservation accredited structural engineer

6.9 to 6.12 USP and USI would remind and reinforce GCC that early in 2023 we approached the NCP Mitchell Street owners to look to develop and the create Mackintosh-Thomson Mews (a plan dating back to April 2000). This led to the development of the concept, which was presented to a Senior GCC Officer, and a Feasibility study was to be developed early 2023 ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page4.html***

However, post mid-2023, and with Ediston resiling from a joint feasibility study option, GCC had another Senior Officer, and it took a year to facilitate a meeting to look to discuss (non-viable) scheme options. GCC then cancelled this due to taking court action, and then their representative left. However the GCC agenda for this cancelled meeting was as follows:

- *GCC would welcome constructive dialogue on the future of the building*
- *GCC may be interested in acquiring the building and allowing all parties to move on*
- *GCC would like to have an in-person meeting to discuss potential routes forward.*
- ***GCC are currently of the opinion that the scaffolding can be removed without creating a safety issue. (Contradicts expert advice from the GCC-specified Conservation Burden architect)***

It took until April 2024 to schedule the next meeting. Derek Souter did attend as an observer a meeting on Nov 2023 between GCC and Primevest (owners of the NCP Mitchell Street Car Park). After that meeting, USP and USI again pushed the potential for Mackintosh-Thomson Mews.

7.1 CPO Powers and GCC CPO Framework

7.2 The Council has powers under the Town and Country Planning (S) Act 1997 (the 1997 Act) to make a compulsory purchase order.

7.12 In particular, the evaluation criterion within the CPO Framework relating to ownership/attempts to negotiate purchase may be modified or disapplied.

The evaluation criteria will be approved by the Director of NRS in consultation with the Director of Legal and Administration to achieve the best terms in accordance with s.191 of the 1997 Act.

It's now proven beyond doubt the GCC DRS and Legal did not disclose the actual true position regarding the Dec 1999 CPO delays in June 2002 and thereafter, with the Economic Committee Report failing to disclose the contract breach and the financial and legal implications of this. The essence of any wrongdoing and impropriety is denied on record by GCC, despite in July 2018 admitting to a known but undisclosed contract breach that had not been disclosed to Scotland's FM 2004 and prior to that GCC's own Econ Dev Committee, and therefore "Souter" had a point, but it's just dismissed. And it was passed to be a complaint by the SLCC. Then mysteriously after GCC lobbying, the SLCC dismissed this summarily and, in essence, said to USP, "If you're not happy, sue us!!"

7.3 Section 189 states: - 3 Section 189 (2) further provides that: -

7.4 Land which is acquired using the powers in the 1997 Act can be transferred to a third party for development (in terms of s.191), subject to various tests being satisfied.

Very challenging to be satisfied 100%; proven non-viability, separate ownership, legally distinct repair obligations, public sector errors, mistakes and misrepresentation – as reflected, for example, in 1998 when a predicted few months' delay became a 12-year delay and now a 27-year delay (all on record and will be founded upon when and if needed).

7.5 The Council developed a CPO Framework for what are known as 'agency' or 'back to back' CPOs in response to the court cases arising out of the redevelopment of Buchanan Street in the late 1990s/early 2000s. (Report to Development and Regeneration Services Committee 26.10.2000) Firstly, this of course relates to relatively simple and significantly less complex potential transactions.

The Egyptian Halls differs massively due to the scale and timescale of the combined public sector incompetence (all on record), but which GCC appears to have significant gaps in their understanding of), including 100% proven non-viability, separate ownership, legally distinct repair obligations, public sector errors, mistakes, and misrepresentation at the core, which will be founded upon when and if needed.

7.6 That CPO Framework sets out circumstances in which the Council would consider using CPO powers under the 1997 Act. In accordance with the CPO Framework, officers have considered the current condition and use of the property, its planning history, and the approach made by an interested party. To repeat, we surmise this to be materially flawed, as it takes no cognisance of the embryonic commercial dialogue, the on-file evidence of GDA/HS and GCC's respective roles in the failure of the 1996 CPO, four failed planning applications, the fact GCC have confirmed the LBRN discharge is non-viable and support from studies, planning applications and Development Appraisals, GCC internal reports, the actual legally separate ownership, legally binding Deed of Conditions, and apportionment of repairs and Statutory Notices. Furthermore, we know there was no proper or competent approach, and GCC have now been briefed accordingly. Whether GCC knew there was not, by any definition, an offer made, some form of future, conditional profit share will be founded upon going forward, should that be required.

GCC had been given on a P&C basis 2008-2019 updated Development Appraisals, which it appears to have overlooked the provision of, despite being on record praising this. And if GCC NRS had looked at the 2008-2019 Development Appraisals, they'd have known the Upper Floors had a significant development surplus and the Ground Floor properties a combined massive deficit. Then again, this report could not have been written due to it being overwhelmingly biased, misinformed and inaccurate.

Let's not ever forget GCC had also praised USP in July 2010 for this: *"The developer has committed very significant expenditure on bringing the building into a single ownership, on preparing a range of technical and conservation studies, and on completing both option and development appraisals for a variety of potential end uses."*

So, if GCC are assessing all factors and inputs and outputs, where is the cognisance of the aforementioned? Where, too then, is the fairness and balance towards USP and USI that GCC states underpin this Review process? Why is the *"interested party"* receiving preferential treatment? GCC should now clarify this voluntarily or via relevant disclosure, given that the following will be applied should it be required.

https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/50.html.

To repeat, Point 6 is highly relevant and gives rise to the two questions that lie at the very heart of this

- ***Whether the terms on which GCC proposes to make the assembled site available to the developer are within the scope of that power?***

- ***Whether GCC took all relevant considerations into account when they decided to exercise the power in this way?***

and are of the view that, in broad terms, the acquisition of the land is reasonably necessary for planning purposes and compelling benefits are likely to be delivered as a result of the repair, repurposing and reuse of the building, such that the use of CPO powers should be investigated.

The failure to highlight how the 1996 CPO failed, ably assisted by GDA and HS and GCC, is not referenced – nor is the fact GCC acknowledged USP reconciled the 12-year title impasse.

7.7 There are 4 phases set out in the CPO Framework.
No comment apart from asking: Will fairness and transparency be afforded, practised and disclosed? To **date it's completely absent from all discussions with USP and USI directly or via agents**

7.8 In the typical situation, the Council will have been approached by a developer who is trying to assemble a site. USP and USI achieved this by 2008 (9 years later than it should have as per the Dec 1999 CPO Agreement) but then found the LBRN discharge project was non-viable due to GDA/HS and GCC (all on record; see 7.6 above). *The developer will usually either own part of the site or will have options to acquire it. They will have been unable to conclude voluntary negotiations to buy the rest of the site* (as yet, no proof has been provided this is the actual case, and this will be asked to be confirmed) *and will be requesting that the Council exercise CPO powers on their behalf to complete the site assembly.*

100% untenable, as no offer was ever made. The List won't have access to the significant capital required to even purchase the Upper Floors unless GCC are leveraging investment entities –

e.g., Are Ediston expected to commit scarce pension and/or investment funds to achieve this? And (as per 7.6 above) there was no proper, competent approach that would bear independent scrutiny. Note again Ediston exercised a commercial right **TO NOT ENGAGE TWICE**, in 2019 and 2023. Also, are GCC denying USP and separately USI the same relevant commercial rights they're affording both The List and also Ediston? This is surely not another example of GCC bias if you don't conform to GCC's non-commercial approach.

7.9 Phase 2 of the CPO Framework process would involve the Council asking for all owners and occupiers of the site to submit proposals to the council.

There have been four failed approved planning applications to date in 1997, 2000, 2005 and 2013. A concept for development has been with GCC since early 2022 that has been praised. It was agreed this was to be assessed via a Feasibility Study, but this was cancelled and, since then. GCC have been unwilling to accept the structural condition of the building to allow a fifth application that can be funded to be applied for and delivered. And If GCC do remove forcibly the scaffolding against the recommendations of both TMP and WRD then it's very likely indeed this would precipitate the demolition of this world-renowned *"architectural masterpiece"*.

Removal of Scaffolding before the 1991 LBRN is fully discharged is NOT recommended by experts!

Given the following has been explained, proven, and viscerally disliked by GCC DRS Feb 2016-Dec 2019, one would have thought Risk Analysis would have been provided for the GCC Councillors to assess as part of the CPO Review Process; again one has to surmise this is another example of a knowledge gap. So, for the benefit of GCC 2025 and its Councillors.

1) *March 2016, the legal consequences of GCC stepping in (attempted Jan-April 2016) and ignoring expert advice from GCC's specified Conservation Bond Architect. Will be updated for 2025.*
2) *Sept 2019, if GCC do step in, carry out works and recharge accordingly, GCC ranks behind the existing Standard Security holders who have primacy over USP's assets.*
3) *Nov 2019, repairs split clarification whether it be legally non-variable 1991 LBRN or a Defective Notice was provided to GCC; the Ground Floor has 100% Liability and Upper Floors ZERO liability.*
4) *Legally separate primacy over Upper Floor assets is held by various Standard Security holders.*
5) *All incremental value is in the separately owned Upper Floors.*

So, what's an example of this? GCC can step in and spend circa **£5M** (see Temp Works attached comparable to Defective Notice spec) and look to remove Scaffolding and recharge USP and then levy a property charge and then look to implement that charge and then look to take title (if the CPO Review process fails, and it will?). However, any recharge ranks behind the existing Standard Security holders of the USP-owned properties.

GCC is also then liable for all Public Safety, and it would cost an estimated **£25M** to discharge to repeat the legally non-variable LBRN. And the real kicker is the Ground Floor is only worth **£2M**. But the Upper Floors are then worth **£6M!!!** It's as bizarre as it is perplexing.

Hence why, several times, all on record, USI's Upper Floors surplus has been offered to be "loaned" to reduce the Ground Floor deficit. However, no one at GCC 2025 can **a)** recall this or **b)** wish to recall this, given it's all about performative actions founded upon opinion as opposed to FACTS and the LEGAL position. And a decade on, the Ground Floor properties could be worth **£12M+** certainly if Mackintosh-Thomson Mews comes to fruition and would be proven or otherwise by the envisaged since early 2023 Feasibility Study (then agreed with Savills-GCC and Ediston – yes, more than two years ago and somehow despite this GCC state an offer involving Ediston was turned down). **Hence the crucial importance of the pre-app process we believe can now be expedited via Savills, Shepherds, WRD, TMP-P&P**

And to repeat, **given the dire/parlous state of finances at Scot Govt/GCC the last thing anyone wants is public money to be spent and not recouped at all. I'm sure Councillors Kelly and Millar and now Councillor/Treasurer Bell will echo this. Especially as GCC would still have no ownership locus.**

7.10 The present situation differs from that scenario in that the property is co-owned by two linked companies. USP and USI have separate Deed of Conditions obligations that GCC mid-2008 agreed to, as well as separate development end uses and hence separate valuations (which were combined for the overall benefit of the scheme, the conservation of this Grade A architectural masterpiece and the wider regeneration of Union Street). Consistent bad faith from GCC and also HES caused that to be rescinded.

In relation to Egyptian Halls, the Council has been approached by an interested party who is neither an owner nor an occupier. To repeat and reinforce, the alleged "interested party" has not made any offer to purchase, informal or otherwise, nor was any "40-word proposal" rejected, nor did the "interested party" take up the offer to continue discussions. To repeat, did GCC really believe this was the case, as it suits their own narrative?

7.11 To ensure that there is a fair, open and transparent procedure before a decision is made to exercise CPO powers To date, markedly since 2013 and certainly since 2019 onwards, GCC has treated USP and USI very badly, rescinding income for public safety works and promoting falsehoods and misinformed opinions underpinned by the historic but known by some non-disclosure of contract breach that, if disclosed much earlier, could have seen the years 2000 and 2013 schemes funded.

and that in due course, there is full consideration of and compliance with the statutory tests for the disposal of land acquired by means of the exercise of CPO powers (s.191), The Publication of Intention (phase 2 of the CPO Framework) will take the form of an open call for proposals from any interested parties, including, but not limited to, the two owners of the property, who has approached the Council. All proposals received will be considered as part of the evaluation process (phase 3 of the CPO Framework).

Just one of the myriad material flaws in GCC's report is that it fails to reference that the two owners have separate valuations, based on very different end uses, and separate repair obligations (USP 100% and USI zero). Neither of the now acknowledged two separate owners will accept this not being recognised and will take legal action, if required, starting with this report as the mainspring for this activity. It is believed the "interested party" is now debarred from participating due to signal misrepresentation.

7.12 Other consequential amendments or amendments to the proposed back-to-back arrangements may be necessary or expedient to reflect the particular circumstances, and these would be reported to the committee as part of phase 4 of the CPO Framework process.

8.1 Should this report be approved, the Council will seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property. This will be appealed, given that GCC presented this to happen on Tuesday, 28th, yet did not provide a copy of the CPO report to their one-time "partners", the co-owners, or their Planning Agent, Savills, that was then briefed out to, unquestioning media

8.2 A fair, open and transparent process (to date, it has certainly not been open and transparent but certainly misinformed, inaccurate and biased, and in effect, **GCC is again being allowed to mark its own homework**) *which will allow full consideration of and compliance with the relevant statutory tests is proposed, seeking proposals which will then be evaluated using pre-approved evaluation criteria.*

Again, as stated originally (March 2025 onwards), this was not being practised fairly and evenly. However, since then and as of July-Sept 2025, we've been made aware of the following: "*DVS previously provided valuation advice to GCC with regard to the subjects in 2016 and 2019. An additional valuation, prepared for the Glasgow Building Preservation Trust (GBPT) in 2024, was facilitated by and shared with GCC.*

And given this very relevant information has now been disclosed, this claim that this *pre-approved evaluation criteria* is accurate, objective, fair, and transparent is now even more incredibly challenged. Whether it's been fabricated to underpin the narrative GCC had to develop to seek and gain approval from the relevant GCC Committee is now openly called to be reviewed and justified as follows:

District Valuers Reports 2016-2025 Aide Memoire

	2016	**2019**	**2024**	**2025**
Did the report use the relevant registered Deed of Conditions?	**Partially**	**No**	**No (99%)**	**No**
Did the report use the correct RVs?	**Yes**	**No**	**No**	**No**
Did the Report reference legally binding Conservation Burden	**No**	**No**	**No (99%)**	**No**
Was the aforementioned wrong, misformed, inaccurate?	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes (99%**	**Yes**
Was approval to merge the values of the Ground and Upper Floors agreed by SS holders prior to this being assumed	**No**	**No**	**No**	**No**
The requirement for Grant funding is reinforced Defined as integral by GCC/GCBPT/SCT	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**	**Yes**

Note USP and USI are denied all and any access to any funding despite the stated fact by GCC that the investors have "*invested significant expenditure on site development/acquisition/studies/reports".* A prime example of institutional bias, discrimination and unfair treatment. Surely also undemocratic!

Evidence of proven commercial non-viability is reinforced in all four of these reports. And for all four reports, it would also appear there's been a consistency of assessment, but key fundamentals have not been updated, e.g., Point 3.3 relevant to Deed of Conditions usage. And the following details the failure to adhere to the applicable Deed of Conditions

(Again, it ignores 29 years of non-viability, accelerating deterioration, GCC's CPO-defined Maintenance Failures, etc.) *The aim is to have the building repaired and brought back into use in a way that is consistent with planning policy and guidance and strategic objectives.* (Again, we must note GCC and GDA/HS have caused four approved applications to founder.

Also expert advice details the irreversible structural decline from Year 2000 to 2025. Yet GCC appears unable or unwilling to comprehend the reality of this. Also various heritage groups like Scottish Civic Trust think similarly. So in a nutshell, if the following fundamental is stated to be accurate, then it's about much, much more than repairing the façade? And if not, then 27 years of Reports and Studies are flawed; the impending Conditions Survey will begin to provide context to allow further objective assessment by conservation-accredited experts.

- ***How This Unique Structure has Worked for 150 Years. "The façade can't stand without the support of the floors, walls and stairs - not today's modern orthodoxy, but it works."*** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html***

- **Egyptian Halls Potential Progressive Collapse Scenario** ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html***

It is considered that a back-to-back agreement with a suitable party is the best way to achieve the desired aim. (Again, massively challenging to the nth degree, a back-to-back buyer will have to fund a **£25M+** deficit to discharge the legally non-variable 1991 LBRN, plus fund compensation for both Ground Floor and separately owned/valued Upper Floors and have a deliverable end use. And it won't be a hotel; that opportunity was spurned by GCC/Scot Govt 2010-2013. In addition the Upper Floors full commercial value requires to be paid separately) *subject to the case for use of CPO powers being fully assessed and authorised in due course.* Again, to repeat, a CPO of the Ground Floor properties would be appealed. A CPO of the Upper Floor property would also be appealed.

8.3 A development brief will be prepared and issued by the Council, or the Council's agents. Information relating to the condition of the building will be made available to interested parties. (If it is as inaccurate and misrepresentative as this CPO Review Report, it will be unworkable and undeliverable.) *The brief will seek interest in the* (co-owned) building, and *the proposals received will be evaluated within a framework which will include but not be limited to the following criteria:* Again, linked owners due to site assembly activities required to develop the project, GCC are also on record complimenting USP for this!

8.4 Following the conclusion of the proposal submission and evaluation process, and having identified a preferred development proposal, further committee authority will be sought to approve the preferred bidder and enter into a back-to-back agreement with them and to promote the CPO.

The expected outcome? There will not be a deliverable back-to-back buyer due to the scale of the 1991 LBRN discharge, which has to be funded by the Ground Floor properties. Plus significant Upper Floors valuation to be funded. In parallel, New Build Development options will be pursued by the Standard Security Holders for all separately owned and valued Ground and Upper Floor properties unless a funding package can be developed for a Conservation-centric scheme.

8.5 Should this process not identify a suitable development proposal the Council will review the situation.

This is the expected outcome, given there was no contractual congruence; therefore, there could not be an informal offer or otherwise, and it is very doubtful there has been an independent (and credible) valuation and there is incontrovertible proof the (sic) offer or otherwise **was not refused**.

In parallel, New Build Development options may have to be pursued by the Standard Security Holders for the separately owned and values Ground and Upper Floor properties unless a funding package can be developed for a conservation-centric scheme. Note that GCC even banned Derek Souter from contacting GCC despite many similar statements, e.g., ***"and it may be better – rather than returning to issues from the late 1990s – that the building owners join with us in a co-operative manner to ensure the preservation and regeneration of this historic building"*** *(GCC March 2018*). So how can GCC accuse USP and USI of non-engagement given the aforementioned?

And FEB 2020 HES stated, "*There are some complex issues around Egyptian Halls. Solving those issues will need some creative solutions.* ***It needs creative approaches to design and engineering, but also creative approaches to funding.*** *It also needs a commitment from all involved to continue to discuss and test a wide range of options."* "Greek" Thomson Symposium.

In marked contrast, this has always been on offer, as stated here: "***USP and USI offer GCC and HES private and confidential, without liability discussions to ensure the Egyptian Halls are preserved , returned to long-term commercial sustainability at the least cost to the public purse whilst delivering for long-term investors a commensurate return."***

9.0 *Next Steps – Develop evaluation criteria and a development brief and agree on a process for inviting parties to submit proposals.* For the record, USP and USI will be raising a complaint via GCC's internal review processes, SPSO and the Scottish Government, claiming abuse of powers and the shifting of blame for a 27-year delay from GCC (GDA-HS). In effect, GCC are marking their own homework. Added now will be the significant challenges regarding the integrity of an alleged "informal offer", which was in fact an embryonic, non-guaranteed profit share in return for full ownership of all Ground and Upper Floor titles.

Carry out a building survey (using statutory powers if necessary). USP and USI require sight of the brief for this to ensure proper processes will be in place. Also that a comprehensive

GCC believe the legally binding 2008 Conservation Bond can be ignored/discounted because the specified architect refuses to accede to GCC's entreaties/demands since 2013 to approve removal of the scaffolding if it's only the façade that's repaired. And GCC also can't rescind the Conservation Bond until it wins the CPO approval and appeal and gets title to the a) Ground Floor b) both Ground and Upper Floors. And it also needs in place all scheme funding and also for the two separate compensation claims? USP and USI believe the potential for a Dangerous Building confirmation is required. So is GCC potentially acting in a negligent manner by refusing to accept what the actual structural condition is? And it's 2nd Conditions Survey does not include comparable specialist testing similar to the recent WRD studies. So is at an obvious disadvantage should GCC begin to insist its 2025 Condition Survey

Access was granted, and all risks reconciled. GCC is also reminded that the 1991 LBRN is non variable and GCC recommended Repair Works have to be congruent with the LBRN primacy. And of course any GCC works would require to be assessed for efficacy (NB GCC's 1997 on-record structural assessment errors) . GCC still apparently cannot comprehend fully the interconnected elements combined and cannot be repaired in stages, e.g., façade repair would **NOT** see the Scaffolding removed. Again, this will involve TMP/WRD expert analysis/assessment. And if it's changed and this can be achieved, then the Scaffolding could be removed subject to specific Public Liability indemnities being in place.

GCC's Conditions Survey would also not owe USP or indeed USI a Duty of Care for any recommendations, e.g., that were then found to be impractical or cause permanent damage. WRD and TMP to repeat are on record stating the scaffolding cannot be removed until the LBRN works are discharged

Issue a development brief and supporting documents (these will need to be checked very carefully as currently it would appear GCC are unaware of a raft of germane issues including the legally non-variable obligations that have to be discharged as well as the actual reality of separate ownership) *with a timescale for submission and assessment of proposals.* Access to the building is allowed for GCC but will not be approved unilaterally for others and will be done so on a case-by-case basis.

Evaluate submitted proposals via agreed evaluation criteria. Prepare a report for the committee on the outcome of the process; assuming suitable proposals are received, this report would seek authority to approve (I) the selection of a preferred developer who would enter into a back-to-back agreement. (To repeat, the LBRN discharge scheme was to cost **£3M** in 1997; it is now nearer **£25M**-**£30M**, unless it's New Build) *and (ii) the promotion of a CPO.*

10.0 *Policy and Resource Implications*

Financial – There may be financial implications, but these will be considered at a later stage

A fundamentally most surprising non-assessment given the following! Estimated CPO Compensation before any Lands Tribunal hearing should be a Contingent Liability?

- A significant compensation **£??M**+ claim would be lodged for USP' Ground Floor properties, founded upon GCC's confirming USP had made a very significant expenditure and also admitting its CPO process could cause considerable delay, and it understood USP's frustration.

- A parallel compensation **£??M** claim for USI's Upper Floors founded upon on record significant surpluses as defined since 2008 by leading, independent Chartered Surveyors. Including the significant projected future development uplift

- Timescale-wise for 3 years, maybe 4 years; note it took from 1996 to 2010 for the original CPO! And GCC failed to deliver on this; instead, USP reconciled this, which GCC then acknowledged

What if GCC ignores expert advice from the Conservation Bond-specified architect that USP accepts? And then carries out repairs, e.g., Defective Notice? This should be a Contingent Liability?

GCC would require to reconcile financially the legal consequences of stepping in (attempted Jan-April 2016) and ignoring expert advice from GCC's specified Conservation Bond Architect. How does it reconcile this before it secures approval for, let's be clear, two separate CPOs, both of which would be appealed separately to the Court of Session?

GCC also cannot summarily rescind the 2008 Conservation Bond without justification. GCC believes it can, and it currently ignores the binding legal obligations and also moral obligations underpinning this legal document that GCC insisted was needed to be put in place.

GCC's Conditions Report is advisory, owes USP and USI no Duty of Care as neither commissioned it. USP and USI have onerous fiduciary duty obligations and have to adhere to expert advice. GCC's 2025 Conditions Report will, of course provide a form of "peer review" but it won't to the level of the detailed, rigorous reports by on file from Conservation-accredited structural engineers 2000 to 2024. ***http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2023.pdf***

A specific Risk Analysis could have been provided for the GCC Councillors to assess as part of the CPO Review Process; again, one has to surmise this is another example of a knowledge gap. Given March 2016 detailed legal letter stating GCC would then become 100% liable for all Public Safety issues. Still legally competent today but of course would be updated.

Recharging and Non Recovery Scenarios – Should be Assessed as Potential Contingent Liabilities?

One surmises GCC would certainly then seek to recharge for any such works, given this would be public money that has been spent. And here are the issues this brings for assessment prior to committing to such an open, non-costed series not approved by GCC's own specified architect. And again, the following has been placed on record to GCC DRS Feb 2016-Dec 2019

- Sept 2019- If GCC does step in, carry out works and recharge accordingly, GCC ranks behind the existing Standard Security holders who have primacy over USP's assets.

- This allows the SS holders 100% control to call up their respective loans and transfer the assets to a new or another company, e.g., USI Ltd. And GCC has ZERO locus over this but would be kept informed due to being an important creditor.

- Nov 2019: Repairs liability clarification was provided detailing USP is 100% liable and USI has a ZERO liability. whether it be legally non-variable 1991 LBRN or now the 2025 Defective Notice.

- Also, legally separate primacy over the USI owned Upper-Floor assets is held by various Standard Security holders. However, to repeat, the Upper Floors have no LBRN or repair liability.

- There is an overfocus on ownership, and somehow the primacy of the standard security holders of the separate properties is either not comprehended or underassessed.

So, what's an example of this? GCC can step in spend circa **£5M** or **£10M** or even **£15M** (see Temp Works Sept 2022 submission from TMP) and look to remove Scaffolding, create a massive Public Safety liability and also recharge USP and then look to implement that charge. But GCC then ranks behind the existing Standard Security holders of the USP-owned properties.

However, maybe there's a knowledge gap here also. GCC always would have been a secondary creditor and rank behind the existing Standard Security holders who have primacy over USP's assets (2008 it was DBS and 2015 onwards, core investors). And separately, primacy over the USI-owned Upper Floor assets is held by various Standard Security holders; however, the Upper Floors have no LBRN or repair liability.

GCC is also then to repeat liable for all Public Safety consequences. And it would cost an estimated **£25M** to discharge to repeat the legally non-variable LBRN.

And the real kicker is the Ground Floor is only worth **£2M**. But the Upper Floors are then worth **£6M!!!** and title deeds to all Ground Floor properties could then be transferred to USI Ltd. Absolutely perplexing to the nth degree to keen observers of this long, very long-running farrago! However, if Mackintosh-Thomson Mews came to fruition, the Ground Floor **£2M** could become **£12M**+ after 10 years! Which, if pragmatically evaluated along with what USP and USI can offer, begins to provide a foundation to overcome a deficit that just increases year on year. What would it be in 3 or 4 years apart from a lot more than it is currently? And no one can afford that – not USP, not USI, not GCC, nor the Scottish Government. But if the major stakeholders would only collaborate openly, then this can be reconciled before the end of 2025 with no legal activity required.

Can GCC afford £Millions and potentially not recover this sum? Potential, impending use of scarce Capital Resources should be carefully reviewed.

Now USP and USI have managed to get a proposal submitted, can I suggest GCC and the Standard Security holders for the separate Ground Floor and Upper Floor properties should combine and assess the following objectively given GCC is on record as follows from the CPO Review report *4.1 Glasgow City Council has no intended use for the building and is not in a financial position to make a voluntary acquisition at this time.*

And GCC, for the record, does not own any part of the Ground Floor, or the separate Upper Floors and has not invested any £££ in the project. And as you know, USP and USI would welcome the removal of the Scaffold in a heartbeat but cannot be due to causal public safety/non-viability – apart from New Build despite this costing circa £800k last 15 years and is close to being unable to fund the Scaffolding, which if removed would make it a Dangerous Building, which GCC has been asked to assess since Nov 2024. GCC may or may not be assessing whether it should step in and implement the March 2025 Defective Notice, which USP and, if required, USI would appeal this based on a very strong, stateable case founded upon structural unknowns/known issues and causal public safety issues.

Given GCC has confirmed it's to step in and implement the March 2025 Defective Notice.

10 Policy and Resource Implications:	
Financial:	***There may be financial implications, but these will be considered at a later stage.***

Can I suggest it's time to assess all Scenarios? Given GCC's 2025 DV Report estimates this at **£250k**? For comparison the attached from Aug 2022 has this at **£4.2M** – perhaps now **£6M** (which GCC was provided with Sept 2022 but appears to have not been passed to Mr Barlow?)

Given GCC as above ***is not in a financial position to make a voluntary acquisition at this time***. Given GCC Building Control has indicated it is preparing to step in and implement the March 2025 Defective Notice and is to cost/scope this for what one assumes is approval before end of 2025 and delivery by July 2026. Ands hence why I've copied in the key Regeneration biased Councillors; Kelly and Millar but also GCC's Treasurer Councillor Bell to make them aware of the potential for non-recovery of what are very scarce GCC resources indeed.

And we do understand and agree whatever can be done, should be done prior to the 2026 Commonwealth Games. However back to Recharging Scenarios, which were referenced earlier this year Ms MacDonald/ Mr Gillespie have been provided the financials that prove the scale of the investment by the core investors 1998 onwards, hence the following safeguards are in place.

Core Investors safeguards

- **The core investors are protected by the separate Standard Securities held for the Ground Floor Properties and also separate Upper Floor properties.**

- USP has granted primary Standard Securities x 3 x **£6M** = **£18M** since Oct 2018 and when 8 years is factored in at 10% interest = **£38M**

- USP has also granted USI a second Standard security and at 13 years at 10% interest = **£6M**

- USI has granted joint and several primary Standard Securities to the three investors and associated business since 2012 and at 10% interest = **£9M**

GCC raise a Joint and Several Claim against USP and USI

- So, on a joint and several basis meaning USP and USI combined it's circa **£54M** plus circa **£1.5M** of WIP/ Creditors = **£55.5M**

- However, As GCC has been informed since 2019 as per 2003 Legislation (see attached) it would rank behind the existing Standard Security holders if it stepped in and spent say **£1M**, **£5M, £10M** or even **£15M** on works

- So how does GCC recoup any sums expended? And let's conjecture its **£2.5M**, **£5M** or **£10M** or **£15M** which when added to the **£55.5M,** this would see GCC holds **3.5%, 7 %, 14%** or **21% of the creditor votes of £70.5M**.

- **Now GCC could look to wind up USP and/or USI? But the debt split £ for £** then affords the SS holders/debtors **79%+** of voting rights and the flexibility to implement or agree a phased sale/lease/ JV.

GCC can only raise a claim against USP, which is 100% liable for Repairs (Not USI has it has a ZERO liability)

- USP Standard Security cover is then circa **£46.5M** and if GCC stepped in and spent **£2.5M (6%) £5M (12 %)** or **£10M (18%)** or **£15M (24%)** it still leaves the combined SS holders and debtors with in excess of 75%

- And as the super majority shareholders the core investors can facilitate transfer of the USP assets to another company (USI-single title) or the EHBPT Ltd Trust

- And as you know we're on record as stating this should not happen and cannot happen given the unrelenting and increasing budget pressures on GCC. However, on the other hand the core investors have the right to a commensurate return for their now 27-year investment, which of course GCC has acknowledged as per ***"committed a significant expenditure"***

- We all agree something needs to be done. And surely, we can all combine to achieve something tangible for the 2026 Commonwealth Games

- If Scaffolding could be removed without any public safety risks, then Ground Floor Rents would double; this income would become available for project development working capital!

Summary

- **We believe key Councillors should be cognisant of this. And the reality is scarce funding would not be put to the best use.**

- **And the fact there's more than one measured way for this to be reconciled well before the 2026 Commonwealth Games given the willingness by the core investors to agree this?**

- **And of course, this would negate the need for a 2nd CPO reconciling what Councillor Kelly has defined as *a complex process and there's no timeline for when it might be concluded***

- **But if GCC is not interested, then events will develop and take their course.**

SAVE THE EGYPTIAN HALLS PETITION

Facebook – 4,125

On Line Petition- 2,022

Street Petition – 1,471

Misc Emails – 391

Total = 8,009

3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - DOWNLOADS

The Big Game Changer- Mackintosh-Thomson Mews Concept:

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page4.html Mackintosh-Thomson Mews + Golden Z + Avenues + Frasers = the equal of or better than St Christopher. ***https://www.stchristophersplace.com/*** which takes one from Marylebone to Regent Street and back. Glasgow can deliver better than this.

CPO Review Request Key Evidence- Downloads:

How Defeat was snatched from the Jaws of Victory - STV 2001
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page13.html

FEB 2024 - GCC's misrepresentation to Provost, Scotland's FM, USP, key stakeholders 1999- 2024
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/CPO Title Transfer Delay-Inadvertent Misrepresentation Document.pdf

AUG 2023 - Egyptian Halls Slicing the Gordian Knot
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/SlicingTheGordianKnot.pdf

JUNE 2023 What caused the Year 2000 Scheme to Founder?
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/What Caused The Brilliant Feasible Year 2000 Scheme To Founder.pdf

MARCH 2023 - How a barrier to regeneration was created inadvertently
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/How A Barrier Was Created Inadvertently.pdf

AUG 2022 - HES Request for Accountability
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/HES-Accountability-Appendices.pdf

SEPT 2019 - Why did the 1996 Egyptian Halls CPO fail? Briefing to SPICE- Scottish Parliament
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/1609-2019 UPDATED Egyptian Halls CPO Briefing Note.pdf

SEPT 2019 - Why has GCC's CPO Amendment Claim "*it will only delay your scheme by a few months*" become 312+ months and MANY times the original £3M cost?
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/2409-2019-GCC's Feb 1998 CPO Amendment will cause a 300+ month delay-WHY!.pdf

NOV 2018 - History of Non-Viability Development caused by GDA, HS, GCC, assisted by Scot Govt.
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0811-2018 The Egyptian Halls Non Viability Confirmation 1996-2018.pdf

NOV 2018 - Missed Opportunities caused by GDA, HS, GCC assisted by Scot Govt
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/0511-2018 Historic Marketing and Missed Opportunities Summary 1996-2018.pdf

JAN 2024 – Detailed evidence of attempted engagement and avoidance of difficult decisions
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/ProductiveProblematicNowHopefullyProductiveDiscussions.pdf

JAN 2024- Correspondence detailing attempted engagement and avoidance of difficult decisions
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/EgyptianHallsSpineTimelineofCorrespondence.pdf

JAN 2024- Expert studies by Conservation accredited Structural Engineers/specified architect
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2019-2023.pdf

MARCH 2024 Spine line of key documents detailing errors, mistakes, misrepresentation and
http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Key Documents-Deed of Conditions Summary.pdf

Structural Updates:

How This Unique Structure has Worked for 150 Years. "The façade can't stand without the support of the floors, walls and stairs - not today's modern orthodoxy but it works."

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page17.html

Deterioration Timeline 1980-2022

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/Deterioration Timeline 1980-Oct 2022.pdf

LBRN Discharge Visual Aide Memoire

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/E-Halls LBRN Repairs Aide Memoire-June2023.pdf

Egyptian Halls Potential Progressive Collapse Scenario

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/StructuralMovie.html

Conservation Bond specified architect's expert advice-ignored by GCC

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Approved Building & Building Work 1998-2019.pdf

Structural Reports:

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2018.pdf

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2019-2023.pdf

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Egyptian Halls Structural Survey Glossary Year 2000-2023.pdf

Buildings at Risk Register:

https://www.buildingsatrisk.org.uk/search/keyword/Egyptian%20Halls,%20Glasgow/event_id/892661/building_name/egyptian-halls-84-100-union-street-glasgow

Save The Egyptian Halls Petition:

http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/E-HALLS 8000+ Petition SUMMARY 2011.pdf

Media Coverage:

- **Extensive Media Coverage 1998-2023**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/Extensive-Media-Coverage-1998-2023.pdf
- **Nineveh on the Clyde 1999**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page12.html
- **Thomson – Glasgow's Master Builder-BBC 2017**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/page11.html
- **Professor Gavin Stamp's Piloti Files**
  http://www.egyptianhalls.co.uk/assets/files/The%20Piloti%20Files%202000-2019.pdf

4. GCC CPO Review Report

Item 3

6th February 2025

Glasgow City Council

Contracts & Property Committee

Report by George Gillespie, Executive Director of Neighbourhoods, Regeneration and Sustainability

Contact: Mandy MacDonald Ext: 78503

AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE THE USE OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE POWERS (CPO) AND TO SEEK A DEVELOPMENT PROPOSAL FOR EGYPTIAN HALLS

Purpose of Report:

To seek committee authority to investigate the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls), including approval to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property, and devise an appropriate bid process including selection and evaluation criteria to assess proposals.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that Members:

(i) Consider the contents of the report.
(ii) Approve the investigation of the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls) including approval to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property.
(iii) Authorizes the Executive Director of Neighborhoods, Regeneration and Sustainability in consultation with the Director of Legal and Administration to approve a development brief and selection and evaluation criteria for the development proposals, including departures from the relevant CPO Framework where necessary or expedient, with the recommended proposal being reported to a further committee for approval.
(iv) Authorise officers to appoint agents to act on the Council's behalf, if required.

Ward No(s): 10 Anderston/City/Yorkhill Citywide:

Local member(s)advised: Yes ☐ consulted: Yes ☐ No ☐

1.0 Introduction

1.1 This report seeks committee authority to investigate the requirement for the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls). This will include the development of an open, fair and transparent process, aligned with statutory tests, with which to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property.

1.2 The Council has a Framework for the Use of Compulsory Purchase Powers under the Town and Country Planning (S) Act (CPO Framework) which sets out the process for making CPOs and entering into back to back agreements with developers. Back to back agreements regulate the transfer of the acquired land to the developer. This process is typically triggered by an approach from a developer. That situation has arisen in relation to Egyptian Halls. The report sets out the Council's intended response, and the changes to the process set out in the CPO Framework proposed to be adopted on this occasion to reflect the differences in the current circumstances from those envisaged in the CPO Framework.

1.3 This report does not seek authority to promote a CPO at the current time.

2.0 Background

2.1 Egyptian Halls is a category A-listed building located at a key arrival gateway to the city centre from Central Station on Union Street, within Glasgow Central Conservation Area. The building is in private ownership. The building has been vacant and derelict (at upper floors) for over 30 years and has featured on the national Buildings at Risk Register since its inception in 1990. Scaffolding has been in place for 15 years, but is not being used to facilitate repairs, conversion or maintenance. There has been widespread concern from neighbouring proprietors, heritage bodies and the wider public regarding the deterioration of the building over many years, the presence of the scaffolding and the consequent adverse impact on the environment of Union Street. (Steps are being considered separately to facilitate the removal of the scaffolding – see section 3.4.4 and 3.5 below).

2.2 The condition of the property has deteriorated in recent years and there does not appear to be a viable scheme being developed or proposed by the current owners, and without intervention, there is an increased risk of significant failure in the fabric of the building.

2.3 It is important to take steps to secure the future of this A-listed building as it is widely regarded as the masterpiece of Alexander Thomson's architectural legacy within the city. Thomson was an extremely important and influential architect whose pioneering approach to design and structural innovation has been praised and celebrated internationally since he began designing buildings in the mid-19th century. Thomson's designs were largely confined to Glasgow and many of those properties have now been demolished, damaged or lost to bombing in the Second World War. Egyptian Halls is one of the very few large-scale, commercial buildings that he designed which survives. It is a unique

architectural and historic asset within Glasgow and repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the building is a priority for the Council.

2.4 The City Development Plan and the City Centre Strategic Development Framework both prioritise and encourage retention of historic assets. The Central District Regeneration Framework and its Action Plan identify the Egyptian Halls as a 'high profile, architecturally significant Building at Risk that must be prioritised to find a sustainable long-term use that respects (these) important buildings'. The Action Plan supports early focus on the Egyptian Halls as a building at risk as an "Immediate Action". Proposed action identified within the Action Plan includes approaching owners to evaluate potential to support and advise. As discussed below at 3.3 prolonged engagement by officers with the current owners, in line with the Action Plan, has not resolved the issues or brought about meaningful progress.

3.0 Current situation

3.1 Ownership

3.1.1. The property address is 84 – 100 Union Street.

3.1.2. The ground and basement floors, known as 84, 88, 96 and 100 Union Street are owned by UNION STREET PROPERTIES LIMITED (SC186601) Registered Office Whitehall House, 33 Yeaman Shore, Dundee, DD1 4BJ.

3.1.3. The upper floors are entered from the close numbered 92 Union Street and are owned by UNION STREET INVESTMENTS LTD (SC353348) Registered Office – Whitehall House, 33 Yeaman Shore, Dundee.

3.1.4. Both companies are owned by the same parties.

3.1.5. The ground floor shops are partly occupied by tenants which include a phone shop, a motorbike shop and a vape shop. The upper floors are not occupied. The Council will investigate ways to support the relocation of the current tenants if the use of compulsory purchase powers is authorised in due course.

3.2 Previous CPO

3.2.1. The property has been the subject of a previous back to back CPO. The City of Glasgow District Council made a CPO in March 1996 at the request of a consortium of owners in the building, The CPO was confirmed by the Secretary of State for Scotland on 23rd May 1996.

3.2.2. Notice of Confirmation and then Notices to Treat and Notices of Entry were served in January 1998 at the request of the consortium. However, title was not taken at that time.

3.2.3. In late 1999 the consortium of owners invited the Council to begin discussions with Union Street Properties Limited (USP) and a connected

company, Union Street Developments Limited (USD). This resulted in a back to back agreement with USD in 2002 which restated and amended the original agreement with the consortium.

3.2.4. During 1998, and 1999 USP purchased 84, 88 and 98 Union Street, and completed their purchase of the remaining interests in the property in 2004. The upper floors of the property were transferred to Union Street Investments Limited in 2009.

3.2.5. The whole of the property has been in the ownership of one or other of the linked 'Union Street' companies since 2004.

3.3 Planning History

3.3.1. The current owners gained consent for repair schemes during the early to mid-2000s, had a demolition application refused in 2011 and thereafter gained planning permission and listed building consent for a hotel scheme in 2012. None of the consented schemes have been delivered and there are no extant permissions in place.

3.3.2. The Planning Service and Building Standards Service have been engaged in discussions regarding the condition of the building and its potential re-use for over three decades (including discussions with previous owners). As stated, the current owners have had control of the entire property for approximately twenty years, and based on that history it would appear they are unable to progress with any scheme for bringing the whole of the building back into use.

3.3.3. No applications for planning permission for reuse have been submitted by the current owners since the 2012 consented scheme. Correspondence received from the owners over the last five years repeatedly indicates that scheme proposals will be submitted for discussion, but no deliverable or realistic proposals have been received.

3.4 Building condition

3.4.1. A report by the structural engineers employed by the building owners (July 2024), notes the continuing decline in the condition of the building. It notes that since the engineers' involvement from 2019, although there have not been any drastic changes, there has been an ongoing incremental decline, and the risk of a significant failure will only increase without appropriate intervention.

3.4.2. A recent inspection of the property by Building Standards in December 2024 concurs with that position. Whilst the roof covering appears to be preventing water ingress, the building remains open to environmental conditions. The upper storeys remain in an entirely unoccupiable state and it is clear that the continued decline in the overall building fabric will continue through a prolonged lack of occupation and ongoing maintenance.

3.4.3. There is notable ongoing concern for areas of the front façade, in particular the front parapet wall and cornice. This has significant historic movement with an uncapped wallhead and stone joints exposed to continual water ingress. Without intervention it will lead to the type of significant failure noted in the engineer's report. Timber packing to historical temporary supports installed on the rear wall are also showing signs of significant rot.

3.4.4. In order to prevent a significant deterioration occurring which would result in an immediate public safety issue, a defective building notice using Building Standards powers is being served on the owners to address the condition of the façade and parapet wall. Once repairs are actioned by the owners, or the Council, if necessary, further action will be considered and taken as appropriate to secure the removal of the scaffolding. However, a sustainable long term solution is required for the building and if this report is approved, officers will seek proposals and investigate the use of CPO powers to facilitate this.

3.5 Advertisement on the scaffolding

3.5.1. Advertising Consent was initially granted on a temporary basis for one year in 2000 which expired without being implemented. A later Advertising Consent was granted on 22 July 2008 (reference 08/1320/DC). However, scaffolding was not erected until 2009. The consent allowed for the erection of a shroud/banner image of the Egyptian Halls on the scaffolding and for an advertisement hoarding facing Union Street while approved works to the building were being carried out. No approved works were ever carried out.

3.5.2. Despite this, unauthorised large-scale advertisements continued to be displayed on the scaffolding structure, prompting a series of enforcement actions by the Council's Planning Enforcement team. Action included the Council seeking an interdict at the Court of Session to prevent further unauthorised advertising on the scaffolding surrounding the listed building. An out-of-court agreement was reached, leading to the cessation of further banner advertisements on the scaffolding.

3.5.3. As part of the resolution, the owners of the Egyptian Halls gave a formal undertaking to the court not to cause, undertake, or permit any advertisements on the scaffolding without prior consent from the Council. The court's formalisation of the undertaking ensures compliance. This long-running process has ultimately achieved the Council's aim of prohibiting inappropriate large-scale advertising that detracts from the visual amenity of the conservation area. Since the agreement, no further banner advertisements have been displayed on the scaffolding.

4.0 Voluntary Acquisition by Council

4.1 Glasgow City Council has no intended use for the building and is not in a financial position to make a voluntary acquisition at this time.

5.0 Current Proposal

5.1 The Council has been approached by an interested party which wishes to acquire the Egyptian Halls building with the intention of delivering a mixed-use repurposing proposal. At this point, this proposal is at an early stage and is considered to be commercially sensitive. However, plans would comprise a new food/restaurant market development on lower floors with a hotel on upper floors. The proposed scheme would retain the existing building and would include a modest extension to the roof to create additional floor space. Early review suggests that this proposal could be acceptable in principle in Planning terms.

5.2 The proposal would also require to be assessed against the evaluation criteria to be developed in accordance with section 8 below.

5.3 The Council understands an informal offer to purchase the building was made by this interested party at a figure in excess of an independent valuation, but this was not progressed by the owners.

6.0 Planning Policy

6.1 It is considered necessary for the proper planning of the area that the property is returned to active use and repurposed to align with the City Development Plan's aspirations to repair, restore and enhance historic assets, improve the amenity of the Central Conservation Area and boost the vibrancy and economic competitiveness of the City Centre. The overall aim is to regenerate the building and by doing so, improve and enhance the area surrounding it and the Union Street entrance at Central Station.

6.2 Bringing this deteriorating building at risk back into productive economic and sustainable re-use aligns further with key policy objectives in National Planning Framework 4 (Policy 1 and 2) for tackling the climate and nature crises, climate mitigation and adaptation and (Policy 7) the re-use of existing buildings and historic assets.

6.3 The Glasgow City Development Plan 2017 (CDP) contains a suite of policies that will be used in the assessment of development proposals and identifies two overarching key aims for the City: creating and maintaining a high quality, healthy place, and developing a compact city form that supports sustainable development. To help deliver these aims, the CDP sets out a strategy that seeks to deliver on four strategic outcomes:

- a vibrant place with a growing economy
- a thriving and sustainable place to live and work
- a connected place to move around and do business in, and
- a green place

These outcomes create the rationale for the CDP's policies and proposals.

6.4 An overarching policy, Policy CDP 1: The Placemaking Principle, will be applied to all development proposals throughout the City and is underpinned by a design-led approach to planning.

6.5 The Council will continue to focus on the regeneration and redevelopment of the existing urban area to create a sustainable City. Experience has shown that efforts to address the City's physical legacy and improve the environment have been successful where they have sought to address, not only appearance and context, but the full range of benefits and opportunities that new development can generate in terms of how people interact with and benefit from their environment. Of particular relevance, good placemaking can have a major influence upon the sustainable economic growth of an area.

6.6 Policy CDP2: Sustainable Spatial Strategy aims to influence the location and form of development to create a 'compact city' form which supports sustainable development. This policy provides a spatial representation of the CDP's strategy through Spatial Supplementary Guidance which includes Strategic Development Frameworks (SDF's).

6.7 Of relevance is the City Centre Strategic Development Framework (CCSDF). This supports a vibrant, attractive centre driving a growing economy which includes repopulating the centre, ensuring a mix of uses and round the clock activity, whilst improving the quality of the urban environment to help attract more residents, businesses and visitors.

6.8 The CCSDF provides a framework for strategic interventions for the city centre and was adopted as Supplementary Guidance to the CDP in May 2021. Priority 1 of the CCSDF prioritises actions which accelerate transformation of the urban environment to ensure climate resilience, improved liveability and place quality. Priority 2 of the CCSDF prioritises actions to increase activity and diversity in the city centre to support its continued prosperity at the heart of the city-region and as a key contributor to the national economy. Re-use of this important asset would transform the urban environment by creating a vibrant asset where currently there is dereliction, improve climate resilience by reusing an existing asset, and improve liveability and place quality by enhancing the amenity of the Glasgow Central Conservation Area. The reuse of the building would also bring activity and vibrancy to this part of the city centre and therefore improve the prosperity of the city.

6.9 The Council's recent *Vision and Plan for the Golden Z* (approved 2023), identifies the current state of Egyptian Halls building as being a contributing factor in the degradation of the surrounding street.

6.10 In addition, the City Centre Strategy and Central District Regeneration Framework both promote the repair and repurposing of heritage assets and seek to reinforce the distinctive character and identity of the Central District of the city centre. The Central District Regeneration Framework's key objectives include to retain and improve the competitive edge of Glasgow city centre, repopulate the centre and increase city density and function mix, create more attractive and remarkable spaces, create a seamless transition from a daytime

to night-time economy – vibrant, safe, family friendly. The repair and reuse of Egyptian Halls will create vibrancy, improve safety and provide a more attractive place within Union Street and the city centre.

6.11 Proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property will be assessed against the above policies and guidance, along with the other relevant policies of the CDP, having regard to the aforementioned strategies and frameworks.

6.12 As discussed at 6.10 above, the Central District Regeneration Framework and its Action Plan identify the Egyptian Halls as requiring action as a priority.

6.13 Links to a selection of plans and strategies are available in Appendix 1

7.0 CPO Powers and GCC CPO Framework

7.1 The Council has powers under the Town and Country Planning (S) Act 1997 (the 1997 Act) to make a compulsory purchase order.

7.2 Section 189 states*: -*
(1) A local authority shall, on being authorised to do so by the Scottish Ministers, have power to acquire compulsorily any land in their area which:
(a) is suitable for and is required in order to secure the carrying out of development, redevelopment or improvement;
(b) is required for a purpose which it is necessary to achieve in the interests of the proper planning of an area in which the land is situated.

7.3 Section 189 (2) further provides that:-
A local authority and the Scottish Ministers in considering for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) whether land is suitable for development, redevelopment or improvement shall have regard to: -
(a) the provisions of the development plan, so far as material,
(b) whether planning permission for any development on the land is in force, and
(c) any other considerations which would be material for the purpose of determining an application for planning permission for development on the land.

7.4 Land which is acquired using the powers in the 1997 Act can be transferred to a third party for development (in terms of s.191), subject to various tests being satisfied.

7.5 The Council developed a CPO Framework for what are known as 'agency' or ‘back to back’ CPOs in response to the court cases arising out of the redevelopment of Buchanan Street in the late 1990s/early 2000s. (Report to Development and Regeneration Services Committee 26.10.2000)

7.6 That CPO Framework sets out the circumstances in which the Council would consider using CPO powers under the 1997 Act. In accordance with the CPO Framework, officers have considered the current condition and use of the property, its planning history, and the approach made by an interested party,

and are of the view that, in broad terms, the acquisition of the land is reasonably necessary for planning purposes and compelling benefits are likely to be delivered as a result of the repair, repurposing and re-use of the building, such that the use of CPO powers should be investigated.

7.7 There are 4 phases set out in the CPO Framework.

Consideration – as to whether the acquisition of the land using CPO powers is reasonably necessary for planning purposes; this is usually triggered by an approach from a developer.

Publication of Intention – following committee authority for officers to investigate the use of CPO powers, to issue an invitation to all owners and occupiers of the site to submit proposals for consideration.

Evaluation of Proposals Submitted

Conclusion – following detailed evaluation of proposals, a further report is submitted to committee recommending which, if any, of the proposals submitted should be supported. The report will seek authority to enter into a back to back agreement with the preferred developer which will include obligations to have planning permission in place; to demonstrate reasonable attempts at voluntary acquisition; and an undertaking to meet all of the Council's costs including compensation payable as a consequence of the CPO.

7.8 In the typical situation, the Council will have been approached by a developer who is trying to assemble a site. The developer will usually either own part of the site or will have options to acquire it. They will have been unable to conclude voluntary negotiations to buy the rest of the site and will be requesting that the Council exercise CPO powers on their behalf to complete the site assembly.

7.9 Phase 2 of the CPO Framework process would involve the Council asking for all owners and occupiers of the site to submit proposals to the council.

7.10 The present situation differs from that scenario in that the property is owned by two linked companies. In relation to Egyptian Halls, the Council has been approached by an interested party who is neither an owner nor an occupier.

7.11 To ensure that there is a fair, open and transparent procedure before a decision is made to exercise CPO powers and that, in due course, there is full consideration of and compliance with the statutory tests for the disposal of land acquired by means of the exercise of CPO powers (s.191), the procedure in the CPO Framework will be amended on this occasion, as follows: -

7.11.1. The Publication of Intention (phase 2 of the CPO Framework) will take the form of an open call for proposals from any interested parties, including, but not limited to, the two owners of the property, the tenants and the interested party who has approached the Council. All proposals received will be considered as part of the evaluation process (phase 3 of the CPO Framework).

It may be necessary to amend or expand the broad evaluation criteria set out in the CPO Framework to include other appropriate criteria reflecting the nature of the building. In particular, the evaluation criterion within the CPO Framework relating to ownership/attempts to negotiate purchase, may be modified or disapplied. The evaluation criteria will be approved by the Director of NRS in consultation with the Director of Legal and Administration to achieve best terms in accordance with s.191 of the 1997 Act.

7.12 Other consequential amendments or amendments to the proposed back to back arrangements may be necessary or expedient to reflect the particular circumstances, and these would be reported to committee as part of phase 4 of the CPO Framework process.

8.0 Seeking and Evaluating Proposals

8.1 Should this report be approved, the Council will seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property.

8.2 A fair, open and transparent process, which will allow full consideration of and compliance with the relevant statutory tests, is proposed seeking proposals which will then be evaluated using pre-approved evaluation criteria. The aim is to have the building repaired and brought back into use in a way that is consistent with planning policy and guidance and strategic objectives. It is considered that a back-to-back agreement with a suitable party is the best way to achieve the desired aim, subject to the case for use of CPO powers being fully assessed and authorised in due course.

8.3 A development brief will be prepared and issued by the Council, or the Council's agents. Information relating to the condition of the building will be made available to interested parties. The brief will seek interest in the building and the proposals received will be evaluated within a framework which will include but not be limited to the following criteria:

- Retention and use of the building, including alignment with heritage status and design parameters
- Previous experience of developments of this type
- Timeframe and deliverability for development
- Funding

8.4 Following conclusion of the proposal submission and evaluation process, and having identified a preferred development proposal, a further committee authority will be sought to approve the preferred bidder and enter into a back-to-back agreement with them and to promote the CPO.

8.5 Should this process not identify a suitable development proposal the Council will review the situation.

9.0 Next Steps

(i) Develop evaluation criteria and a development brief, and agree a process for inviting parties to submit proposals.
(ii) Carry out a building survey (using statutory powers if necessary).
(iii) Issue a development brief and supporting documents with timescale for submission and assessment of proposals.
(iv) Evaluate submitted proposals via agreed evaluation criteria.
(v) Prepare a report for committee on the outcome of the process; assuming suitable proposals are received, this report would seek authority to approve (i) the selection of a preferred developer who would enter into a back-to-back agreement, and (ii) the promotion of a CPO.

10 Policy and Resource Implications

Resource Implications:

Financial:	There may be financial implications, but these will be considered at a later stage.
Legal:	All transactions will be subject to review and conclusion by Glasgow City Council's Corporate and Property Law section and any external resources they may require.
Personnel:	No anticipated impact on personnel
Procurement:	The proposals as currently anticipated would not give rise to relevant procurement issues. This will be kept under review at later stages.

Equality and Socio-Economic Impacts:

Does the proposal support the Council's Equality Outcomes 2021-25? Please specify.	In preparing any future report for committee, the proposals will be assessed against the Council's Equality Outcomes and its statutory obligations
What are the potential equality impacts as a result of this report?	No significant impact at this stage but to be re-considered and assessed as appropriate in due course including by reference to specific proposals once developed.
Please highlight if the policy/proposal will help address socio-	N/A at this stage but to be re-considered and assessed as appropriate in due course including by reference to specific proposals once developed.

economic disadvantage.

Climate Impacts:

Does the proposal support any Climate Plan actions? Please specify:	An assessment will be carried out once proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property have been received
What are the potential climate impacts as a result of this proposal?	An assessment will be carried out once proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property have been received
Will the proposal contribute to Glasgow's net zero carbon target?	To be assessed and reported on at a later stage.

Privacy and Data Protection Impacts: None

11.0 Recommendations

11.1 It is recommended that Members:

(i) Consider the contents of the report;
(ii) Approve the investigation of the use of CPO powers in respect of the property at 84-100 Union Street (Egyptian Halls) including approval to seek proposals for the repair, repurposing and future active reuse of the property.
(iii) Authorises the Executive Director of Neighbourhoods, Regeneration and Sustainability in consultation with the Director of Legal and Administration to approve a development brief and selection and evaluation criteria for the development proposals including departures from the relevant CPO Framework where necessary or expedient: with the recommended proposal being reported to a further committee for approval.
(iv) Authorise officers to appoint agents to act on the Council's behalf, if required.

Appendix 1

Document links:

Acronym	Document Link	Date Published
CCS 24-30	City Centre Strategy	Apr 2024
CDRF	Central District Regeneration Framework	May 2019
Golden Z	*Vision and Plan for the Golden Z*	2023
NPF4	National Planning Framework 4	Feb 2023
CDP	City Development Plan	Mar 2017
CCSDF	City Centre Strategic Development Framework	Adopted May 2021
SG1	Supplementary Guidance 1: Placemaking Part 1 Placemaking Part 2	June 2018
CCAMP	Central Conservation Area Management Plan	Mar 2012
CPO Framework	GCC Framework for the Use of Compulsory Purchase Powers under the Town and County Planning (S) Act	2000 (no link available pre-digitisation)
TCP	Town and Country Planning (S) Act 1997	1997